South Valley University

Pragmatics

Fourth Year English Majors

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Chapter one: Politeness

Link to video:

https://study.com/academy/lesson/what-is-pragmatics-definition-examples.html



Politeness: Strategies, Principles and Theories:
Theoretical Perspective

It is likely for us to deal with politeness as a constant notion, as in the notion of polite societal conduct, inside a society. It is additionally viable to identify a group of one-of-a-kind typical standards due to behaving politely in social interplay inside a certain society. Several of these may encompass behaving tactfully, generously, modestly, and sympathetically towards the others. Nevertheless, inside a communication, there will be an extra scarcely special kind of politeness

at function. If we want to illustrate it, we require the face notion (Yule, 1996: 60).

As a scientific expression, face signifies the communal individual's self-image. It points to that self moving and communal sense that everybody owns and anticipates others to be familiar with. Politeness in a communication is defined as the way utilized to confirm consciousness of the face of another individual. By this, politeness is likely to be achieved in conditions of social remoteness or nearness. Showing consciousness for the face of other individual whilst that individual looks socially remote is frequently illustrated in terms of high opinion or esteem. Showing the corresponding consciousness while the other individual is socially near is frequently illustrated with respect to openness, companionship, or harmony. Type one is seen in a question posed by a student to the teacher, as shown in [a], and type two in the question posed by a friend to the similar person, as shown in [b] (Ibid).

a. Excuse me, Mr. Ali, but can I talk to you for a minute?
b. Hey, Ahmed, got a minute?

It is understood from this kind of attitude that there are various sorts of politeness related to and linguistically manifested the supposition of comparative social remoteness or nearness. In nearly all contexts of English dialogues, the contributors in a communication frequently must decide, when they converse, the comparative social remoteness between them, & thus their face needs (Manurung et al., 2015: 2).

Subsequently, the action of face saving directed to the negative face of a person shall have a tendency to exhibit respect, stress the significance of the time of the other person or his/her concerns, and encompass as well an apology for the annoyance or break, which is additionally named negative politeness. The action of face saving worried with the individual's high quality face shall have a tendency toward showing harmony, emphasizing that all speakers wish for the identical thing, & they have a frequent aim, which is additionally named positive politeness (Emaliana, 2013: 30).

The strategy of positive politeness results in the asker to attract to a joint aim, and companionship as well, by words similar to those in the following question [a].

a. How bout letting him see her gift?

b. Hello, friend, he'd be glad if she'd let him see her gift.

These on register expressions do signify an increased hazard to the speaker who suffers from a rejection & can be headed by several who wants and gets to understand you when you talk, the same as the sort shown in the following, intended to institute the required common on the base of this strategy.

- Hello. How's it going? Ok, if I sit there? We should be interested in the same crazy things. You take a lot of remarks as well, huh? Say, do me a big favor and let me take one of your pencils.

Nevertheless, mainly in nearly all the contexts of English speaking, the action of face saving is usually done by means of a strategy of negative politeness. The usual shape utilized is a question that includes a modal verb like the following [a]:

a. Could you lend me a pencil?

b. I m sorry to bother you, but can I ask you for a pencil or something?

c. I know you're busy, but might I ask you if-em-if you happen to have an additional pencil that I can, you know –eh- borrow?

Utilizing this strategy leads to structures including apology expressions for imposing the kind seen in [b]. Further complex negative politeness action may from time to time be listened to in extensive chat, frequently with uncertainties, the same as in [c].

(Yule, 1996: 65).

Negative politeness is usually articulated by questions which even request agreement to pose, for instance, Might we ask---?, as seen in [c]. Superficially, questions like these provide a chance for another to reply in negative manner to the question without embracing the same effect of refusal of replying with negativity to a bald straight on record imperative (Manurung et al., 2015: 4-5).

Politeness Strategies & Principles

Politeness Strategies:

The inclination to utilize positive politeness forms, highlighting nearness between the one who speaks and the one who hears, may be viewed as a solidarity strategy. This can be the main operating strategy amongst an entire group or it can be a choice utilized by an individual speaker on a certain occasion. Linguistically, a strategy like that will contain personal information, utility of nicknames, sometimes abusive terms as well (principally amongst males) and shared dialect or slang expressions. Often, a solidarity strategy will be distinguished by inclusive terms like 'we' and 'let's', as in the party invitation in [a].



Figure (1) How to get a pen from someone else

(Brown and Levinson, 1987: 162)

[a] Come on, let's go to the festival. Everybody will be there. We will have fun.

The inclination to utilize negative politeness shapes, highlighting the listener's freedom right, may also be viewed as a respect strategy. It may be the usual strategy of an entire group or just a choice utilized on a certain occasion. A deference strategy is concerned with what is named as 'formal politeness'. It is impersonal as if nothing is common or shared, and may contain expressions that do not point to the speaker or the hearer (for instance, 'Clients may not smoke here, sir'). The language related to a respect strategy highlights the independence of both the speaker and hearer, distinguished by the nonexistence of personal demands, as seen in [a], a substitute account of the festival invitation in [a].

[a] There is going to be a festival, if you can make it. It will be fun.

These common kinds of strategies are demonstrated here by utterances which are in fact central to the speech event (for instance, invitation). Yet, face saving behavior is frequently at work well before producing such utterances in the form of pre-sequences.

(Siburian, 2016: 4-5)

Cooperative Principle (CP) & Politeness Principle (PP):

A lot are composed in enhancement of Grice's notion of CP that the principle is taken for granted to an extent. However, it seems essential to present a kind of explanation here about (a) For what CP is required & (b) For what reason it seems insufficient for explaining the relationship amid logic and compelling. Also, it is going to be crucial to take into account the function in the current form of its all element maxims (Farahat, 2009:18).

Briefly, the responses to questions (a) and (b) are as the following. We need the CP to assist in accounting for the relationship between logic and compelling or sense and force, & this type of elucidation is principally welcome since it resolves dilemmas occurring in an approach based on truth to semantics. Nonetheless, in itself CP may not clarify (1) for what reason individuals are frequently non-direct in expressing the meaning they want to convey, and (2) what kind of relationship there is between logic and compelling when nondeclarative sentence kinds are taken into consideration (Leech, 1996 : 80).

Also, some objections are directed to the CP of Grice based on its not facing the proof of genuine language utility. For instance, it is stated that spoken restrictions like CP restrictions do not function since the greater part of declarative sentences have no function bearing information. Also, it is argued that CP maxims are non-general to language, as there exist linguistic areas and communities where we can apply all of them. These criticisms are not necessarily so damning as they seem. To refuse the CP on merely quantitative arguments means to mistake maxims for statistical standards, which is not probable. There is not an argument made that CP can be applied to all communities in the same style. In fact, a chief purpose of sociological pragmatics lies in detecting how various communities manage maxims in various means, for instance via furnishing politeness with a bigger evaluation than cooperation in particular positions, or via furnishing precedence to a PP maxim more than any other else. Nevertheless, we should admit that CP is in a feeble situation if clear exceptions to it may not be adequately explained, that is why PP may be viewed not only as being another

principle that we must add to CP, but as an essential complement saving CP from serious problem.

(Yaqubi et al., 2016: 52)

An example in which the PP saves the *CP is as* follows:

[1] *a*- They will all miss Ali and Sama, won't they?

b- Well, they will all miss Shatha.

[2] *a*- Someone has taken the strawberries off the biscuit.

b- It wasn't he.

[i] *B* in fact fails to notice the Quantity Maxim:

When *a* asks *b* to ascertain *a's* view, *b* just corroborates part of it, and definitely disregards the remainder. From this, we originate an implicature: b is of the view that they will not all miss Sama. Yet on what arguments is the implicature reached? Not only on the base of CP, because *b* can add '... but not Sama' with no deceitful, unrelated, or blurred. To conclude *b* can be more informative, yet only at the cost of more impoliteness towards a third person: that *b* thus repressed the preferred information so as to inhence PP.

The responses in [1] will certainly about to have a tone of fall and rise, which is a tone frequently linked to oblique implicature. Yet, a further significant point is: the two instances show how a clear violation of CP is seen, at a more profound level of explanation concerning PP, not being such thing, by this CP is restored from complexity by PP.

(Xiujun, 2001: 17)

In PP negative shape, it can be devised in a common way, i.e. reduce the word of impolite attitudes, & there exists an equivalent positive copy that increases the word of polite attitudes to the utmost, which is something less significant. In [1] & [2], the suppressed impolite attitudes are 'They won't miss Sama and 'He has taken the icing off the biscuit'. Polite and non-polite attitudes are correspondingly attitudes favorable and unfavorable to the listener or to a 3rd person, in which favorable and unfavorable are assessed on a pertinent level of rates. It must be emphasized, once more, that the actual attitudes of *s* are not under consideration, but rather what *s* declares to consider (Leech, 1996: 83).

At this point, we must take into consideration the universal socio-function and work of both principles, and the mutual relationship amid both. CP allows one to participant in a dialogue to converse on assuming that the other one who participants is cooperative. By this, CP functions as organizing the words we utter in that it contributes in certain assumed illocutionary or discoursal objectives. Moreover, PP owns a greater

regulative role than that, i.e. to preserve the social balance arid the friendly relationships that make us able to suppose that our interlocutors are cooperative and supportive first. To set things correctly: if not polite to our neighbor, the communication path between both would collapse, & we will not be capable to borrow his mower any more (Ibid).

Certain states exist in which politeness may withdraw, for instance, where *s* & *h* are busy in a joint action where reciprocation of information is evenly significant to them both. Yet, there are other states in which PP may dominate CP to the point that even the Quality Maxim, which inclines to prevail over other cooperative maxims, is given up, i.e. in some situations, individuals feel that they have the right to say white lies. *S,* for instance, might perhaps sense that the solitary way to refuse whatever invitation in a polite way is to pretend to be busy having another engagement. Yet, we must differentiate white lies like this, which intention is to mislead the listener, & situations that represent only obvious violations of CP. A difference is there between off the record politeness & on the record politeness, for instance, when *s* tells *He couldn't help me hold these chairs, could he!,* & it is somewhat evident that *h* could hold them (Tamada, 1997: 2).

Tact Maxims:

Tact Maxims apply to *directive* and *commissive* classes of illocutions made by Searle, which in their propositional content *X* point to a certain act to be made correspondingly by the listener or the speaker. This act can be names *A,* & can be assessed with respect to what *s* supposes to be its rate or advantage to *s* or *h.* Accordingly, *X* 'she will cut these onions', can be put on a COST-BENEFIT BALANCE, as follows: (Leech, 1983: 132)

[I] Cut these onions.

At a certain quite undefined point on the scale, basing on the situation, the pertinent cost grows advantage to *h* rather than cost to *h;* yet in a clear way, if you maintain the imperative disposition fixed, a common increase exist in politeness.

The extra means of having a politeness scale is to maintain the similar propositional content *X,* for example: *X* 'She will cut these onions', and to augment the extent of politeness by utilizing a more and more non-direct type of illocution. Non-direct illocutions incline towards more politeness (a) for they raise the extent of optionality, & (b) because the further non-direct an illocution will be, the further reduced and uncertain its power inclines to be.

(Xiujun, 2001: 11)

[2] Answer the phone.



There is a matter pragmatics must elucidate is: For what reason do certain indirect illocutions work as being impositives, whereas other illocutions do not?, for instance, [3] is an offer instead of being impositive, it entails that 'sitting down' is to a benefit to *h*.

(Xiujun, 2001: 11)

[3] Won't you sit down?

Other matters that need to be explained are: (a) For what reason does the utility of non-direct strategy, like adding negation in [3] , in the one case, that of [3], result in more politeness, with its implication of impatience, (b) For what reason do various non-direct illocutions have various implications whether emotive or attitudinal which is impossible to reduce to the plain extent of politeness?, for instance. (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 69)

[4] You will be silent.

In the correct situation, are all impositives with objective of *h* being silent; yet the mode they are formed implies an extremely diverse strategy on *s* part in every state, [4] which implies the severity of a military order. Therefore, it is rather insufficient to notice in [2] and [4] the correlation amid non-directness and politeness: we should be capable to state not just *how* polite a particular illocution is, but rather *for what reason* a certain device of non-directness participates to a certain illocutionary objective. For instance in [2], the extent of non-directness associates with the extent *h* is permitted the choice of not executing the intentional action, answering the telephone. In fact, here the point of the

indirectness strategy is to bias the impositive further and further toward the negative option, in order that it grows increasingly simpler for *h* to answer 'no'. By this, negative politeness, *i.e.* serving the cost evasion to *h*, is augmented (Said, 2011: 63).

It looks strange at this point to describe politeness, as minimizing impolite beliefs. The prepositional content of those sentences all: ill-mannered to *h* as long as it assigns certain endeavor, problem, or cost to *h*. In utilizing the imperative in [1] & [2], *s* conveys the conviction that *h* is going to do the act. The imperative's utility does not permit *h* to have any option in the issue (Said, 2011: 63).

There are two aspects concerning the Tact Maxims; a negative aspect which lies in minimizing the cost to *h*, & a positive aspect which lies in maximizing the advantage to *h*. The 2nd aspect is of low significance, yet it is a normal result of the 1st aspect, which denotes for instance, that by suggesting a certain act advantageous to *h, s* must make the illocution bias towards a positive effect by limiting *h's* chance of answering by 'No'. Hence, the imperative which does not in fact permit *h* to answer by 'No' is in a casual situation a positive polite manner for creating the offer: *Help yourself Have another bite of fish*. The non-negative bias may be augmented as well by emphasizing persuasively: *Do have another bite!; You MUST have another bite!* will imply that *h* will make *s* a non-negative favor by accepting; as a result it is possibly that the bites are decayed, indigestible, or poisonous! The cause behind this reverse of polite strategies in positives & commissives is quite clear & has a relation with politeness irregularity: what should be articulated effectively by a contributor as a polite conviction should be minimized evenly by the other contributor as an impolite conviction. Hence, rising the non-negative politeness of an offer signifies expecting and neutralizing the receiver's negative politeness (Said, 2011: 30-31).

This assists in clarifying the reason why the negative shape of the inquiry '*Won't you help yourself*' is in an offer polite. The negative inquiry is an inquiry concerning a negative proposition, which means the rejection of a non-negative proposition. The logic may be literally said as in: I wish and wait for you to help yourself, but now it seems that you will not help yourself; is it really so?. Actually, it gives *h* the tribute of carrying a polite conviction, and simultaneously politely (from *s's* viewpoint) conveys disbelief in that belief, and thus calls *h* despite the apparent unwillingness to agree to the offer. Hence, the inquiry is biased toward a non-negative impact. For the contrary cause, *"Would you mind helping yourself"* as an impositive is polite. The logic of *brain* in the structure signifies the action A negative anticipation, given that *"Would*

you mind" is the same semantically as "*Would you dislike*---" or "*Would you object to*---*"*. Thus, it owns an integral negative bias & differs from "*Would you like*---*"*, that is further normally explained as bringing in an offer, which is a negative reply to this inquiry which implies *h's* agreement *"No, I wouldn't mind*---", yet, it is a non-committal answer as well, simply bearing the meaning "I would not object", emphasizing that *h* is not reluctant but *h* is ready to make *A.* The insertion of a more negative to the approach does not make sense; and so the unsuitability of *"Wouldn't you mind*--- *?"*(Leech, 1983: 132).

Politeness & Solidarity:

Once we talk, we should continuously make options of a lot of different types: what we wish to utter, how we wish to utter it, and the definite sentence kinds, terms, and sounds which best join what with how. How we utter a thing is in any case as significant and vital as what we utter; actually, the content and type are somewhat indivisible, being only two aspects of the similar thing. The way to view this relation lies in checking a number of particular features of communication: i.e., pronominal option between the forms of tu & vous in languages that need an option; the utility of designating and addressing terms; & the utility of politeness indicators and signs. In all cases, we will observe that specific linguistic options a speaker makes signify the social relation that the speaker recognizes to be present between him & the listener. Furthermore, in a lot of cases, it is not possible to evade making such options in the real messages packaging (Birner, 2013:202).

Address Terms:

In observing a number of matters concerned with naming & addressing, we should first look at practices between foreign individuals to make ourselves far away from English somehow. A short view to such dissimilar system might perhaps permit us to get a further non-subjective point of view about what we make with our mother language & in our real culture. That non-subjectivity is not only helpful, but it is rather essential if we wish to evade findings and results twisted by ethnocentricity.

The study of Brown and Ford in 1961 about designating practices in English language was founded on analyzing modern dramas, the designating practices are noticed in Boston in a business, in the mid-western United States, & in England. They state that the asymmetric utility of title, last & first name (TLN/FN) showed disparity in influence, that reciprocal TLN signified disparity & unfamiliarity & that reciprocal

FN signified parity & familiarity. A change from reciprocal TLN to FN is frequently started by the further influential member of the relation as well. Additional choices are present as well in addressing others: the title only (T), for example, Prof. or Dr.; the last name only (LN), for example, George; or multiple designation, for example, difference between Mr. George and John. We must notice in such categorization that titles such as Mr. or Miss are widespread alternatives of the title type, namely generic titles & forms such as Jack, Mate, Mack or Buddy are generic first names (FN), for instance in "What's up, Buddy?", or "Hey, Jack, I wouldn't do that if I were you" (Wolfson, 1986: 67).

Addressing by title only is the slightest friendly type of addressing since titles typically allocate grades or professions, as in Major, Dr. or Waiter, which are empty of private content. Thus, we may say that Dr. John is more intimate and familiar than Dr. only, admitting that the other name of the person is well-known and may be referred to. Recognizing & utilizing another individual's first name is evidently a symbol of significant familiarity or no less than a desire for such familiarity. Utilizing a pet name or a nick name demonstrates a bigger familiarity as well. When somebody utilizes just our first name in addressing us, we might sense from time to time that that individual is assuming an familiarity we are not aware of or otherwise is attempting to affirm some influence over us. Notice that the mother reduces the familiarity of her son's first name only to "Johnny", or pet name "Honey", & as a result it serves to indicate a censure. (Said, 2011: 39)

We may see some probable risks in communication cross cultures as different relations are articulated via what seems, seemingly as a minimum, to be the similar addressing system. The risks are bigger as well if we are taught the terms in a novel addressing system yet fail to realize how they are connected to each other (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 242).

Theories of Politeness

Robin T. Lakoff:

Robin Lakoff might well be named the modem politeness theory mother, since she was one of the chief scholars to study it from a definitely pragmatic perspective. She defines politeness as a method of interpersonal relationships intended to make the interaction easy via reducing the potential for divergence and argument innate in all human beings' exchange (Lakoff, 1975: 13-14).

Lakoff utilized politeness to refer to a number of weaknesses in the traditional linguistic theory, & performed that by associating politeness with Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP). This theory bases on assuming that human are innately cooperative & attempt to be as much as informative in communication with informativeness pointing to a maximally competent information transfer. Those suppositions are grasped by CP and its related maxims of Quantity, Relation, Quality & Manner working as being rules of linguistic behavior controlling linguistic interpretation & production. When they are followed (which in accordance with Grice is the default situation), maximally informative communication or clarity is arrived at. Yet, they may be ignored as well, where case particular interpretive processes are prompted. By this, people may mean more than they literally say, and be understood as such (Grice, 1975: 45, 113-114).

In brief, the CP and its maxims intend to explicate how it is that people can understand each other beyond the literal spoken words. Nevertheless, in ordinary informal conversation, the CP and its maxims are almost by no means firmly followed, and to explain this, Lakoff suggested a politeness rule, equal with the Gricean clarity rule and matching it.

Penelope Brown & Stephen C. Levinson:

Brown & Levinson's theory is definitely the most prominent one witnessing the countless interactions, appliances, criticisms, adjustments & corrections of their publication in 1978/1987. Brown & Levinson grew nearly identical with the impoliteness itself, or as one of the researchers states that it is not possible with no pointing to Brown & Levinson's theory (Brown and Planck, 2015: 327).

Brown & Levinson like Lakoff views politeness with respect to conflict avoidance, yet their explanatory toolbox varies considerably from Lakoff's toolbox. The fundamental ideas are rationality and face as being general characteristics, namely owned by all orators and listeners embodied in a universal Model Person. Rationality is the lessening or logic of means & ends, whereas face comprises two opposite fancies:

face, or the fancy that person's acts are unhindered by other ones (Wierzbicka, 1985: 145).

Geoffrey Leech:

Leech's theory of politeness places politeness in a framework of inter-personal oratory. The departure spot is his wider distinction between semantics -as the field of grammar, the linguistic method, the rules- & pragmatics -as the field of oratory, namely the execution of the rules-. Semantics is linked to a sentence's conceptual rational connotation or sense, whereas pragmatics is linked to the relation between the sentence sense & its pragmatic power, namely its communicative connotation among orators and listeners in certain utterance positions. While semantics is governed by rules, pragmatics is governed by principles, the difference between both is that the code is expressive, unlimited, of the kind of either / or and entail detached values, whereas principles are usually normative, relative in their appliance, may conflict or disagree with coexisting principles and point to continual values not separate ones. Semantic logic & pragmatic power are distinctive rather than separate phenomena, for power consists of logic. The probable pragmatic power of an expression relies on & consists of its semantic logic (Leech, 1983).

Shoshana Blum-Kulka:

Blum-Kulka studies politeness according to the Israeli & Jewish context. She borrows essentials from other different theories, but reinterprets them in a way relative to culture. Cultural standards or cultural scripts are terms of vital significance in her approach. Though she approves the presence of face-wants, she emphasizes that these are culturally decided and that their specific formulation may therefore never pretend to be universal as they are in Brown & Levinson. She admits, like Ide, the differentiation between strategic and obligatory linguistic options, but argues that its range and depth differ from culture to culture, grasping the obligatory options under the label 'cultural conventions'. In her viewpoint, discernment simply points to that part of politeness which is strongly conventionalized and languages with a high incidence of Discernment strategies (Blum-Kulka, 1983: 38, 55).

Conclusion

From the abovementioned, we may say that the theory & approach of politeness is a widespread, applicable & pragmatic phenomenon,

namely a type of communicative conduct seen in man's languages and human society.

Politeness drew the attention and interest of a lot of researchers into conducting researches and papers about it since the years of nineteen seventies, and carries on to be a main focus for research in fields and domains related to social interaction.

Studying the phenomena of politeness may give an insight into extensively conflicting issues out of widely different interests. They embrace, for instance, investigating the chronological progress of politeness in normal reaction, studying pragmatics of cross cultures & misinterpretation, the face speaking ethnography & politeness in various situations & cultures, strategies of politeness as giving the stylistic consistency of certain kinds of reaction, for example, dissimilarities of gender in the style of speech, politeness as a practical impulse for linguistic structure, for example, "honorifics", the social psychology of face administration & interpersonal awareness, appliances of the theory of politeness to analyzing and examining ceremonial ritual and to viewing culture as rhetoric or shapes of effectual expression.

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6 Pragmatics

Pragmatics the study of language use in interpersonal communication. It is concerned with the choices made by speakers and the options and constraints which apply in social interaction. It examines the effects of language use on participants in acts of communication. Pragmatics is closely related to semantics, the study of meaning, with which it is often associated. For this reason the current chapter follows that on semantics.

Just as semantics covers a range of levels – grammar, syntax and the lexicon – so pragmatics is spread across a number of fields within linguistics and interfaces most clearly with semantics and sociolinguistics. The boundaries cannot, however, be always clearly defined. Depending on the type of emphasis one places in the field of pragmatics at least three subgroups can be recognised.

Pragmalinguistics deals with the more linguistic end of the pragmatic spectrum. Usage is seen from the view point of the structural resources of a language, i.e. it concerns aspects of context which are formally encoded in the structure of a language. These would be part of a user's pragmatic competence (compare this with competence in syntax).

Sociopragmatics would see usage as primarily determined by social factors in communication.

Applied pragmatics refers to practical problems of interaction in situations where successful communication is critical, e.g. medical interviews, law courts, interrogations, official counselling.

One should also mention that there is a philosophical type of pragmatics, as developed in the late 19th century by American philosophers such as William

James and Charles Peirce and which is a precursor to linguistic pragmatics. There are typical themes which one finds treated in discussions of pragmatics. These are dealt with in the following parts of the present section.

6.1 Speech acts

A speech act is an utterance spoken in an actual communication situation. The notion stems from the British philosopher John Langshaw Austin (1911-1960) who worked in Oxford and elaborated his ideas in a series of lectures given shortly before his death and published in 1962 as *How to do things with words*. Austin was a representative of the school of ordinary language philosophy and maintained that one of the chief functions of language was to carry out socially significant actions. This explains his concern with language in use.

Speech acts are realised certain verbs and attempts have been made to classify these according to type of speech act. Austin begins his treatment by introducing a distinction between *constative* and *performative* verbs. The former are those which describe reality, e.g. *rain* in *It rained heavily all through the week-end*. Such sentences have a truth value as they can be evaluated as true or false. Performative verbs are quite different. They are instrumental in achieving an interactional goal between two or more speakers. A typical example would be the verb *promise* which realises a purely linguistic act. In the sentence *I promise to help you with the work* no work is done but the sincere intention to do so in the near future is expressed by the speaker.

FELICITY CONDITIONS A closer look at different types of speech acts reveals that the success of the act is dependent on a number of extra-linguistic conditions. For instance, the act of baptising can only be performed by someone who is entitled to do this by virtue of an ecclesiastical office. A priest can baptise a child or the wife of a mayor can baptise a ship if there is agreement that she is the person to do this. Furthermore, such actions have generally a ritual structure: there are special phrases involved and they must be spoken correctly and completely, otherwise the speech acts misfires.

Apart from such ritualised acts there are many which require conforming to knowledge about how they are performed and what is necessary for them to succeed. If you attempt to insult someone and they laugh at you, then the perlocutionary act (the effect of the insult, see below) is unsuccessful. If on going into a restaurant you ask your companion which of the two of you is going to cook then this utterance is infelicitous inasmuch as it is not a successful piece of communication.

6.2 Types of speech acts

Speech acts can be classified and subclassified. The first division leads to a triad of basic types one of which applies to all possible utterances.

1) LOCUTIONARY ACTS These express sense or reference as in ***A cow is an animal*** or ***The earth is round***.

2) ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS Here the intentions of the speaker are expressed by using a performative verb such as ***I baptise this ship 'The Spirit of Galway'***.

3) PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS With this type the effect of the linguistic action is central. Perlocutionary acts include those which have a visible effect on the speaker, such as insulting or persuading someone.

The second and third type above are concerned with intention and effect and are thus the more prototypical type of speech acts. Depending on the precise action which is performed one can reach further subdivisions as shown in the following brief list.

	Label	*Example*
Directives	commanding, requesting	*Do your homework! Can I offer you a drink?*
Commissives	promising	*I promise to come in time this evening.*
Expressives	apologising	*She's sorry about the trouble her remarks caused.*
Representatives	asserting	*I maintain that he is guilty.*

INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS A frequent situation in language use is where the literal meaning of a sentence is not that which the speaker wishes the hearer to use in his/her interpretation. A simple example illustrates this. The sentence ***It's very draughty in here*** is not normally intended as a simple statement but as an indirect request to close a window or door in a room. For reasons of politeness (see below) speakers may choose this indirect method of realising a directive speech act. Such acts leave the addressee the option of not complying with the implied request without losing face.

6.2.1 Further developments

The American philosopher John R. Searle expanded Austin's ideas in a significant publication, ***Speech Acts*** (1969), in which he stressed the necessity of relating the function of signs and expressions to the social context in which they occur. The development of speech act theory has led to a split in philosophical semantics into truth-based semantics (involving constatives) and speech-act semantics (involving performatives). The distinction can be seen as that between meaning in communication as opposed to meaning in language, hence the assignment of the former to the field of pragmatics.

6.3 Conversational implicatures

The English philosopher H. Paul Grice (1913-1988) was concerned with the task of accounting for how human beings behave in normal conversation. To this end he introduced the notion of 'conversational implicatures' which are implications deduced by speakers during conversations. In order to be successful in deducing the intended meanings of one's interlocutors the latter must abide by certain maxims of conversation. Grice recognises four main maxims of conversation

MAXIMS OF CONVERSATION

Quality	What you say is assumed to be true
Quantity	Be informative but not too much so
Relevance	Be relevant to the purpose of the exchange
Manner	Be perspicuous, avoid absurdity and ambiguity

Grice furthermore assumes that speakers keep to the *cooperative principle*. This is an unspoken agreement between speakers in conversation to follow the maxims of conversation, to interpret sensibly what is said by one's interlocutor and in general to abide by the conventions of linguistic interaction in conversation. Occasionally, the maxims may be flouted for deliberate effect, for instance when one is being ironical or sarcastic or indeed when lying.

A further development of the conversational implicatures of Grice is what is termed *relevance theory*. The linguists Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson applied the notion of relevance to the structuring of conversation and maintain that a contribution is relevant if the effort required to process it is small, i.e. if it matches the context and concurs with the assumptions of the addressee.

6.4 Politeness

In general politeness is an aspect of a speaker's social behaviour which shows deference towards the wishes and concerns of the addressee. There is a linguistic manifestation of politeness, investigated seminally in a book by the English linguists Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson (1979), which involves strategies for maximising deference in exchanges, e.g. by employing indirect speech acts or by using formal address terms. These strategies aim at a certain goal, to save the face of the addressee. The term *face* refers to the public self-image of speakers and can be subdivided into two main types. Positive face refers to an individual's wish to be respected and appreciated by others. Negative face refers to the wish not to be restricted or impeded in the choices

one makes concerning social behaviour. Politeness is hence understood as a means of showing awareness of another's face. Social behaviour can constitute *face saving acts* by being deferential to others, emphasizing the importance of their wishes and concerns. On the contrary a *face threatening act* tends to encroach on another's freedom of action and may be interpreted as an imposition or indeed an insult. There are many linguistic strategies for minimising the threat to negative face, for instance by apologizing in advance for disturbing someone, and for maximising the enhancement of positive face, for instance by pointing out a common interest in some suggestion made to an addressee.

Languages provides devices or strategies for reducing the potential loss of face in social interactions. For instance, *hedges* are devices, used in conversation, which serve the purpose of weakening the force of a statement, e.g. *He is perhaps the culprit after all. Could you possibly give me a hand? He's not up to scratch, I suppose. She won't leave us, will she?*

The face of one's interlocutor can be supported in conversation by *back-channelling*, a strategy in communication whereby the listener confirms his/her attention to what the other person is saying (see section ??? below).

There are significant differences between language in terms of what is regarded as polite or impolite. For example, a simple but often important difference between English and German is that the latter allows the neutral use of third person pronouns when referring to someone who is present. If, say, more than two people are in a conversation in English then it is good manners when two are talking to each other and referring to somone else in the conversation to use the name of this individual, e.g. *Well, as George was saying, we could always come back early*. In German it would be entirely acceptable to say *Naja, wie er sagte, wir können auch früher zurückkomen* where *er* = 'he' is used for George, even if he is standing beside the people talking and listening to what they are saying.

6.5 Terms of address

The major European languages use different personal pronouns depending on the degree of acquaintance which speakers have with those they address. The systems found in Europe show a twofold distinction: one form for addressing acquaintances, friends and relatives and one for addressing strangers or more distant acquaintances. The formal means for realising this distinction vary from case to case. Each language uses the second person singular for informal address but there are a variety of ways for expressing formality pronominally as can be seen from the following table.

Pronominal distinctions according to formality in selected languages

	Informal	Formal	
French	*tu*	*vous*	(second person plural)
Italian	*tu*	*lei*	(third person singular feminine)
Spanish	*tu*	*usted*	(???)
Russian	*ty*	*vy*	(second person plural)
German	*Du*	*Sie*	(third person plural)

Because of the differences in realisations, it is practice in linguistic discussions to refer to the informal marker as the T form and the formal one as the V form (corresponding to the first letters of the French and Russian pronouns). Such systems are termed *dyadic* as they have two possible pronouns for addressing individuals.

In those languages with the above distinction the higher levels of society tend to use V-forms more and the lower levels the T-forms. This fact may be a remnant of the historical situation out of which the pronominal distinction arose.

6.5.1 The development of pronominal systems

The use of a plural of respect is commonly assumed to reach back to Latin and anecdotally to Julius Caesar. What is true is that the plural came to be used for addressing a single individual and so documents the encoding of social distance in language use. This distinction was picked up by vernacular European languages by the early Middle Ages, in German, for example, the earliest record of *ihr* 'you-PL' with singular reference goes back as far as the ninth century. Well into the early modern period this remained the only deferential pronoun of address. Its use was regulated by social status in the feudal system and later by class affiliation. By the end of the sixteenth century the third person singular – *er* 'he' or *sie* 'she' – appears as an indirect address form indicating deference.

The forms from different languages in the above table have various sources. For instance, the third person singular feminine in Italian *lei* 'she' refers originally to *maiestà* 'majesty'. The German use of *Sie* 'she-SG' with plural verb forms is attested and would appear to be a combination of indirect third person address and respectful plural as augmented deference. In French and Russian the *vous* and *vy*, both 'you-PL' respectively, attained a double function: as a reference to more than one individual with whom one is on informal terms and as a form for more distant acquaintances and strangers which could be used in the singular or plural.

6.5.2 Present-day systems

The factors which determine the use of T versus V forms vary across languages,

both in history and at present. By and large today's European languages have an absolute system where a given form is used for a certain individual and maintained until a possible switch is made. Switches are generally irreversible, indeed the only normal switch is from V to T with the important exception of teenagers becoming adults and experiencing the shift of T to V on the part of adults who address them.

Another orientation of the address system is conceivable. This would be where speakers decide from the actual speech context in which they find themselves what form of address to use. Such systems tend to be unstable over time because of the flux and uncertainty which they generate. The dyadic address system of English did not survive and this may be because it was not absolute. In the early modern period *thou* (the original T form) and *you* (the original V form) could be used for one and the same person, depending on the situation.

Address systems serve the function of giving linguistic expression to fairly stable aspects of social relationships, such as power, distance, solidarity or intimacy. But speakers often feel the desire to be more formal or less formal with certain individuals on certain occasions. If the direction the speakers wish to take is not congruent with the T/V form they use, a tension arises which cannot be resolved simply in absolute systems but which can be mitigated by the use of other features which congregate around the address pronouns, such as colloquial expressions, discourse elements which promote informality (or formality as the case may be).

Occasionally, a language may consciously abandon an established dyadic address system. This happened in the mid twentieth century in Sweden when the V form, *ni* 'you-PL', came to be replaced entirely by *du* 'you-SG' as the only pronoun of address, irrespective of degree of acquaintance. A similar situation applied, though to a lesser extent, in Norway and Denmark (but not in Finland). A slight swingback can be seen in Sweden where some young people think it fashionable to address other individuals using the *ni* form.

Although the various address systems are formally different, their social functions show considerable similarities. In the following a brief consideration of the German address system is offered to show how forms of address are manipulated by speakers in socially varied situations.

6.5.3 The German address system

The general rule in German is that the formal *Sie* 'you' is used for strangers and the informal *Du* 'you' for friends and relatives. However, the matter is considerably more nuanced than this simple statement implies.

Social maturation and the use of T/V A system of address in a language is something which is learned consciously by children in their society. The rule always holds that children use the familiar form with each other and with their relatives. However, they must learn (by 5 or 6 at the latest) that there is a marked formal form which is to be used with strangers. As opposed to the

acquisition of other aspects of language (morphology, syntax, etc.) children require a fair degree of correction as they overgeneralise the T form (here: *Du)* to begin with. Because the T form is the original unmarked form, there is a general correlation between age and the use of the formal V form. The T form is used among peers up to their twenties (unless some professional situation forbids this or the parties in a conversation are complete strangers).

Non-reciprocal usage and the notion of power The practice of one partner using one form of address and the second another is dying out quite quickly in European languages. It used to be common where one member in a conversation enjoyed a position of greater social power and thus was entitled to use the T form whereas the other had to use the V form. Originally, this was the situation with the nobility. Occasionally, there may be professional relationships today which reflect a similar type of situation. For instance it is common in German for master craftsmen to say *Du* to their apprentices but not vice versa.

Politeness and the use of formal address From the original use of the *Du* form for social inferiors there developed a secondary usage as a sign of contempt. In this sense it can still be used today. However, this only works in those situations in which the person addressed has an inherent claim to be addressed with the *Sie* form, e.g. an older pupil in school, an inmate in a prison, a worker on a building site, etc. The application of the *Du* form is always felt to be indignifying by the other party as it demonstrates a lack of respect.

The converse of this situation is that where people use the *Sie* form as a sign of politeness and mutual respect. This usage would seem to be confined to the middle classes, probably because with working classes politeness does not have such a high value as solidarity, indeed it is often regarded as being class disloyal, i.e. aspiring to a higher social class, to overuse the *Sie* form. In keeping with the fact that the *Sie* form occurs in socially stratified contexts, there is a greater occurrence of the *Du* form in rural as opposed to urban settings. Indeed languages which have an entirely rural population (such as Irish) may often not have any formal pronominal address at all.

Degrees of acquaintance and the T form There is a general rule in all languages which have a formal/informal distinction that at the level of greatest personal acquaintance, the reciprocal *Du* form is used. This holds for instance between siblings, husband and wife, lovers, etc. Formerly, the age difference could have outweighed this with children using the *Sie* form to their parents or at least to their parents-in-law, however this usage has completely died out.

Because the *Du* form implies close acquaintance it can be used to force this. Very often such a move is taken by one partner in an exchange and frowned upon by the other. Speakers often resist attempts on the part of others to use *Du* so as to keep their social distance from them. Forcing the *Du* form on someone is regarded as bad social behaviour. Retention of the *Sie* form can often occur simply where individuals want to be on the safe side: stick to politeness and you cannot go wrong.

Solidarity and the T form A frequent function of the *Du* form is to

demonstrate solidarity, i.e. strong common interests, with another individual or group of individuals. In this environment the requirement of close acquaintance can be waived. This is evident in many groupings in society. For instance, there is a tradition that members of the social democratic party say *Du* to each other. Equally, if one deliberately engages in a special activity with other individuals then joining the group usually involves using the *Du* form, e.g. engaging in various forms of sports. The use of the *Du* form for reasons of solidarity probably has its origin in working class usage. For example among miners, road workers, hauliers, etc. reciprocal *Du* is ubiquitous.

Switching from the V to the T form In all languages with a distinction between a familiar and a formal form of address there is continual switching from the V to the T form. Indeed it is socially codified in many languages, e.g. in German there is a quaint ceremony of *Bruderschaft trinken* 'to trink brotherhood', which is optional. The same term and ceremony also exists in Polish. Once the *Du* form has been established it is impossible to return to the *Sie* form without insulting the other person.

In situations in which there is a disparity in a relationship it is always up to the social superior to take the initiative and propose the *Du* form. This is a residue of the original situation where the more powerful members always said *Du* to the less powerful.

6.5.4 The English address system

English is remarkable among the European languages in not having a distinction between personal pronouns used for strangers and non-strangers. Indeed English does not even have a distinction between a pronoun for the second person singular, when addressing one person, and another for the second person plural, when addressing more than one. Both these matters are related.

English used to have a distinction in pronouns for address (see section 3.8.2 *Morphological change* for the original distribution of forms). On the one hand, there was a singular form *thou* 'you-SG', which now only survives in a few rural regions in England and in religious usage. On the other hand there was a plural form *ye* 'you-PL' which survives in some conservative varieties of English such as Scottish and Irish English. The *ye* form was later replaced by *you*, the original accusative. The singular was used for familiar and the plural for polite address. However, the system did not establish itself, most likely because it was not absolute. In the early modern period – as attested, for instance, in Shakespeare's *Hamlet* – one could say *thou* and *you* to one and the same person, depending on the situation. Hamlet appears to use *thou* to his mother when he is addressing her in this function and uses *you* when addressing her as queen. This situation contrasts clearly with that in all European languages which have maintained the pronominal address distinction. These languages use it exclusively: one either uses the T form with someone or the V form, one cannot use now one, now the other form.

A further feature of the early modern English address system is that the *thou* form was often perceived as contemptuous, at least in certain varieties of the language (though not in traditional rural usage). The net effect is that the *thou – you* distinction did not maintain its function of social differentiation and went into decline. By the 18th century it was gone entirely in the standard language.

6.6 Honorifics

T/V address systems such as those found in Europe are by no means the only cases where social relationships are given pronominal expression. Indeed there are many languages which have far more complicated systems. Where a language goes beyond a T/V configuration linguists speak of *honorifics*. These are morphological encoded elements which are used to express varying degrees of social deference. Languages in east and south-east Asia are well-known for having explicat honorific systems, e.g. Japanese, Korean, Thai.

To give an idea of just what such a system entails in terms of morphological choices, the personal pronouns in Thai are outlined below. The European languages discussed in the previous section only have differences for the second person, but for a language like Thai there are distinct forms for the first person as well. The third person shows less variation. The form *khow* is most common with a special feminine form *khun-nai* used when referring to married women. The third person is not always distinguished by gender and number, though the general form *khow* does have the combined form *phuak khow* as a polite form to refer to more than one individual.

First person singular forms

shan (m + f)	for close friends / intimates; old to young (strangers and family), young to old (family)
phom (m)	Thai to foreigners and vice versa; young to old
di-shan (f)	as *phom*, but used by females
kraphom (m)	younger male to older person; commoner to nobility
kha (m + f)	peasants amongst each other
kha-pha-chao (m + f)	most formal level, both genders

Second person singular/plural forms

tai-thao	addressing someone in high office, nobility, etc.
than	particulary polite form; junior to boss, employee to customer, etc.
khun-naai	equivalent forms for addressing females, especially married women
khun	general address pronoun for strangers, and for people of differing ages groups; also found between husband and wife

theu	used between siblings, friends; otherwise only where person addressed is considerably younger; otherwise offensive
phi	equivalent form but without age difference implied with *theu*. increasingly used as a polite form for 'you'
kae	belittling form, implying inferiority of person addressed

There also exist specially pronouns used when speaking to Chinese who were born in Thailand: *ah-check* for men and *ah-sim* for women. When speaking to Chinese, Thais may use *oua* 'I' and *lue* 'you', but these forms can be construed as offensive and are not generally regarded as polite.

The distinction between the genders is important in Thai, not only for personal pronouns as seen above. There are certain forms which are used exclusively by men or by women. For instance *cha, khrap* is 'yes' (used by men) while *cha, khah* [short low tone] is 'yes' (used by women). *Khrap* is also a polite particle used at the end of sentences by men and *khah* by women, with a short high tone it renders the sentence a question.

The other parameter which is important in the Thai honorific system is age which is seen in the context of family relations. For example, *loung* 'uncle' and *pa* 'aunt' are common forms of address for people who are considerably older than the speaker. The form *na* is found for addressing female who are a little younger than one's mother. This issue will be considered in detail in the section on kinship terms below, see ???.

6.7 Deixis

Very much in language is concerned with pointing or referring. This section of language is referred to as *deixis* from the Greek word meaning 'display, reference'. Deixis (read: /deɪksəs/, sometimes /daɪksəs/) occurs in various guises. An obvious form is that of pronominal reference where pronouns serve the function of referring to nouns which have already been introduced in the discourse. In a synthetic language like Irish the articles and pronouns serve to refer back to nouns mentioned in a previous sentence as in *Cheannaigh mo athair capall agus cráin an seachtain seo caite.* 'My father bought a horse and a sow last week'. *Bhí sí an-daor cathfidh mé a rá.* 'It (i.e. 'the sow') was very dear'. Personal pronouns form another group of elements which have a deictical function as in *I suppose he has left by now* where a male person must have been previously mentioned in the discourse otherwise the sentence is not interpretable.

There are two other major areas where deixis plays a central role. This is in the temporal sphere of language, just consider the many expressions in any language to express points in time: *today, now, later, before, tomorrow*. The tense system of a language, such as English with present, past, pluperfect, future and future perfect tenses, can be interpreted as fulfilling deictic functions along a time axis.

The second area is that of spatial deixis. Apart from the many prepositions and adverbs, such as *up, down, over, under, across, underneath,* English has a two-way system of demonstrative, or 'pointing', pronouns: one for objects/beings close to the speaker and one for those further away as in English *this/that*. There is also an archaic term for distant objects/beings which were nonetheless still in sight: *yonder* as in *Yonder building is the town church*. The use of demostrative pronouns has been extended to express degrees of relevance where greater distance correlates with a decrease in urgency, consider the sentences *This matter must be dealt with immediately. We can turn to that question later*.

6.7.1 Location and existence

There is an essential relationship between space and time inasmuch as location presupposes existence. Consider sentences like *There are biscuits in the cupboard* and *There are modern translations of his plays.* Such sentences use locative expressions – introduced by *There are...* – to imply existence. Other languages document the interrelationship of the temporal and spatial axis in a similar manner. For instance, in Irish the word *ann* 'in-it' expressed existence as in *Níl ach drochsheans ann,* lit. 'there is only a bad chance in-it'. The sentence means that only a slight chance exists. Such meanings arise from concluding that location somewhere automatically implies existence. The same is in German where the sentence *Die Übersetzungen sind da* can mean 'the translations exist', i.e. they have been made, or 'the translations are there' (*da* = 'there'), e.g. they are in the office. The connection between space and time can be seen even more clearly in the word for 'existence' in German, *Dasein,* lit. 'to be there'.

6.7.2 Anaphora

A further set of deictic elements can be found which have the function of referring back to something which has already been mentioned in the current discourse. These elements are known collectively as anaphora (from Greek *ana* 'back' and *pherein* 'carry') and usually have the forms of prepositions. It is a feature of discourse that we mentioned something or someone explicitly, i.e. by name, the first time it occurs, but that after that we refer to the person or thing using pronouns. Consider the following sentence: *Fiona*$_{i}$ *bought a new car*$_{j}$ *recently but she*$_{i}$ *is not satisfied with it*$_{j}$. Here one can see that the elements which share a subscript letter are co-referential, i.e. *Fiona* & *she* and *a new car* & *it*. It is a fact that in most languages third person pronouns fulfil this anaphoric function of pointing back to someone/something already mentioned. The latter may be in a different sentence, indeed often is. Personal pronouns are not the only elements used for anaphoric purposes, frequently synonyms are found with this function, e.g. *Fergal*$_{i}$ *got cash for the building work and that way the old fox*$_{i}$ *managed to escape tax* where *Fergal* and *the old fox* are co-referential.

Such examples show that by using anaphora to reference what has been introduced earlier one can create cohesion in discourse and texts (see next section). In some cases there is a kind of zero-element anaphora. Consider the sentence ***Fergal wants to propose to Fiona but doesn't have the courage*** in which the finite verb ***doesn't*** is co-referential with ***Fergal*** and so points backwards. However, the subject of this verb is supressed and so one can speak of a zero-element which nonetheless has an anaphoric function.

Occasionally, an element points forward in a text. Such elements are called ***cataphora*** and can be seen in a sentence like ***Fiona didn't see him until he came around the corner, but it was indeed her long lost cousin.***

6.8 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is an area of linguistics which is involved with the examination of stretches of language which are larger than single sentences. Such stretches usually form a unit which is defined by the topic of discourse, e.g. a conversation about a football match, cracking a joke, a political interview or a lecture on historical linguistics.

A discourse with a recognisable structure can be analysed on two levels. The first is the semantic one and the term used to refer to whether a discourse make sense or not is ***coherence***. Successful discourse depends largely on hearers recognising the context in which it takes place, i.e. what the so-called universe of discourse is. This leads to a restriction of the expected themes and hence makes the comprehension of the discourse a lot simpler. Furthermore, humans have encyclopedic knowledge about the world they live in and can draw on that to achieve the necessary level of contextualisation when interpreting a discourse. Incidentally, computers do not have such knowledge which makes automatic translation such an unreliable business.

The second level is the formal one. The main issue here is: how does one string together sentences? If this is done successfully then the discourse shows ***cohesion***. There are various means to establish sentence connectivity: by the use of intersentential links in which anaphoric elements play a central role (see previous section).

6.8.1 Back-channeling and turn-taking

Discourse involves at least two individuals so the hearer or hearers can influence the discourse when someone is speaking. One important role which the hearer has is to offer feedback to the speaker. This is term ***back-channelling***, communication by the listener to the speaker. Typically this would involve such elements as supportive noises, uttering short phrases like ***yes; I see; of course; right; sure; indeed***. Back channelling is important for successful conversation as it encourages the speaker to continue. Even negative back channelling, e.g. *I*

don't think so; I'm not so sure; hmm, maybe not can have this effect of support. The total lack of back channelling is often regarded by English speakers as disconcerting, especially in situations in which there is no eye contact, e.g. on the telephone. Cultures differ in this respect, e.g. Finns engage in much less back-channeling than, say Italians.

This issue is closely linked to the attitude towards silence in different societies and cultures. In some cases, silence is taken as dissatisfaction with the discourse and is avoided, e.g. among speakers of Irish English. Other societies, such as Finland, do not interpret silence in this way and so much more of it is found in personal contacts. If one looks further afield one can find communities, e.g. among some native Americans, where long periods of silence occur quite regularly, especially at the beginning of a social contact.

It is normal in discourse for the speaker to change throughout. The manner in which this change is affected varies across countries and cultures. Some allow a fair degree of overlap, with the person who wishes to speak pushing his/her way forward by talking more loudly, sometimes, but by no means always, showing that he/she does not want the present speaker to continue, e.g. with expressions like *Well whatever, Be that as it may*. In Irish English overlap of this kind is very common and not interpreted negatively. Other varieties of English and other languages see such behaviour as impolite.

Even if the discourse remains with one speaker, he/she may wish to change the topic of conversation. This is technically known as *turn-taking*. A turn is an event during a conversation when a change in topic is made. There are various mechanisms for doing this, usually by signalling the change to the hearer, e.g. *Oh by the way, I saw Fiona in town yesterday. On the subject of cars, I had to bring mine to the garage last week.*

6.8.2 Highlighting in sentences

Much of what occurs in discourse not only conveys information in a matter-of-fact manner but also places some kind of emphasis on certain aspects of the bundle of information. This is technically known as *topicalisation*.

Languages differ in the means which they use to convey what is new and what is given information in an utterance. For instance, Irish tends to use syntactic methods whereby the stressed element is brought to the beginning of the sentence. Technically this syntactic device is known as *clefting* which basically involves the positioning of the element to be stressed in a main clause with a form of *be* in the third personal singular neuter and the rest of the non-clefted sentence in a subsequent subordinate clause.

Is i gCorcaigh a bhfuil sé ina chónaí faoi láthair.
'It is in Cork that he is living at present.'
S'í a bhean chéile a rachaidh mé san ollscoil.
'It is his wife that I saw at the college.'

The grammaticality of clefting varies greatly within the varieties of present-day English (intonation – a rise in the tone of voice – is normally used for topicalisation purposes). In more standard forms only subjects and objects can undergo clefting. But in Scottish and Irish English, so-called 'Celtic' varieties, many elements can be the object of clefting, e.g. a prepositional phrase as in: *It's to Glasgow she went yesterday.*

A sub-type of cleft sentences occurs when a single-clause is broken up into two clauses in which the topicalised element is brought to the front of the entire sentence. Such instances are termed *pseudo-cleft sentences*.

They're no good.	→	*No good is what they are.*
He bought a bicycle	→	*What he bought was a bicycle.*

Summary

- *Pragmatics* is the study of language from the point of view of *usage*. It has various sub-forms depending on the emphasis given by linguists, for instance it can be investigated from a strictly linguistic stance or with regard to social factors.
- *Presupposition* means that something is taken for granted in a sentence whereas *entailment* implies that some other fact(s) apart from that stated in the sentence also hold(s).
- In the analysis of *conversation* various *implicatures* – 'rules' if you like – are taken to apply. They refer to the quality, quantity, relevance and manner of conversation and are assumed to be almost universally valid.
- A *speech act* is a classifiable and structured utterance spoken in an actual communication situation. There are preconditions for speech acts such as *felicity conditions* which must be met for a speech act to be successful.
- Speech acts are classified according to their *effect*. *Locutionary* acts simple express sense or reference. *Illocutionary* acts express the intentions of the speaker whereas for *perlocutionary* acts the effect is of greatest importance. There are further subdivisions in type such as *directives* (commands for example) or *commissives* (promises for instance). An *indirect* speech act is one where the intended meaning of a sentence is different from the literal one.
- *Deixis* concerns the various types of *pointing* which is possible with language. This can be direct, with adverbs of direction, or indirect, for instance with different types of pronoun.
- *Discourse analysis* is concerned with the analysis of spoken language in sections larger than the sentence. The two main features for successful

discourse are *coherence* (based on semantic transparency) and *cohesion* (achieved through formal mechanisms such as sentence connectors and anaphoric elements).

- Emphasising sentence elements is achieved mainly through *topicalisation* (movement of highlighted elements, normally to the beginning of a sentence) and *clefting* (moving an element to the beginning by placing it in a dummy sentence with the rest in a subordinate clause).

Further reading

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Grice, H. Paul 1989. *Studies in the ways of words*. ???

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The New York Institute of Cognitive and Cultural Studies, 2004
St. Petersburg State University, Session I (Week 1: July 5-9; Week 2: July 12-16)

Introduction to Pragmatics

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Broad overview

Pragmatics — the study of language use — is central to current theoretical linguistics and connects in important ways with nearby fields (philosophy, sociology, literature, etc.). This course will aim to introduce students to the basic concepts of linguistic pragmatics and explore some of their consequences, both for linguistic theory and for the study of cooperative social interaction more generally.

I will presuppose no linguistic background, but I will strive to make the course interesting for experienced linguists. I hope this is reflected in the questions and potential group projects in section 11, which mix basic and advanced linguistics with literary criticism and sociology.

Course website: http://homepage.mac.com/cgpotts/nyi04-pragmatics/

Reading (downloadable from the course website)

These notes. [required]

Grice, H. Paul. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan, eds., *Syntax and Semantics*, Volume 3: Speech Acts, 43–58. New York: Academic Press. [required]

Chapter 1 of Levinson, Stephen C. 2000. *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [recommended]

Assignment (due July 12)

Answer one (or more) of the questions is section 11 (p. 25). Your answer(s) should be in short-essay form.

If you are new to linguistics, I strongly encourage you to see me for help in selecting an appropriate question. The questions differ greatly in the amount of background knowledge they require.

1 Pragmatics and linguistic theory

Levinson's (2000:2–4) analogy

Figure 0.1
Rembrandt sketch

"We interpret this sketch instantly and effortlessly as a gathering of people before a structure, probably a gateway; the people are listening to a single declaiming figure in the center. [. . .] But all this is a miracle, for there is little detailed information in the lines or shading (such as there is). Every line is a mere suggestion [. . .]. So here is the miracle: from a merest, sketchiest squiggle of lines, you and I converge to find adumbration of a coherent scene [. . .].

"The problem of utterance interpretation is not dissimilar to this visual miracle. An utterance is not, as it were, a verdical model or "snapshot" of the scene it describes [. . .]. Rather, an utterance is just as sketchy as the Rembrandt drawing."

1.1 Some phenomena that have received pragmatic analyses

I do not necessarily endorse pragmatic analyses of these phenomena. The references provided are just some (but by no means all!) of the classic works on these topics.

1. **Quantifier domains** Why does *everyone* so rarely quantify over everyone? (von Fintel 1994)
2. **Modality**: How many meanings for *must*? (Kratzer 1981)
3. **Scalar inferences**: Why does *some* tend to mean *not all*? Why does *three* tend to mean *exactly three*? (Horn 1989; Levinson 2000)
4. **Focus effects**: How does *Well, Ed didn't READ the book* come to suggest (implicate) that Ed did something else with the book? (Rooth 1992)
5. **Indexicals**: What do *I* and *you* and *here* refer to? How do they get their referents? (Kaplan 1989)
6. **Belief reports**: Is it false or misleading to say that *Lois Lane believes Superman is a reporter*? Why or why not? (Berg 1988)
7. **Polarity items in questions**: *Why do anything?*/#*Why not do anything?* (Linebarger 1987)
8. **Metaphor** (Levinson 1983:§3.2.5)
9. **Discourse particles** (Blakemore 2001)
10. **Gradable adjectives**: How can *That mouse is tall* be true and *That elephant is tall* be false in a situation in which both the elephant and the mouse are 1 meter tall? (Kennedy 1999)
11. **Intrasentential anaphora**: Why is it so hard to intepret *he* as coreferential with *Eddie* in *He believes that Eddie deserves a prize*? (Reinhart 1983; Heim 1998)
12. **When literal interpretations go wrong**:

    (A) "Can you pass the salt?"

    (B) # "Yes." (without passing the salt)[1]

[1] In linguistics, a prefixed hatchmark, #, indicates semantic or pragmatic anomaly. A prefixed asterisk, *, means that the form is ungrammatical. A percentage sign, %, signals dialect variation.

1.2 My perspective

I am primarily a semanticist. I study the range of possible meanings for linguistic expressions. My goal is a *compositional* semantic theory:

(1) **Compositionality** A semantic theory is compositional just in case the meaning of every complex expression in that theory is fully determined by the meanings of its parts and some general rules for putting those parts together.

I generally study pragmatics from the perspective of semantic theory. Pragmatic explanations are often required to square the compositionality principle with the facts of language use. That is, sometimes compositionality seems to fail:

(2) Some students snoozed.

  a. the intersection of the set of students and the set of snoozed is nonempty

  b. not all students snoozed

(3) Some students snoozed. In fact, all the students snoozed.

  a. the intersection of the set of students and the set of snoozed is nonempty

  b. ~~not all students snoozed~~

The meaning of the first sentence seems to change based on the continuation! We will see many examples of such context-dependency. It is not easily squared with a compositional semantics. In many cases, this signals that a pragmatic explanation is called for.

I aim for a formal pragmatics:

Stalnaker 1970:272 "My project in this paper is to carve out a subject matter that might plausibly be called pragmatics and which is in the tradition of recent work in formal semantics. [...] Although this paper gives an informal presentation, the subject can be developed in a relatively straightforward way as a *formal pragmatics* no less rigorous than present-day logical syntax and semantics."

The formalism of these notes is a simple propositional logic (PL). Conversational implicatures will be our primary object of study, and these are propositional meanings, so PL is about as complicated as we need to get. Our use of PL will also give you a sense for how linguistic semantic works and why it often must be a kind of applied logic.

1.3 Situating pragmatics in linguistic theory

A popular, overly restrictive model

$$\ldots \Longrightarrow \text{syntax} \Longrightarrow \text{semantics} \Longrightarrow \text{pragmatics}$$



Interpreted as true iff the set of students and the set of tired things has a nonempty intersection

Conversationally implicates that not all the students are tired.

This picture is too simple, but it is useful because it gets at the intuition that pragmatic meanings are those that are generated by the way speakers deploy semantic content. For complications to this view, see section 10 below.

A more articulated version of the same basic outlook (from Levinson 2000:173)



Figure 3.1
Received view of the semantics/pragmatics relation

1.4 Kinds of natural-language meaning

Horn's (1989:146) typology



Potts's (2004) typology



Figure 2.1: A MEANING GRAPH

1.5 A bit of history

Probably the first proposal for linguistic pragmatics "Semantics deals with the relation of signs to [...] objects which they may or do denote. Pragmatics concerns the relation of signs to their interpreters." (Morris 1938[1971]:35, 43)

Morris's view of pragmatics is much broader than today's, since it basically encompasses sociolinguistics and much of cognitive science (Levinson 1983:2).

Grice's conversational implicatures 'Logic and conversation' is a defining moment in pragmatic theory. Grice strikes a balance between the logical positivism of people like Russell and the ordinary-language philosophy of Austin, Strawson and others. As Bach (1994) says,

> It is no exaggeration to say that such philosophers as Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein paid only lip service to natural languages, for they were more interested in deep and still daunting problems about representation, which they hoped to solve by studying the properties of ideal ("logically perfect") languages, where forms of sentences mirror the forms of what sentences symbolize. As Austin complains at the beginning of *How to Do Things with Words*, it was assumed by philosophers (he had the logical positivists in mind, like Schlick, Carnap, and Ayer) that "the business of a [sentence] can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which it must do either truly or falsely." Austin and the later Wittgenstein changed all that. Austin made it abundantly clear that there are all sorts of "speech acts" besides statements. And the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*, rebelling against his former self, came to think of language not primarily as a system of representation but as a vehicle for all sorts of social activity. "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use," he advised. Here he went too far, for there is good reason to separate the theory of linguistic meaning (semantics) from the theory of language use (pragmatics), not that they are unconnected.

Formal pragmatics Pragmatics comes into its own when Stalnaker (1970) suggests ways that it can be made precise. Gazdar (1979a,b) follows through. Dynamic theories like Discourse Representation Theory (DRT; Kamp and Reyle 1993) and File-Change Semantics (e.g., Heim 1982; Chierchia 1995) intentionally (and fruitfully) blur the line between semantics and pragmatics. Kadmon (2001) is an extremely useful overview. Levinson 1983:§1 explains how pragmatics took shape as a discipline.

1.6 Some proposed definitions for *pragmatics*

Let's assume that none of these definitions actually identifies the domain of pragmatics. Together, they can help us get a feel for the sort of phenomena we will study.

Truth conditional "Pragmatics has as its topic those aspects of the meaning of utterances which cannot be accounted for by straightforward reference to the truth conditions of the sentences uttered." (Gazdar 1979a:2)

Literal encoding "I take it that semantics covers truth-conditional interpretation. I don't know if it covers things that can't be called truth conditional. At any rate, I think that roughly, semantics covers "literal meaning." Pragmatics has to do with language use, and with "going beyond the literal meaning." " (Kadmon 2001:3)

Context "Pragmatics studies the use of language in context, and the context-dependence of various aspects of linguistic interpretation." (Lycan 1995:588)

Bach 1999 provides additional definitions and a valuable discussion of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics.

Our focus For this course, we'll focus on conversational implicatures. Such meanings typically result from interactions between the semantics of a speaker's utterance and some general maxims of cooperative social interaction. We'll see that they can also be essential to determining the semantics of the sentence uttered (*intrusive* conversational implicatures; section 10).

Why conversational implicatures?

- Studying conversational implicatures can provide excellent insights into the methodology of formal semantics and pragmatics.
- Conversational implicatures are elusive but essential to communication. They can help us understand the vagaries and misunderstandings typical of everyday communication.
- Conversational implicatures have proved resistant to formalization in a way that indexicals, ellipsis resolution, and reference have not. But progress is constantly being made. The time is right for linguists to get a firm grip on them.

2 Sentences, utterances, propositions

Conventions

- *Utterances* are inside double-quotes. [Utterances are real-world objects.]
- *Sentences* are given as trees or as labelled bracketings. [Sentences are abstract linguistic objects.]
- *Propositions* are underlined. [Propositions are abstract nonlinguistic objects.]

Contrasts

- Utterances are located in space–time and have agents (speakers). Neither sentences nor propositions are located in space–time, nor do they have agents. They are abstract objects
- Sentences are inherently linguistic. Utterances are events that involve linguistic objects (sentences), but they are not themselves linguistic. Propositions are not linguistic (but rather very easily specified with language).

(4) "I am happy" (uttered by Chris Potts) is an *utterance* of the *sentence*



(equivalently, [$_S$ I am happy]) and expresses the *proposition* Chris Potts is happy.

Can we eliminate any of these concepts? No.

(5) **A single utterance can correspond to more than one proposition:**

"It is cold in here."

It is cold in here

Someone should close the window

(6) **A single utterance can correspond to more than one sentence:**

"A hippo arrived; it had much luggage."

[$_S$ A hippo arrived]

[$_S$ It had much luggage]

(7) **A single sentence can be used in multiple utterances:**



"Most pencils are yellow."
(spoken on March 11, 1955)
"Most pencils are yellow."
(spoken on July 5, 2004)

(8) **A single sentence can convey more than one proposition:**



Ed succeeded
No one who is not Ed succeeded

(9) **A single proposition can be expressed by more than one sentence:**

Ed said he is ill

[$_S$ Ed said [$_S$ that he is ill]]

[$_S$ Ed said [$_S$ he is ill]]

(10) **A single proposition can be expressed by more than one utterance:**

George is confused

"I am confused."
(spoken by George)

"George is confused."
(spoken by a non-George)

Speaker's meaning The proposition or propositions that a speaker intends to convey with his or her use of a particular sentence in a particular utterance.

3 The essentials of Propositional Logic (PL)

3.1 Lexicon

$p, q, r, p', q', r'''', \ldots$

3.2 Syntax

1. Every lexical item is a sentence of PL. (So p is a sentence, for example.)
2. If φ is a sentence of PL, then $\neg\varphi$ is a sentence of PL.
3. If φ and ψ are sentences of PL, then all of the following are also sentences:
   i. $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$
   ii. $(\varphi \vee \psi)$
   iii. $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$
   iv. $(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi)$
4. Only that which can be generated by these clauses (= the grammar) in a finite number of steps is a sentence of PL.

Notes

1. In the definition of the grammar above, φ and ψ are *metavariables*. They stand for sentences of PL of any size and complexity. So φ can stand for p, and it can also stand for $(((p \vee q) \rightarrow (r \wedge \neg p)) \leftrightarrow \neg r)$. And so forth. Anything that can be built using the rules can be put in the place of a metavariable (and nothing else can be so placed).
2. An important difference between PL and any natural language: *for PL, it is **not** an empirical matter whether a string is in the language or not*. For NLs, it **is** an empirical matter: we must survey speakers and probe intuitions.

3. Like natural-language sentences, PL sentences have tree structure:



3.3 Semantics

1. Without a semantics, PL would just be a set of symbols, arranged in an orderly way but without any meaning.

   The way that we give them meaning is with a valuation function V. V accepts as arguments all and only the sentences of PL. It returns as value 1 if the proposition is true, and 0 if it is false.

2. For example, suppose that we want p to be true and q to be false. To make this precise, we say that V applied to p gives 1, and V applied to q gives 0:

   $V(p) = 1$ (‘V applied to p is 1’)
   $V(q) = 0$ (‘V applied to q is 0’)

3. We want the only valuations we consider to be ones that correspond to the intuitive meanings for the connectives. That is, if p is true and q is true, then we want $(p \wedge q)$ to be true. If either of p or q is false, then $(p \wedge q)$ should also be false.

4. The definition of the valuations that we will even *consider* are as follows:[2]

   i. If p is a propositional variable, then $V(p)$ is 1 or 0.
   ii. $V(\neg\varphi) = 1$ iff $V(\varphi) = 0$
   iii. $V(\varphi \wedge \psi) = 1$ iff $V(\varphi) = 1$ and $V(\psi) = 1$
   iv. $V(\varphi \vee \psi) = 1$ iff $V(\varphi) = 1$ or $V(\psi) = 1$
   v. $V(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = 1$ iff $V(\varphi) = 0$ or $V(\psi) = 1$
   vi. $V(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) = 1$ iff $V(\varphi) = V(\psi)$

   These constraints on valuations are the heart of the semantics for PL.

[2] In logic and linguistics, ‘*iff*’ abbreviates ‘*if and only if*’ (one sometimes finds ‘*just in case*’).

4 The original Gricean maxims

The cooperative principle (a super-maxim)

Make your contribution as is required, when it is required, by the conversation in which you are engaged.

Quality

Contribute only what you know to be true. Do not say false things. Do not say things for which you lack evidence.

Quantity

Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not say more than is required

Relation (Relevance)

Make your contribution relevant.

Manner

1. avoid obscurity
2. avoid ambiguity
3. be brief
4. be orderly

5 Conversational implicatures

5.1 Defined (Levinson 1983:113)

(11) S's saying that p conversationally implicates q iff:

i. S is presumed to be observing the maxims, or at least (in the case of floutings) the co-operative principle

ii. In order to maintain this assumption it must be supposed that S thinks that q

iii. S thinks that both S and the addressee H mutually know that H can work out that to preserve the assumption in (i), q is in fact required

5.2 Properties of conversational implicatures (Levinson 2000:15)

- **Cancellability (i.e., defeasibility)** — the property of being an inference defeatable by the addition of premises
- **Nondetachability** — any expression with the same coded content will tend to carry the same implicatures (a principled exception has to be made for Manner implicatures)
- **Calculability** — the more or less transparent derivation of the inference from the premises that include the assumption of rational conversational activity
- **Nonconventionality** — the noncoded nature of the inferences and their parasitic dependence on what is coded
- **Reinforceability** — it is often possible to add explicitly what is anyway implicated with less sense of redundancy than would be the case if one repeated the coded content
- **Universality** — because the inferences are derived ultimately from fundamental considerations of rationality, we expect a strong tendency to universality (unlike coded meanings, of course); conversational implicatures are motivated, not arbitrary

6 An example: *and* vs. *or*

6.1 Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that [$_{\text{conj}}$ or] translates as $\vee$ (*inclusive* disjunction).

Inclusive disjunction, $\vee$, has a specific meaning, representable with a truth table:

	p	q	$p \vee q$
V_a	1	1	1
V_b	1	0	1
V_c	0	1	1
V_d	0	0	0

6.2 Consequences

My hypothesis predicts that a sentence containing [$_{\text{conj}}$ or] is such that

1. it expresses a truth if exactly one of the disjuncts is true;
2. it expresses a truth if both of the disjuncts are true;
3. it expresses a falsehood if both disjuncts are false.

6.3 Data

I gather some empirical evidence that seems relevant to this hypothesis.

(12) [$_{\text{S}}$ [$_{\text{S}}$ It is Tuesday in Santa Cruz] or [$_{\text{S}}$ it is Wednesday in Santa Cruz]]

(13) [$_{\text{S}}$ [$_{\text{S}}$ Ali is intelligent] or [$_{\text{S}}$ Ali is hard-working]]

Consider first (12). I translate it as follows:

(14) a. $p =$ [$_{\text{S}}$ it is Tuesday in Santa Cruz]
b. $q =$ [$_{\text{S}}$ it is Wednesday in Santa Cruz]
c. $(p \vee q)$ = [$_{\text{S}}$ [$_{\text{S}}$ It is Tuesday in Santa Cruz] or [$_{\text{S}}$ it is Wednesday in Santa Cruz]]

6.4 Intuitions

To probe my intuitions systematically, I imagine the four relevant situations (the ones that correspond to the valuations in the truth-table):

(15) Suppose that it is Tuesday but not Wednesday in S.C. Then I judge (12) to be true.
My hypothesis predicts this.

(16) Suppose that it is Wednesday but not Tuesday in S.C. Then I judge (12) to be true.
My hypothesis predicts this.

(17) Suppose it is neither Tuesday nor Wednesday. Then I judge (12) to be false.
My hypothesis predicts this.

So far, this corresponds perfectly to the truth table.

But what about a world in which it is Tuesday *and* it is Wednesday? My hypothesis says that (12) is true in such a world. Is it? This question is unanswerable! To answer it, I need to imagine that I am in a world in which it is both Tuesday and Wednesday in Santa Cruz. I can't imagine such a world! So this is not the right kind of example to see whether my hypothesis makes correct predictions about world (12).

6.5 A better example

Example (13) is a better test of the hypothesis, because it is easy to imagine that Ali is both intelligent and hard-working.

(18) a. $r =$ [$_{\text{S}}$ Ali is intelligent]
b. $q =$ [$_{\text{S}}$ Ali is hard-working]
c. $(r \vee q) =$ [$_{\text{S}}$ [$_{\text{S}}$ Ali is intelligent] or [$_{\text{S}}$ Ali is hard-working]]

As above, my account predicts that (13) is true if both disjuncts are true. This is because $(r \vee q)$ is true if $r = 1$ and $q = 1$. (See valuation V_a above.)

6.6 Trouble

My informants report that there is something very strange about using (13) if the speaker knows that we are in a world in which Ali is both intelligent and hard-working.

6.6.1 Option 1

I could revise my hypothesis, translating [$_{\text{conj}}$ or] as *exclusive* disjunction:

	p	q	$p \infty q$
V_a	1	1	0
V_b	1	0	1
V_c	0	1	1
V_d	0	0	0

6.6.2 Option 2

I could seek a Gricean explanation for my informants' uneasy feeling about using (13) in a world in which Ali is both intelligent and hard-working.

6.7 More evidence

Only facts can decide between Option 1 and Option 2. The following kind of example seems decisive in favor of Option 2.

(19) Professor: "Everyone who got an A on the midterm or an A on the final gets a prize. Otherwise, no prize."

a. Odd-ball response: #"I got an A on both the midterm and the final, so that means I don't get a prize."

b. Sensible response: "I got an A on both the midterm and the final. Gimme my prize!"

Such examples seem readily available. So I opt for Option 1. Option 2 predicts that the odd-ball response is the felicitous one, and the sensible response is weird. On Option 2, I would have to say that [$_{\text{conj}}$ or] can translate as $\vee$ in at least some circumstances. This might be correct, but it seems better to maintain an unambiguous translation of [$_{\text{conj}}$ or] if that is possible.[3]

[3]To pursue the ambiguity line further, one would want a generalization saying where each can occur. This would have to be a noncontext-dependent explanation, else it would collapse with the Gricean one I am about to offer. To pursue this line, one would also want to think about [$_{\text{conj}}$ and/or], [either…or], [neither…nor], and other such expressions.

6.8 But what about those uneasy feelings?

I cannot just ignore my informants' judgment that (13) is odd in a world in which Ali is both intelligent and hard-working. How can I explain this?

6.9 Grice to the rescue

My sense is that (13) is infelicitous in a situation where Ali is both intelligent and hard-working because it is more informative to use [$_{\text{conj}}$ and] in such a situation. First, I need to be precise about what "more informative" means.

6.10 Introducing strict implication, $\prec$

(20) Definition: $[\varphi \prec \psi]$ is true if and only if

a. $V(\varphi) = 1$ implies that $V(\psi) = 1$ for any valuation V.

b. That is, every valuation that makes φ true is one that makes ψ true.

c. Gloss: 'φ is *as strong as* (*as informative as*) ψ'.

If we have $[\varphi \prec \psi]$, but it is false that $[\psi \prec \varphi]$, then we can say that φ is *stronger* than ψ.

'Stronger' means 'true on *fewer* valuations'.

6.11 A role for quantity

Using $\prec$, I can formalize the intuition that $(p \wedge q)$ is more informative than $(p \vee q)$, because, by the above definition, $[(p \wedge q) \prec (p \vee q)]$:

	p	q	$p \wedge q$	$p \vee q$
V_a	1	1	**1**	**1**
V_b	1	0	0	1
V_c	0	1	0	1
V_d	0	0	0	0

And since $(p \vee q)$ is true, but $(p \wedge q)$ false, in valuations V_b and V_c, the conjunction $(p \wedge q)$ is *stronger* than the disjunction $(p \vee q)$.

Recall that Grice's maxim of quantity is as follows:

(21) "Quantity: (1) make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). (2) Do not make your contrubution more informative than is required." (Grice 1975:45)

So by quantity, if the speaker is obeying the maxims, then $\wedge$ should be used. It is the more informative option!

6.12 Calculating the conversational implicature

I claim that the intuition that using [$_{\text{conj}}$ or] disfavors an interpretation in which both disjuncts are true is the result of a conversational implicature, arising as follows:

(22) A: "What is the secret to Ali's success?"

B: "Ali is intelligent or Ali is hard-working"

Speaker A reasons:

a. I seek a unique answer to my question. That is, the answer should tell me exactly what kind of world I am in.

b. By quantity, Speaker B should provide one.

c. But B provided something translating as $(p \vee q)$, which is less informative than $(p \wedge q)$. (That is, $[(p \wedge q) \prec (p \vee q)]$.)

d. Why? Well, it must be that quality prevents him from providing an answer that gets us to a single world. That is, he is not in a position to know for certain that p obtains, that q obtains, or that $(p \wedge q)$ obtains. That is, of the four worlds that are possible, he can only narrow us down to two of them without violating quality:

	p	q	$p \vee q$
V_a	1	1	1
$\mathbf{V_b}$	**1**	**0**	**1**
$\mathbf{V_c}$	**0**	**1**	**1**
V_d	0	0	0

e. Hence, I will not assign this the interpretation where both disjuncts are true. For that, speakers use $\wedge$, because that limits us to just a single world (valuation):

	p	q	$p \wedge q$
$\mathbf{V_a}$	**1**	**1**	**1**
V_b	1	0	0
V_c	0	1	0
V_d	0	0	0

6.13 Conclusion

The initial hypothesis seems to survive. We account for the full range of cases considered using just the semantics, and then appeal to Gricean principles — the balancing of Quantity and Quantity — to explain why speakers tend to infer from a use of [$_{\text{conj}}$ or] that exactly one of the disjuncts is false. Translating [$_{\text{conj}}$ or] as exclusive disjunction doesn't account for data like (19). For that, we need to appeal to $\vee$. Future research might show that this is necessary, but for now it is simpler to maintain an unambiguous [$_{\text{conj}}$ or].

7 Particularized and generalized

Levinson 2000:16

(23) The distinction between particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs) and generalized conversational implucatures (GCIs)

a. An implicature i from an utterance U is *particularized* iff U implicates i only by virtue of specific contextual assumptions that would not invariably or even normally obtain

b. An implicature i is *generalized* iff U implicates i *unless* there are unusual specific contextual assumptions that defeat it

These two classes of implicature have much in common, and for that reason they are often conflated. But Levinson (2000) makes a convincing case that this distinction has consequences for the grammar. He shows that we can make considerable progress by focussing on generalized conversational implicatures and bringing innovative logical tools to bear on them.

8 Flouting maxims

Grice (1975:49) lists four ways in which a speaker can fail to satisfy a maxim. The fourth is flouting:

> He may FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may BLATANTLY fail to fulfill it. On the assumption that the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so without violating another maxim (because of a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead, the hearer is faced with a minor problem: How can his saying what he said be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall CP [cooperative principle]? The situation characteristically gives rise to a conversational implicature; and when a conversational implicature is generated in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being EXPLOITED." (p. 49)

Grice provides numerous examples. The questions in section 11.4 (page 28) involve examples of maxim flouting and ask whether we can find useful generalizations about how conversational implicatures arise in these cases.

9 Alternative formulations of the maxims

9.1 Horn 1989, 1996

- Quality (same as Grice): Strive for the truth. Do not say that which you know to be false. Do not say that for which you lack evidence.
- R-principle: Say no more than you must, respecting Q.
- Q-principle: Say as much as you can while respecting Quality and the R-principle

9.2 Levinson 2000

- Q-heuristic: What isn't said, isn't
- I-heuristic: What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified
- M-heuristic: What's said in an abnormal way isn't normal

9.3 Relevance Theory

Definitions from Simons (Forthcoming)

(24) *Communicative Principle of Relevance*

Every utterance conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

(25) *Optimal Relevance*

An utterance is optimally relevant to an audience iff:

a. It produces adequate contextual effects to be worth the audience's processing effort.

b. It is the most relevant utterance, compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences, for the production of those contextual effects.

10 Conversational implicature intrusion

10.1 Grice's circle

> Grice's account makes implicature dependent on a prior determination of "the said". The said in turn depends on disambiguation of "the said". The said in turn depends on disambiguation, indexical resolution, reference fixing, not to mention ellipsis unpacking and generality narrowing. But each of these processes, which are prerequisites to determining the proposition expressed, may themselves depend crucially on processes that look indistinguishable from implicatures. Thus what is said seems both to determine and to be determined by implicature. Let us call this *Grice's circle*.[4] (Levinson 2000:186)

Examples sampled from Levinson 2000:§3

(26) **Indexical resolution (§3.2.3)**

a. "*Some of you* know the news; I'm not talking to *you*; I'm talking to the rest of you."
(*to you* is interpreted as 'to some but not all of you')

b. "The meeting is on *Thursday*."
(if tomorrow is Thursday, then *Thursday* means *not tomorrow*)

[4] Levinson notes that Grice was well aware of the nature of this situation.

(27) **Generality narrowing (§3.2.6)**

a. "Fixing the car will take some time."

b. "I've eaten breakfast."

c. "Chris is short." (relative to pro basketball players)

d. "Chris is tall." (relative to gymnasts)

(28) "Eating some cookies is better than eating all of them." (p. 203)

(29) "Driving home and drinking three beers is better than drinking three beers and driving home." (p. 199)

10.2 Implications for the theory

10.2.1 Fiddling with the standard model (Levinson 2000:188)



Figure 3.2
Presemantic and postsemantic pragmatics

The appearance of pragmatics both before and after semantics seems to indicate that the relationship is not unidirectional. We should allow information to flow both ways.

10.2.2 Chierchia's proposal

Chierchia's (2001) starting point is the observation that scalar conversational implicatures can be embedded:

(30) a. Eddie: "Mary will run the meeting or Mary will operate the projector."
(Eddie's utterance conversationlly implicates that Mary will not do both.)

b. Eddie believes that Mary will run the meeting or Mary will operate the projector.
(Uttering this sentence would conversationally implicate that Eddie believes that Mary will not do both.)

A global computation of conversational implicatures might wrongly predict only the weaker scalar implicature expressible as *It is false that Eddie believes that Mary will run the meeting and Mary will operate the projector.*

To ensure a more local calculation, Chierchia places the scalar implicature in the lexical meaning of the determiner. Here is a simplified meaning for [$_{\text{conj}}$ or]:

(31) a. regular dimension: $\vee$

b. conversational-implicature dimension: $|$, *not and* (Sheffer stroke)

He employs a similar strategy for a wide range of scalar items that give rise to intrusive generalized conversational implicatures.

10.2.3 Layered Discourse Representation Theory (DRT)

This option is explored in depth by Kadmon (1987) and Geurts and Maier (2003), and it is discussed approvingly by Levinson (2000). We use the syntax of DRT for both semantics and pragmatics, but we distinguish the two realms in the logic and, in turn, in the models.

$w\ x\ y\ z$	
$w =$ **mary** $\quad x =$ **eddie** **projector**(y) **meeting**(z)	
believe(x)	**run**$(w)(z) \vee$ **operate**$(w)(y)$ $\underline{\neg(\textbf{run}(w)(z) \wedge \textbf{operate}(w)(y))}$

The pragmatic meaning is underlined. It is presumably defeasible, i.e., governed by a nonmonotonic logic.

10.2.4 Nonmonotonic logic/default logics

Conversational implicatures are unreliable (cancellable, defeasible). The rigidity of deductive logics is thus inappropriate. Default logics are more forgiving. See Levinson 2000:§1.5.1 for an overview. And see question 34 (p. 26).

11 Questions and group projects

The purpose of these questions is simply to get you thinking about the issues. You should not feel compelled to answer each and every subpart of the question(s) you pick, nor should you feel limited to these questions. You're encouraged to see me to discuss possible, extensions, rearrangements, or entirely new questions/topics.

11.1 The logic of the maxims

(32) **The maxims in game theory**

Groenendijk (1999) develops a game-theoretic analysis of questions that has some of the Gricean maxims built into it as rules of the game. His reconstruction of the maxim of quantity simply forbids players from making moves that do not change the state of the game. Which aspects of the original Gricean maxim does this capture? Which does it neglect?

(33) **Maxims ranking**

There is a clear sense in which the maxims are ranked and violable, as in Optimality Theory (Kager 1999; McCarthy 2001). We can see this in the restatements of them by Horn (section 9.1) and Levinson (section 9.2). This raises significant theoretical issues, ones that have been explored recently by Beaver (2004). Let's explore some ourselves, via a little scenario:

Speaker B knows	that it is sunny outside.
Speaker B knows	that it is summertime.
Speaker B does not know	whether it is Wednesday.

a. **Speaker A asks Speaker B: Is it Wednesday?**
   i. How does Speaker B reply if he values Quantity above all other maxims?
   ii. How does Speaker B reply if he values Quality above all other maxims?

b. **Speaker A asks Speaker B: Is it summertime?**
   i. How does Speaker B reply if he values Quantity above all other maxims?
   ii. How does Speaker B reply if he values Quality above all other maxims?

(34) **Nonmonotonic logic**

Initially, it seems that both of the following sentences have the same entailments, namely, (34c):

a. Ed sang or Ed danced.

b. Ed sang or danced. He did not sing and dance.

c. i. $\textbf{sing}(\textbf{ed}) \vee \textbf{sing}(\textbf{ed})$
   ii. $\neg\big(\textbf{sing}(\textbf{ed}) \wedge \textbf{sing}(\textbf{ed})\big)$

However, if we add additional premises, we can see that they are in fact different:

a. Ed sang or Ed danced. In fact, he both sang and danced.

b. $^{\#}$Ed sing or danced. He did not sing and dance. In fact, he both sang and danced.

The first is coherent. The second is a contradiction. Can we find a logic that characterizes this behavior? Suppose that we are free to mark (pragmatic) premises in our logic with a symbol M. What condition should we place on M to ensure that it behaves in a way that is useful for modelling conversational implicatures? Levinson 20001.5.2 should be helpful for thinking about this.

11.2 Implicature calculation

(35) **Moore's Paradox**

a. It's snowy, but Freddy believes it isn't snowy.

b. It's snowy, but you believe it isn't snowy.

c. $^{\#}$It's snowy, but I believe it isn't snowy.

Is the third example semantically contradictory? If not, can we use the maxims to understand why it is marked?

(36) **Necessity modals**

a. This is the road to South College.

b. This must be the road to South College.

c. I believe that this is the road to South College.

Let $S \rightrightarrows S'$ mean that S is appropriately asserted in a subset of the situations in which S' is appropriately uttered. Let $\Rightarrow$ be the proper version of $\rightrightarrows$.

a. What $\rightrightarrows$ relationships exist between these examples when they are asserted?

b. Can we use the maxims to understand these relationships?

(37) **Cardinal determiners**

Cardinal determines like *three* seem to engender the generalized conversational implicature *at most three*. Try to find

a. a scenario in which determiner *three* lacks its *at most* scalar implicature; and

b. a scenario in which determiner *three* lacks its *at least* meaning.

11.3 Patterns of lexicalization

(38) Here is a view of the *nand* ('not and') operator (the Sheffer Stroke).

φ	ψ	$\varphi \mid \psi$
1	1	0
1	0	1
0	1	1
0	0	1

Horn (1989, 2003) observes that this operator is never lexicalized in natural languages. However, it shows up often in computation (hardware and software engineering). How can we use pragmatics (especially the reasoning employed throughout section 6) to explain this why lexical item is missing? Why is this pragmatic explanation reenforced by the abundance of *nand* gates and the like in computational settings? Levinson 2000:§1.7 is a good resource for this question.

(39) Try to extend the reasoning employed in (38) to explain why natural languages do not have quantifiers like *nevery* ('not every'), adverbs like *nalways* ('not always'). Again, Levinson 2000:§1.7 will prove useful.

11.4 Maxim flouting

(40) **Car Talk**

On the radio show *Car Talk* (broadcast March 31, 2002), one of the hosts read the following joke, purportedly taken from an evaluation sheet filled in by students at the end of a college course:

Q. "How would you describe the quality of the textbook?"

A. "Very high. It is printed on the very best paper and beautifully bound."

What does the speaker/writer intend to convey with this answer, and how does he manage to do it? Using Grice's maxims, give precise answers to these questions. Note: there are a few ways that this joke can be interpreted. Concentrate on one; if you perceive others, then you are welcome to discuss them, though this is not required.

(41) **The real crime**

"Professor Erika Kohut (Isabelle Huppert), who gives piano lessons to advanced students at the Vienna Conservatory, stands at the window of her studio and hurls thunderbolts at the teen-age musicians. When a talented boy hits a clinker, she says, "A wrong note in Beethoven is better than a bad interpretation," which, she implies, is his real crime." (Denby, David. 2002. *The New Yorker*, April 1, p. 98)

How does Professor Kohut manage to imply that the student's interpretation is bad? (And what about those thunderbolts? How to we understand them?)

(42) **Generalizations about flouting?**

What kinds of conversational implicature can maxim flouting give rise to? Can we identify any generalized conversational implicatures as the output of flouting? If the answer is yes, then we are on our way to a formal theory of this domain (which would be cool!).

(43) **From Manfred Krifka's lecture notes on pragmatics:**

Read the beginning of Vaclav Havels essay 'The power of the powerless' of 1978, a very important piece of dissident literature. Havel discusses the case of a greengrocer in Prague who puts a sign in his shopping window reading "Workers of the world, unite!" and speculates what he could have meant by that.

a. Why does the greengrocer not display a sign saying 'I am afraid and therefore obedient'?

b. Havel describes how the slogan isnt even noticed anymore, but forms "part of the panorama of everyday life". Give another example of this phenomenon.

11.5 Universality

(44) Read Keenan 1979 and identify the factors that she regards as evidence that Malagasy speakers devalue the quantity maxim. Are these criteria, taken individually, unique to Malagasy society, or can we find them in our own as well? Is the combination of all those factors unique to Malagasy society? What does this tell us about Keenan's special kind of cultural relativism? Has she convincingly challenged the universality property (section 5.2)?

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CHAPTER 1

PRAGMATICS

1.1 Introduction

In its initial stages, the study of language focused mainly on the capability for understanding how language works (Chomsky, 1965). However, since the 1980s, research has indicated that there was a need to change that language competence focus to a more practical perspective on the use of language. Throughout this chapter, a review of this change of perspective is provided by focusing on pragmatics as the language discipline that has fostered this change. Several researchers have contributed to help build up this new focus on language competence based on usage and performance (Levinson, 1983; Leech, 1983; Thomas, 1995; Kasper 1997; LoCastro, 2003, etc.). Pragmatics is concerned with the study of language from a particular point of view in which interactants are the main source of meaning. This meaning is communicated throughout interaction and this interaction involves a dynamic negotiation process between speakers. Any interaction takes place in a context (immediate physical setting) but it is also indirectly linked to, and dependent on, social and cultural factors. Moreover, there should be a differentiation between the two main components within this new approach to language: i) the pragmalinguistic component, which specifically depicts the linguistic resources available for the speaker to choose when interacting (e.g. directness, indirectness, pragmatic routines, modification devices) and ii) the sociopragmatic component, which involves cultural and social factors (e.g. social status, social distance, power, rights and obligations, and the degree of imposition) influencing linguistic choices.

After introducing the field of pragmatics and providing a complete and understanding of the definition of its components, this chapter moves to define some specific concepts directly related to this discipline, due to their communicative nature. Such concepts are those of speech acts (Austin, 1976; Searle, 1969), politeness (Grice, 1975; Leech, 1983; Lakoff, 1989; Brown & Levinson, 1987, etc.) and context (Malinowski, 1923; Cicourel, 1980; Verschueren, 1999; Cutting, 2002; Huang, 2007, etc.).

These concepts are described by following their evolution and different interpretations, since numerous researchers have studied them in detail. First, speech act theory is related to pragmatics since it describes and classifies linguistic action patterns used by speakers in a given interaction. Second, politeness theory influences those linguistic choices based mainly on the variables of distance, power and imposition that affects interactants' linguistic behaviour. Finally, the concept of context is seen as delimiting both politeness theory and speech act resources since, as a wide concept, it mainly involves the ongoing setting but most importantly social and cultural factors constraining interaction.

1.1.1 Origins and components

There have been crucial changes since the early 1980s related to the study of language from a pragmatic point of view. The main point to be made was the change of perspective from a focus on competence, whose main exponent has been Chomsky (1965) in his theory of mental faculty towards performance. It was noted that this faculty was essential to convey meaning in language use and interaction. Thus, this relatively new paradigm which gives greater importance to language performance rather than language competence has been termed *pragmatics*. A great number of scholars have presented their own definitions for this new paradigm (Alcón & Martínez-Flor, 2008; Bublitz, 2001; Crystal, 1997; Kasper & Rose, 2001; LoCastro, 2003; Schauer, 2009) among many others. Crystal's (1985) definition of pragmatics has been considered as the one better reflecting the nature of pragmatics in its origins since users' linguistic choices, the constraints they face and the effects of their production when using language are studied. In addition to that, some other researchers (McCarthy, 1991; Thomas, 1995; Clark, 1996) contributed to the definition and expansion of the concept of pragmatics in the early 1990s, considering pragmatics as the study of

- meaning in context;
- meaning in interaction;
- the necessity of focusing on non-linguistic elements such as utterances and signs.

Thomas (1995) placed emphasis on the role of pragmatics as the study of meaning in interaction as a negotiation process in which "physical, social and linguistic" context (Thomas, 1995: 22) may have an important role.

The twenty-first century has been the most representative in terms of the evolution of pragmatics, due to the impact of previous theories in the 1980s and 1990s and their effect on research conducted afterwards. For the purposes of this book, research carried out by Bublitz (2001), LoCastro (2003), Martínez-Flor and Usó-Juan (2010a), and Schauer (2009) has been considered as reflecting a step forward in the description of pragmatics under a more contemporaneous and elaborated point of view. Thus, Bublitz's (2001) contribution resides in the understanding of the intended meaning since the use of linguistic forms and communication strategies can be described by pragmatics. First, LoCastro (2003: 11) defined pragmatics as "an inherently functional perspective on language". That functionality is reflected in the linguistic and non-linguistic means by which the speaker produces their intended meaning. In addition to that, the author placed emphasis on both speaker and hearer as meaning-creation entities while interacting, since linguistic choices and constraints when using language are important. Apart from interactants, importance was given to the distinction between linguistic (co-text) and non-linguistic aspects as entities included in the term context. Thus, it can be inferred from this definition that speaker and hearer are the main sources of meaning when uttering sentences. As seen in the characteristics proposed above, LoCastro (2003) thought it was necessary to include and describe participants, the different contexts in which interaction can take place, the limitations when using a language and the effects of language use in any interaction between participants.

Schauer (2009) went a step further in the definition of pragmatics with the purpose of not only spreading but also delimiting the scope of pragmatics by emphasising the coding and decoding system of utterances, principles of rational and effective communication and the role of society (Bublitz, 2001; Mey, 2001). Some of the inclusions provided with that aim were speech act theory, the cooperative principle, politeness theory and conversational implicature. Martínez-Flor and Usó-Juan (2010a) proposed pragmatics principles and features based on previous research (Leech, 1983; Thomas, 1995; Verschueren, 1999; Yule, 1996). First, meaning creation, negotiation and interpretation between speaker and hearer within any interaction; second, the particular context in which interaction takes place which may include the physical, social and linguistic context; third, meaning creation as a dynamic concept negotiated throughout the process of communication in a specific context. Furthermore, they suggested some defining characteristics of pragmatics:

- language use with communicative purposes;
- language function importance over language form;
- communicative purposes' study;
- context importance;
- authentic language use;
- applicability to different disciplines.

Having provided the different definitions and characteristics of pragmatics through time, it is also necessary to describe its two main components, which are pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics. The pragmalinguistic component was defined as "the particular resources which a given language provides for conveying particular illocutions" (Leech, 1983: 11). On the other hand, the term sociopragmatics was originally described as "the sociological interface of pragmatics" (Leech, 1983: 10). Several studies have been carried out with the aim of describing both components in more detail (Kasper, 1997; Kasper & Rose, 2002; Barron, 2003; Martínez-Flor & Usó-Juan, 2010a). Having examined this bulk of research, it was agreed that pragmalinguistic competence includes the linguistic forms and resources that are available to communicate and understand intended meaning. These resources include pragmatic strategies such as directness and indirectness when conveying meaning, as well as the use of pragmatic routines (Bardovi-Harlig & Mossman, 2017). The usefulness of these resources resides in interactants' ability to boost or diminish the illocutionary force in any conversation. Sociopragmatic competence is related to the social and non-linguistic aspects constraining interaction, for instance social status and sociological variables (Brown & Levinson, 1987).

Thus, taking into consideration all the definitions of pragmatics and its main components previously described, the definition of pragmatics to be adopted in this particular research needs to take into account meaning in interaction, linguistic and non-linguistic notions of context, interactants' linguistic choices and the constraints they encounter within the communication process itself. Then, some of the main characteristics considered essential for the study and applicability of pragmatics are presented below:

- The main sources when conveying meaning are speakers and hearers, since both are involved in creation and interpretation of meaning.
- As a dynamic concept, meaning is negotiated by interactants.

- Paralinguistic resources such as body language should receive attention since these help in meaning creation and understanding.
- As context may affect interaction in different ways, two different interpretations of this term should be provided. On the one hand, the physical context which has been traditionally referred as setting and involves not only the immediate context where any interaction can take place, but also factors that may influence interaction – for instance, social and cultural factors. On the other hand, co-text is defined as the linguistic context and it reflects the sociopragmatic variables' effect on the linguistic choices, interactional patterns and communication strategies chosen by speakers and hearers.

Summing up, the term pragmatics has been introduced by providing its definitions, components and aspects related to it. As it is a relatively new language paradigm, it necessary to develop a more expanded description of the concepts implicit in the achievement of communicative actions. The next subsection is devoted to

- an introduction to speech act theory as it is related to the pragmalinguistic component in pragmatics;
- politeness theory as constraining linguistic production and connected to sociopragmatics;
- the concept of context as the physical and spatial setting in addition to the linguistic creation of meaning from an already existing linguistic background.

1.2 Concepts related to pragmatics

This section presents speech act theory, context and politeness since these are directly related to pragmatics. First, is a brief description of speech act theory from its founders (Austin, 1976; Searle, 1969) to more recent theories, for example the dynamic speech act theory (DSAT) proposed by Geis (1995) although more detailed information is given in Chapter 2. Second, politeness theory is reviewed as it influences interaction and must be necessarily understood in order to describe pragmalinguistic choices. The last part in this subsection is devoted to the description of context theory to determine its importance and influence in conversation.

1.2.1 Speech act theory

What follows is a brief outline of speech act theory, which is widely developed in Chapter 2. The most representative figures regarding speech act theory are considered to be Austin (1976) and Searle (1969), since both established their own theories on speech acts. Austin (1976) based his theory on performative verbs, which imply the performance of actions when speaking. Thus, he differentiated between three different types of main acts produced:

- locutionary, which is the oral production itself;
- the illocutionary act, which represents the intention and force of the locutionary act;
- the perlocutionary act, which is the effect of the speaker's words on the hearer.

His proposal was a classification of illocutionary acts based on performative verbs. In addition, he proposed what he coined as felicity conditions on performatives, which represent conversational postulates to be understood and produced as such. Austin's work influenced his PhD student John Searle who published *Speech Acts* some years later in 1969. In his work, Searle (1969) differentiated between illocutionary acts and illocutionary verbs, affirming that it is not necessary to use a performative verb to achieve an illocutionary act. His classification of speech acts, which also include indirect speech acts, was based on the illocutionary point, direction of fit and sincerity conditions.

Both theories have received criticism as context and politeness factors were not considered and are thought to influence speech act production. As a reaction, some new theories presenting innovations have been developed for example Geis's (1995) DSAT theory, which puts emphasis on speech acts' production and understanding as goal-recognition and goal-achievement process carried out by interactants fostering their abilities in differing specific contexts.

1.2.2 Politeness theory

Although the very concept of politeness involves "… proper social conduct and tactful consideration of others" (Kasper, 1994, pp. 3206), its study under a pragmatic scope has become a complete and meaningful paradigm due to researchers' manifold contributions (Brown and Levinson, 1978, 1987; Fraser, 1990; Grice, 1975; Lakoff, 1973, 1977, 1989; Leech,

1983, 2003, 2005). Kasper (2009) differentiated between two main politeness theory approaches. First, politeness is seen as a set of rules or maxims to be achieved to accomplish interactions (Grice, 1975; Lakoff, 1977; Leech, 1983). The second approach was seen as a system of rules governing social interaction (Fraser, 1990) or the social functions of language in interaction carried out by Brown and Levinson (1987), which was derived from the notion of face (Goffman, 1955). A short summary of these theories is presented below from the earlier to more recent ones.

Grice's cooperative principle was defined as "make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose of direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice, 1975: 45). Thus, it is speakers' rationality and goal-achievement purpose that may lead interaction to fulfil conversational needs. In order to achieve these needs, the author proposed four different maxims, i.e. quantity, quality, relation and manner, which should be taken into consideration when accomplishing the cooperative principle.

- *Quantity*: Give as much information as required (specific communicative exchange demands) and avoid information overload.
- *Quality*: The information given must be truthful and concordant with facts. Avoid deceitful statements and those which miss authentic evidences.
- *Relation*: Provide pertinent and significant information.
- *Manner:* Be clear and easily understood when communicating meaning. Try not to be inconclusive or ambiguous. Achieve communicative purposes precisely, following the logical order, and be concise.

As conversation is considered to be a dynamic process, if speakers achieve these maxims the result will be a predetermined type of conversation in which question-answer patterns and pauses will be recurrent. Providing that all speakers know these conversational patterns of interaction, interactions will result in non-spontaneity. However, as interactants convey meaning in diverse ways, Grice accounted for the possibility of not adhering to his super maxims (SMs), and a maxims system that could be violated or flouted. If a maxim is flouted, the hearer needs to inference its meaning in order to understand the speakers' words, which entail the speaker sharing contextual knowledge with the hearer on many occasions. When a maxim is flouted, it does not mean that the cooperative principle has been flouted, but the provision of more information than what was linguistically conveyed, which leads to

conversational implicature. The violation of a maxim implies the clash of one maxim with another.

One of the main drawbacks in Grice's SM and the maxims' system is that the speaker receives all the attention, releasing the hearer to a secondary position which is only seen as important in the communication process when a maxim is flouted and there is a need to infer the conversational implicature produced by the speaker. Leech (1983) proposed a more balanced position between speaker and hearer, not only seen as necessarily inferencing when a maxim is violated or flouted, but also as an essential part of conversation. Leech's politeness principle (1983, 2003, 2005) is on the one hand to be considered as a continuum from Grice's cooperative principle because of the similarities present in the model of politeness in conversation. On the other hand, the innovations proposed by this author are related to the inclusion of the hearer as an essential part in the interactional view of conversation and the explanation of the use of indirectness when trying to communicate meaning. Leech's (1983)[1] politeness principle contains six maxims:

- *Tact* refers to sensitiveness and implies the speaker's reduction of effort to the hearer by increasing the hearer's aid.
- *Generosity* is related to benevolence and entails benefit minimisation and cost maximisation to the speaker.
- *Approbation* can be described as reducing criticism and disapproval to others while increasing approval and recognition of others.
- *Modesty* is related to decency and humility. This maxim can be described as increasing the speaker's disapproval and lessening the speaker's recognition.
- *Agreement* is a maxim that implies compliance and understanding between speaker and hearer. Both are assumed to reduce disagreement and maximise agreement.
- *Sympathy* as a maxim is related to mutual affection and support. Interactants must boost sympathy and lessen aversion.

In addition to these maxims, he proposed some independent variables that work as filters when accomplishing the maxims. These variables are

- *social distance,* which represents interactants' social relationship with each other and can be described as closeness e.g. family members or close friends, and distance e.g. unknown people;

[1] See G. Leech, *Principles of Pragmatics,* London: Longman, 1983, p. 132

- *authority* which includes interactants' social status, age and also gender;
- *costs and benefits* which imply the effects of the act on the hearer e.g. the use of indirectness to achieve politeness and deference.

Conversely to the previous authors, Lakoff (1973, 1977, 1989) explicitly described the notion of context and its possible effects in interactions. The politeness model presented by this author includes a set of politeness rules coined as *formality*, *hesitancy* and *equality of camaraderie* (Lakoff, 1977: 88).

- *Formality*: This can be achieved by remaining distant to the addressee. Thus, the increase or decrease of distance directly affects the degree of formality and/or informality speakers want to achieve.
- *Hesitancy*: Permit the addressee to decide by not forcing them into a decision and give options if possible, even when these options do constrain the addressee's volition.
- *Equality of camaraderie*: This rule might imply modification of distance to achieve equal status with the addressee, also described as a "rule of informality" (Lakoff, 1977: 14).

In addition to these maxims, the politeness proposal also included two main principles by which any linguistic and non-linguistic interaction should be governed: 'make yourself clear' and 'be polite' (Lakoff, 1977: 86). Lakoff highlighted that contextual conditions may influence the choice of politeness rules when communicating. His interest resides in the critical factors to produce polite or impolite utterances. These factors are "status differences between interlocutors, degree of familiarity between speaker and hearer, and the culture in which the utterance is made" (Schauer, 2009: 10).

Following the description of the three politeness theories based on the accomplishment of maxims and the inclusion of hearer and context as also affecting the achievement of politeness in any interaction, is the description of the last two theories of politeness. These are not conceived as a system of maxims but as a set of linguistic strategies to attain politeness. These theories were proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987) and Fraser (1990). Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory has become one of the most influential theories of politeness. Their proposal of linguistic strategies was based on the notion of face proposed by Goffman as the "positive social value of a person effectively claims for himself by the line

others assume he has taken during a particular contact" (Goffman, 1955: 5). In order to improve and adapt the notion of face to the necessities of their politeness theory, Brown and Levinson reformulated the notion of face as any individual claim for a universal self-image which is directly related to two aspects, termed positive and negative face. As individuals, our positive face implies the approval and recognition of personality traits and character aspects by other individuals. On the other hand, negative face entails "freedom of action and from imposition" (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 61) which any individual can expect from others. In other words, any individual wants that their actions will not be blocked by any other individual. Thus, the interdependence of the terms of face and interaction was expressed as awareness of interactants' face (Yule, 1996).

When dealing with face as the main point of departure, it should be noted that it can be maintained, lost or enhanced. It depends on interactants' choice of performing a *face-threatening act* (FTA), which is defined as "acts that by their nature run contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or the speaker" (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 65), or a *face-saving act* (FSA) which is described as reducing the impact of the utterance and is achieved by the use of positive or negative politeness strategies. Positive ones are characterised by preserving the positive face of the addressee and are aimed at showing "closeness and solidarity, appealing to friendship, making other people feel good and emphasising that both speakers have a common goal" (Cutting, 2002: 48). The notion of solidarity within positive politeness strategies refers to the use of linguistic forms with the objective of reducing distance and increasing closeness. Some of these linguistic forms were pointed out as the use of "... personal information, use of nicknames, abusive terms (males), and shared dialect or slang expressions" (Yule, 1996: 65). On the other hand, negative politeness strategies try to minimise the imposition of an FTA by showing distance, avoiding imposition and giving options to the addressee (Cutting, 2002). As a way to convey negative politeness, the use of deference (Yule, 1996) such as negative politeness linguistic forms helps the speaker and hearer to demonstrate distance. The result of distance is respecting the hearer's face and it is mainly communicated linguistically with the use of impersonal strategies or socially with social behaviour.

Brown and Levinson (1987) centred their attention on FTA and proposed five super-strategies which speakers can choose from to perform an FTA, since face can be lost in any interaction. The first decision that any speaker has to make is whether to do the FTA or not. If he decides to do it, there are two options – doing it on-record or off-record. Off-record implies communicating the message in a non-clear way by the use of

indirect linguistic forms in order for the hearer to completely or partially interpret the utterance. Thus, this strategy choice means flouting any of the Gricean maxims (Grice, 1975) and leads to conversational implicature in which the hearer and context play an important role in the interpretation of the message uttered. Conversely, when the speaker chooses an on-record strategy, two further options are available. The first option implies *non-redressive* action and means following the Gricean maxims of efficient communication by uttering direct messages. Within this option, the speaker can decide between non-minimising the face threat and using the bald-on-record strategy. Non-minimisation may take place in cases of urgency, warning or channel noise while the second option can be used in welcoming, farewells and offers. The second on-record strategy available means *redressive* action and can be achieved by using positive and negative politeness strategies, since the main purpose is giving face to the hearer. It has been defined as an "action ... that attempts to counteract the potential damage of the FTA … with such modifications or additions, that indicate clearly that no such face threat is intended or desired, and that S in general recognises H's face wants and himself to be achieved" (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 69-70).

As a relevant factor in Brown and Levinson's politeness theory, the choice of the different strategies pointed out above is related to the evaluation of sociological variables described as follows:

- *Distance* (D) is described as "a symmetric social dimension of similarity/difference within which S and H stand for the purposes of this act" (Brown & Levinson, 1994: 76). Thus, this sociological variable is related to two main aspects; the first one is the social relationship between individuals, which is determined by the number of encounters and their degree of formality. The second aspect is associated with the material and non-material aspects negotiated. As face can also be negotiated, it was suggested that closeness between interactants is the result of low distance which is achieved by reciprocal acceptance of the individuals' face.
- *Power* (P) is defined as "an asymmetric social dimension of relative power" (Brown & Levinson, 1994: 77). The authors differentiated between two sources of power: material, and metaphysical control over others. The first one includes economic and physical power while the second means the regulation and restriction of the others' actions, for example, obedience and compliance reflect great power over individuals.

- *Ranking of impositions* (R) "is culturally and situationally defined by the degree to which they are considered to interfere with an agent's … negative and positive-face wants" (Brown & Levinson, 1994: 77). Two identifiable ranks for negative-face FTA were suggested, those implying the expenditure of services which include the provision of time, and others related to goods which include, for instance, non-material goods such as information.

Finally, Fraser's (1990) conversational contract (CC) is the last politeness theory reviewed in this subsection, which is not built up as a construct of maxims but norms that govern any social interaction. These rules were termed rights and obligations that are influenced by the notion of context and social parameters that may change at any time during interaction. The definition of context includes the specificity of a situation and the effects of previous interactions on the current one. As social parameters Fraser understands the influence of status, power and speakers' role on interactants' rights and obligations. Consequently, participants are supposed to behave appropriately and cooperate in meaning negotiation assuming both their way of addressing each other and the content of conversation, in other words, turn-taking, sequences, silence and their intended action when speaking. Fraser affirmed that the central focus of his CC was negotiation since it works as a balance instrument: "During the course of time, or because of a change in the context, there is always the possibility for a renegotiation of the CC: the two parties may readjust what rights and obligations they hold towards each other" (Fraser, 1990: 232). Regarding politeness and differing from the previous models described, it is considered as a dynamic entity which at first is brought into conversation by interactants, i.e. rights and obligations, but can also develop throughout the interaction as an element to be negotiated and renegotiated, which at the same time is context-influenced.

To sum up, politeness in pragmatics can be defined as and concerned with the "… ways in which the relational function in linguistic action is expressed" (Kasper, 1994: 3206). The context in which interaction is taking place must be necessarily taken into consideration since it influences linguistic action. For the purposes of this research, the models which seem to be more appropriate are those outlined by Brown and Levinson (1987), and Fraser (1990). The main reasons for adopting those models for the analysis of speech acts in audiovisual material from a pragmatic point of view are the following:

- the numerous strategies and linguistic resources to express meaning;
- the focus on interactants' intentionality when selecting on-record or off-record strategies;
- the influence of the sociopragmatic variables of distance, power and imposition;
- the role of interactants adhering to rights and obligations in conversation;
- the dynamics of interaction as a negotiation process in which politeness and rights and obligations can also be renegotiated;
- the effect of linguistic context, i.e. a previous interaction, on the current one;
- the notion of context itself where interaction takes place as also influencing interaction.

1.2.3 Context

One of the earlier definitions of context was proposed by Malinowski (1923) who defined context of situation pointing out that "... a word without linguistic context is a mere fragment and stands for nothing by itself, so, in the reality of a spoken living tongue, the utterance has no meaning except in the context of situation" (Malinowski, 1923: 37). From this definition, the differentiation between the linguistic context (i.e. words uttered) and the context of situation as not comprising linguistic units can be observed. Although they were considered as separated entities, the author explicitly describes a relationship of interdependence between them. This original distinction has been used by linguists when trying to define the term context. Nevertheless, more elaborated theories of this concept have been developed (Cicourel, 1980; Cutting, 2002; d'Hondt et al. 2009; Huang, 2007; LoCastro, 2003; Ochs, 1979; Verschueren, 1999; Yule, 1996). A brief summary of the theories dealing with context are presented below in chronological order.

Between the 1970s and the 1980s, Ochs (1979) and Cicourel (1980) presented their theories of context departing from Malinowski's (1923) context of situation by offering a more detailed description, evolution and specificity of concepts. First, Ochs (1979, as cited in Duanti and Goodwin, 1992) outlined a theory of context considering *setting*, *behavioural environment, language as context and extrasituational context*. By so doing, the author included in the definition of context the social and physical framework in which interactions take place, participants' body language and behaviour, language as a contextual resource for producing

Chapter 9: Pragmatics and Discourse

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Abstract: Pragmatics studies the processes of language use, while discourse analysis is devoted to its product, i.e. discourse. Pragmatics can be understood in a narrow sense focussing on cognitive-inferential aspects of information processing, and it can be understood in a wider sense in which it also includes social aspects of interaction. In historical pragmatics, the former conceptualization lies behind work on pragmatic explanations in language change, while the latter conceptualization studies earlier language use from a social and interactional perspective, including such aspects as inserts (e.g. interjections and discourse markers), speech acts, and terms of address. Discourse, as the product of language use, can be seen as a stretch of conversation (dialogue) or as a domain of communication. In the former conceptualization, research focuses on the structural properties of the dialogue, and in the latter, it deals with the linguistic practices pertaining to particular fields of knowledge or interaction, e.g. courtroom discourse, the discourse of science, and news discourse.

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1 Introduction

In a very general sense pragmatics can be defined as the study of language use, while discourse analysis, in an equally general sense, can be defined as the analysis of the result of human communication, viz. discourse.

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> It has been suggested that discourse analysis is more text-centered, more static, more interested in product (in the well-formedness of texts), while pragmatics is more user-centred, more dynamic, more interested in the process of text production. Discourse analysis is frequently equated with conversational analysis, and pragmatics with speech act theory. It would seem difficult to distinguish the two with any conviction, however (Brinton 2001: 139).

There is certainly a great deal of overlap between the two fields. A large range of topics can be dealt with under either heading. Speech acts, such as greetings and farewells, or discourse markers, such as *well*, *so*, or *you know* have both interactional (pragmatic) functions and text-structuring or discourse functions.

As a field of study, pragmatics has grown very considerably over the last thirty years or so. Traditionally, linguists were mainly concerned with an analysis of language structure at the levels of phonology, morphology, and syntax, but with the pragmatic turn in the late 1970s and early 1980s some of the interest shifted from the structure of language to the language user. At the beginning of this development, pragmatics was often seen as the ragbag of linguistic description (see Mey 1998: 716). As such it covered performance phenomena that could not be handled at the traditional levels of linguistic description, such as speech acts, conversational implicature, deixis, and politeness, but also the structure of conversations.

On the other hand, even in the early days of pragmatics, the discipline was also seen as a perspective. As such it was not a level of linguistic description but a different way of analyzing language. Language was not seen as a system of signs but as a means of communication. "Pragmatics is a *perspective* on any aspect of language, at any level of structure" (Verschueren 1987: 5, italics in original; see also Verschueren 1999: 2). Under the former view, pragmatics was a separate level of linguistic description, parallel to other levels, such as syntax or semantics. Under the latter view, pragmatics was a particular way of doing linguistics that could be applied to all other levels of linguistic description from phonology and morphology to syntax, semantics and, indeed, discourse.

These positions have developed into a more restricted cognitive-inferential conceptualization of pragmatics (adhered to, generally speaking, by Anglo-American researchers) and a broader socio-interactional conceptualization (common among European researchers). Cruse (2000), for instance, gives the following narrow definition of pragmatics:

> For present purposes, pragmatics can be taken to be concerned with aspects of information (in the widest sense) conveyed through language which (a) are not encoded by generally accepted convention in the linguistic forms used, but which (b) none the less arise naturally out of and depend on the meanings conventionally encoded in the linguistic forms used, taken in conjunction with the context in which the forms are used (Cruse 2000: 16).

In this conceptualization, people routinely understand more than what is explicitly communicated. They read between the lines, as it were, and this is the field of the pragmaticist. In her handbook article on historical pragmatics, Traugott (2004: 539) also takes pragmatics "to be non-literal meaning that arises in language use", and Sperber and Noveck (2004: 1) define pragmatics as "the study of how linguistic properties and contextual factors interact in the interpretation of utterances". In their view, pragmatics is not restricted to a study of implicit meanings. In fact, they are at pains to demonstrate that there are many aspects of explicit meaning that require access to contextual information for their interpretation, but they exclude the wider social issues of language use from the scope of pragmatics.

The European tradition adopts a broader, more sociologically based view of pragmatics that includes social and cultural conditions of language use. Trosborg (1994: 37), a representative of this broader European tradition, for instance, states that "sociopragmatics is concerned with the analysis of significant patterns of interaction in particular social situations and/or in particular social systems. For example, speech acts may be realized differently in different social contexts and situations as well as in different social groups within a speech community", while Blakemore, a representative of the Anglo-American tradition, finds it "misleading to include phenomena like politeness, face-saving and turn taking [...] under the general heading of pragmatics" (Blakemore 1992: 47).

The two conceptualizations of pragmatics, obviously, have consequences for the interaction of pragmatics and historical linguistics. The former conceptualization suggests a range of specific performance-related topics, while the latter suggests a specific way of investigating earlier stages of a language and its development.

The term "discourse" is perhaps even more open to different definitions. On the one hand, it can be seen as the spoken equivalent of a text. A (written) text is made up of sentences while a (spoken) discourse is made up of utterances. In this sense, the term "discourse" is more or less synonymous with the term "dialogue" (see below, Section 4). Brinton (2001: 139–140) distinguishes between three discourse analytical approaches to historical data. First, the discourse analyst may use forms, functions, and structures of discourse at historical stages of a language. She calls this approach "historical discourse analysis proper". Second, the discourse analyst may study the discourse-pragmatic factors and motivations behind language change. This approach is called "discourse-oriented historical linguistics". And third, the discourse analyst may focus on the diachronic development of discourse functions and discourse structures over time. She calls this third approach "diachronic(ally oriented) discourse analysis".

However, the term "discourse" can also be used in a much wider sense, not just for a linguistic unit larger than utterances, but as a domain of language. In

such a view, a discourse is a collection of linguistic practices characterized by a distinct group of people and a distinct group of genres and text types, e.g. the discourse of science, or more specifically the discourse of medical science or the discourse of modern linguistics.

In the following I shall evaluate how these conceptualizations of the terms "pragmatics" and "discourse" can be applied to the analysis of historical data and in particular to English historical data.

2 Pragmatic explanations in language change

In the Anglo-American conceptualization of pragmatics, pragmatics is mainly a tool to describe and explain patterns of language change. Language is a means of communication and, therefore, the communicative forces that are at work when people use language must be taken into consideration when we analyze, for instance, the syntax of a language and indeed when we analyze diachronic changes in the syntax of a language. Thus, pragmatics becomes a principle of explanation in language change. In Brinton's (2001) terminology this would be "discourse-oriented historical linguistics".

If pragmatics is seen as one level of linguistic description on a par with other levels such as phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics, it is largely restricted to non-truth-conditional aspects of language, and to aspects of language that depend on the context of utterance. Deictic elements, for instance, depend on the situation of use for their interpretation. Speech acts in their early conceptualization of doing things with words were also restricted to non-truth-conditional aspects. Speech act theory took its starting point from Austin's (1962) observation that speech acts are regularly used for purposes other than stating facts that are assessable in terms of true or false.

Meanings are not abstract entities that pertain to linguistic expressions but the result of negotiations between speaker/writer and addressee/reader, which – through repetition of use – have become conventionalized. A theory of meaning change, therefore, must take into account the communicative situation of speaker/writer and addressee/reader. Traugott and Dasher (2005), for instance, argue that it is ad-hoc negotiations of meanings that may lead to meaning change if they are invoked repeatedly until they become conventionalized in the entire speech community. They call such ad-hoc meanings "invited inferences", a term borrowed from Geis and Zwicky (1971). However, Traugott and Dasher use it in a broader sense and do not restrict it to generalized implicatures. It signals the speaker/writer's role in inviting the addressee to infer the intended ad-hoc meaning. As an example they cite the case of *as/so long as* (Traugott and Dasher 2005: 36–37). In Old and Middle

English the spatial meaning ('of the same length as') co-existed with the temporal meaning ('for the same length of time as'). In some contexts, the meaning invited the conditional meaning 'provided that', as for instance in (1).

(1) *wring þurh linenne clað on þæt eage* ***swa lange swa*** *him ðearf sy.*
wring through linen cloth on that eye as long as him need be-SUBJ
'squeeze (the medication) through a linen cloth onto the eye as long as he needs.' (850–950 Lacnunga, p. 100; example, gloss, and translation from Traugott and Dasher 2005: 36, ex. 19)

The medicine is to be applied for the duration that it is needed, which invites the inference that it is to be applied only if it is needed. According to Traugott and Dasher all examples of *as/so long as* in Old and Middle English are either spatial or temporal, and while some allow a conditional reading, the conditional reading is never predominant. This changes in Early Modern English, when examples occur in which the invited inference of conditionality has been generalized to contexts of reasoning and cognition in which a temporal reading does not make sense or is at least not salient as in (2).

(2) *They whose words doe most shew forth their wise vnderstanding, and whose lips doe vtter the purest knowledge, so* ***as long as*** *they vnderstand and speake as men, are they not faine sundry waies to excuse themselues?* (1614 Hooker, p. 5; Traugott and Dasher 2005: 37, ex. 20)

Here the conditional reading is salient, while the temporal meaning is still available. Traugott and Dasher paraphrase the temporal meaning as "for the time that they understand and speak as men", i.e. "as long as they live". From the mid-19th century there are examples in which the conditional is the only possible meaning as in (3).

(3) *"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"*
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
"I don't much care where–" said Alice.
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat.
"– ***so long as*** *I get* ***somewhere****," Alice added as an explanation.* (1865 Carroll, Chapter 6, p. 51; Traugott and Dasher 2005: 37, ex. 21a)

Thus meaning change is the result of the interaction between speakers/writers and addressees/hearers in communicative situations. Speakers/writers use established coded meanings (e.g. the temporal reading of *so/as long as*) in creative

ways to invite inferences. Through repeated use, such invited inferences become conventionalized and ultimately they become new coded meanings (Traugott and Dasher 2005: 38).

Thus language change is seen as the result of what Keller (1994) has called an "invisible hand process". Language change comes about as a causal effect of the accumulation of individual speakers' action, who – individually – did not intend this effect.

3 Pragmatics as the study of performance phenomena

Performance phenomena pertain mostly to the spoken language, i.e. to language that is produced under the constraints of online production. Such phenomena were shunned as irrelevant for a long time. For historical linguists they were doubly irrelevant. They were irrelevant because they were not part of the language system itself, and they were irrelevant because historical linguists did not have access to the spoken language of the past. The communicative turn in the '70s and '80s of the 20th century turned performance phenomena into legitimate objects of investigation for synchronic linguistics. Pragmaticists focused their attention on transcriptions of spoken interaction. They studied the minutiae of the turn-taking system, the form and function of individual utterances (speech acts), and so on. But these studies were restricted to present-day data. Pragmaticists saw written language as secondary and therefore as uninteresting for pragmatic analyses.

Today performance phenomena have made their way into standard descriptions of the English language (e.g. Biber et al. 1999, who spend a considerable amount of space on such phenomena within the confines of a structural description of the English language), and within the last decade or so, significant progress has been made on the description of performance phenomena from a diachronic perspective. I shall briefly mention three examples which have received a considerable amount of attention from historical pragmaticists, inserts, speech acts and terms of address. To the extent that the analyses of these elements rely on references to social conditions of their use, they clearly go beyond the narrow Anglo-American conceptualization of pragmatics.

3.1 Inserts

Biber et al. (1999: 1082) use the term "inserts" to refer to "stand-alone words which are characterized in general by their inability to enter into syntactic relations with other structures. [...] They comprise a class of words that is peripheral, both in the grammar and in the lexicon of the language". They distinguish nine different types of inserts: interjections (*oh*, *ah*), greetings and farewells (*hi*, *hello*, *goodbye*), discourse markers (*well*, *right*), attention signals (*hey*, *yo*), response elicitors (*right?*, *eh?*), response forms (*yeah*, *yep*), hesitators (*um*, *er*), various polite speech-act formulae (*thanks*, *sorry*), and expletives (*shit*, *good grief!*). Not all of these are equally amenable to a historical analysis. Biber et al. (1999: 1096–1098) provide some statistics about their distribution in American English and British English conversations, but they do not say anything about their occurrence in written genres. It seems reasonable to assume that some of them are relatively infrequent in the texts that have survived from earlier centuries. While some inserts, such as interjections or discourse markers, have been analyzed in their own right, others, like *thanks* and *sorry*, have been investigated in larger contexts of speech act studies of thanking and apologizing (e.g. Jacobsson 2002; Jucker and Taavitsainen 2008b), and expletives have been investigated in the context of the language of insults (e.g. Craun 1997).

Taavitsainen (1995) investigates the form, function, and distribution of exclamations, such as *alas*, *ey*, *ah*, *harrow*, and *O* in Late Middle and Early Modern English (see also Hiltunen 2006; Person 2009). Their distribution is clearly genre specific. In the *Helsinki Corpus*, which was used for the investigation, exclamations were particularly frequent in the genres comedy and fiction. They also occurred in trials and in Bible texts. In other genres they were rare. Exclamations were used more widely and with a broader variety of functions than in Present-day English. They were regularly used as vocatives and as appeals to the addressee. The interjection *O*, for instance, is often prefixed to an exclamatory sentence and it often combines with a vocative as in example (4), which is taken from a sermon.

(4) ***O my God, my God*** *why haste thou forsaken me?* (1614 Hooker, *Two Sermons Upon Part of S. Judes Epistle*, 1614, p. 7; *Helsinki Corpus*, Taavitsainen 1995: 453)

Discourse markers have received considerable attention in historical pragmatics. Brinton (1996), for instance, analyzed a broad range of discourse markers, or "pragmatic markers", as she calls them, including Old English *hwæt*, Middle

English *gan*, and Middle and Early Modern English *anon*. She is interested not only in the developing discourse functions of these elements but also in the grammaticalization processes that they instantiate. In more recent publications she has added analyses of *only* (Brinton 1998), *I say* (Brinton 2005) and *I mean* (Brinton 2007) (see also Jucker 1997, 2002; Fischer 1998; Brinton 2006).

3.2 Speech acts

Speech acts are not easily amenable to historical investigations because the traditional research methods developed for present-day languages cannot be applied to historical data. Originally the concept was developed by philosophers who investigated the nature of speech acts on the basis of careful considerations of what it means to name a ship, to make a promise, to issue a command, to ask a question, or to greet somebody (Austin 1962; Searle 1969). Later, empirical methods, such as discourse completion tests and role-plays, were developed to investigate speech acts and their realizations by different groups of speakers (e.g. Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Trosborg 1994). For obvious reasons, none of these methods can be applied to historical data.

More recently, corpus-based research methods have been improved and developed to such an extent that various avenues of investigations of historical speech act material have become available. It is, of course, possible to search for verbs denoting specific speech acts. Such speech act verbs are sometimes used performatively to carry out the speech act they denote. Kohnen (2008a), for instance, argues that in Old English explicit performatives were typically used to issue requests and commands as in (5):

(5) *Ic bidde eow þæt ȝe ȝymon eowra sylfra, swa eowere bec eow wissiað.* (Ælfric, *Letter to Wulfsige*, 26; *Helsinki Corpus*, Kohnen 2008a: 30)
'I ask you to take care of yourselves, as your books teach you.'

The Old English verb *biddan* 'ask, bid' is here used performatively. By saying *Ic bidde eow* 'I ask you' the speaker carries out the speech act of asking or requesting (see in particular Kohnen 2000).

However, many verbs that describe a speech act are not normally used performatively. They are used to talk about the speech act they name. They may occur in narratives with an account that a particular speech act had been performed, or in negotiations when the precise speech act value of an utterance is being discussed.

(6) *If eny man wolde* ***challenge*** *a frere of Seint Frauncessis ordre and seue … Frere, thou louest money as myche as othere men […]* (c.1449 *Pecock* Repr.; Taavitsainen and Jucker 2007: 113)
'If any man were to challenge a friar of the order of St. Francis and to say … "Friar, you love money as much as other men […]'

In (6) the speech act verb "challenge" is used together with an example of an utterance with this speech act value.

Many speech acts, perhaps most, are carried out without the relevant speech act verb. In order to locate relevant speech acts, the researcher has to rely on the philological method of actually reading the source texts. Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000) have used this method to describe insults in the history of English. But the method obviously precludes any statistical results. The findings can only be very selective based on the available research time.

Some speech acts show recurrent surface patterns. Deutschmann (2003), for instance, has shown that apologies in English are mostly formulaic. They can be traced with corpus-linguistic tools by searching for a small number of expressions that typically occur in apologies, such as *sorry*, *pardon*, and *excuse* together with related and expanded forms. The same method has recently been used to trace apologies (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2008b), promises (Valkonen 2008) and compliments (Jucker et al. 2008).

3.3 Terms of address

In the 13th century under the influence from French, English started to use the second person plural pronoun *ye* not only for two or more addressees but – under certain circumstances – also for one single addressee. Many Indo-European languages still have this distinction between two pronominal forms of address for a single addressee. On the basis of Latin *tu* and *vos*, the pronoun choices are usually abbreviated as T and V (Brown and Gilman 1960: 254). The conditions under which one pronoun or the other is chosen have been the object of extensive research in recent years (see, for instance, the volume by Taavitsainen and Jucker 2003). Brown and Gilman (1960) in their seminal article on the topic tried to find a common denominator for all languages with such a system. They argue that this common denominator is the semantics of power and solidarity. In medieval Europe, according to this theory, the power semantics accounted for a non-reciprocal use of T from the more powerful to the less powerful. The more powerful received V in return from the less powerful. Equals of the upper classes exchanged mutual V, while equals of the lower social classes exchanged mutual

T. The power semantics of medieval Europe has been replaced by the solidarity semantics in which mutual V signals distance and mutual T solidarity.

A significant body of research has shown that social conditions for the choice of T or V in specific situations are considerably more complex. Mazzon (2000), Honegger (2003), and Jucker (2006), for instance, have shown that Chaucer's system of pronoun choices is much more situationally governed than the usual present-day systems in languages such as German, French, or Italian. In the present-day forms of these languages, choices are more or less fixed for any given dyad of speakers, and a switch from mutual V to mutual T is a noticeable event, often accompanied by some kind of ritual (a switch from mutual T to mutual V, i.e. from informal to formal, would be very unusual). In Chaucer's English, the characters of his fictional work used a more complex system that was based not only on social status between the characters but also on the basis of situational dominance or subjugation. Such approaches have replaced the earlier accounts of Chaucer's use of personal pronouns by such scholars as Nathan (1959), Wilcockson (1980), and Burnley (1983), who tried to explain the choices largely on the basis of fixed social relationships.

By the time of Shakespeare, it does no longer seem possible to provide an account that explains individual pronoun choices. Researchers, therefore, generally focus on frequencies and on co-occurrence patterns of nominal and pronominal terms of address. U. Busse (2002, 2003), for instance, shows that titles of courtesy, such as *Your Grace*, *Your Ladyship*, (*my*) *liege*, or *sir*, are more likely to occur together with a V pronoun than any of the other categories of nominal terms of address, while terms of endearment, such as *bully*, *chuck*, *heart*, *joy*, or *love* are most likely to occur together with a T pronoun (see also Stein 2003; B. Busse 2006).

4 Discourse as dialogue

Discourse can be seen as a stretch of conversation or as a domain of language. In this section, I will use the term "dialogue" to refer to the former and the term "domain of discourse" for the latter. The terms "discourse" and "dialogue" imply an interaction between a speaker or writer and a recipient. Written texts, although there is no regular exchange of roles between speaker/writer and hearer, do have an addressee, even if the addressee is only a recipient and cannot actively contribute to the interaction. They are what Kilian (2005: 102) identifies as a "functional" dialogue.

Fritz (1995: 469) distinguishes three stages of what he calls "historical dialogue analysis". The first stage is characterized by analysis of the pragmatic

structure and function of a historical dialogue in its social and historical context. The second stage is characterized by a contrastive comparison of earlier dialogue forms with later dialogue forms. The third and most advanced stage is characterized by an investigation of the evolution and dissemination of specific forms of dialogue.

In the first stage, the researcher can use the same conversation analytical or dialogue analytical tools that are employed in modern data in order to investigate older forms of dialogue. The analysis can either adopt a macro perspective or a micro perspective. Under the macro perspective, the researcher focuses on the structure of the dialogue under analysis. Levinson (1983) reserved the term "discourse analysis" for such macro analyses of dialogue structures. Under the micro perspective, the researcher focuses on individual pragmatic elements, such as greetings, address terms, discourse markers and so on; or on local structures, e.g. adjacency pairs, such as question-answer sequences. Levinson (1983) used the term "conversation analysis" for this type of investigation.

An analysis of individual pragmatic elements in individual dialogues of earlier periods coincides with the pragmatic research interests sketched out above. And indeed, a considerable amount of research has been published, e.g. on address terms in Chaucer's narratives or in Shakespeare's plays (see Section 3.3). But researchers have also adopted the larger perspective of looking at the inventory of pragmatic elements making up a specific type of historical dialogue. Watts (1999), for instance, investigates in detail two dialogues that were printed in 16th-century English language coursebooks for the benefit of learners of English as a foreign language.

However, in practice it is not always easy to distinguish between the different stages envisaged by Fritz. Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000), for instance, investigate the use of insults in the history of English. The aim is to show a development or an evolution from the earlier forms to the later forms, but at present all that seems to be possible is a contrastive analysis of selected examples at different periods in the history of English. It is not yet possible to trace a continuous evolution of specific speech acts, such as insults. Archer in various publications (e.g. Archer 2005, 2006, 2007) gives a detailed picture of Early Modern English courtroom dialogue and thus carries out research at the first stage of historical dialogue analysis, but she also compares these findings to the present-day courtroom, representing the second stage. And finally she also draws attention to developments within the period under investigation, and thus contributes to stage three of historical dialogue analysis. She focuses mainly on the question-answer sequences in the courtroom dialogues and uses these to pinpoint the (changing) discursive roles of the active participants in the English courtroom, i.e. the judges, lawyers, witnesses, and defendants.

Taavitsainen (1999) also investigates the evolution of a particular form of dialogue. She assesses medical dialogues in Late Middle and Early Modern English and traces the evolution of these dialogues between 1375 and 1750. She describes two traditions that are evident in Early English medical dialogues: the scholastic formula, based on the format of debates by Greek philosophers, and the mimetic dialogues, in which material is presented in fictional conversations between the author and the reader or between fictional characters. Taavitsainen shows how these traditions develop over the centuries and how, in the 18th century, medical dialogues merge with the new pamphlet tradition, in which social matters, such as health-care for the poor or polite conversations, are treated.

5 Discourse as a domain of communication

As pointed out in Section 1, the term "discourse" can also be used in a more general sense as the totality of linguistic practices that pertain to a particular field of knowledge or to a particular occupation. Such discourses consist not of utterances but of typical text types, characterized by specific lexical items, idiosyncratic syntax, and particular routinized patterns of interaction. In such a context, researchers also ask more general questions about the dissemination of information within groups of speakers. Three such domains of communication in particular have received a fair amount of scholarly attention for the Early Modern English period: courtroom discourse, the discourse of science and news discourse.

5.1 Courtroom discourse

A considerable amount of research has appeared on courtroom discourse in the Early Modern English period. The Early Modern English courtroom differed considerably from its modern equivalent. While modern courts presume a defendant to be innocent until proven guilty, the Early Modern courtroom expected the defendants to prove their innocence. Archer (2005: 85) demonstrates how this leads to a more active involvement on the part of the defendant. It was only in the later part of the Early Modern period that courtrooms introduced defence counsels who started to speak on behalf of the defendant.

Koch (1999: 410–411), in his analysis of excerpts of three early Romance court records, draws attention to the communicative complexity of such records. The records written by a court scribe and addressed to a future reader are legal

documents with appropriate formality of expression especially in the ritualistic elements pertaining to the formalities of the proceedings. These parts of the court records are characterized by the "language of distance" as Koch calls it. Embedded in this formal document there is a transcription of the verbal interaction taking place in the courtroom between the judge, the witnesses, the defendants and the lawyers. These utterances, even if they are written down, are closer to spoken language, or the "language of immediacy". There may even be further embeddings, especially if the court cases dealt with libel, in which courtroom interactants report utterances that were spoken outside the courtroom. Such reported utterances are even closer to the language of immediacy.

In her work on the Early Modern English courtroom Archer (2005, 2006, 2007) draws a detailed picture of the strategies adopted by the judge, the lawyers, the defendants, and the witnesses. She concludes that the frequency of questions, their function and their interactional success depended on a number of sociopragmatic factors, such as the speech event, the position of the question, and the discursive roles of the speaker and the addressee as well as the date of the trial (2005: 281). Culpeper and Semino (2000) extend the scope of courtroom discourse. They use two types of data, learned treatises on the topic of witchcraft and courtroom witness depositions. In their analysis, they deal with speech act verbs, such as *to curse* and they show how such verbs could be used to reinterpret trivial arguments within a village community into a witchcraft event.

The witch trials that took place in 1692 in the Puritan village of Salem in the colony of Massachusetts have attracted a considerable amount of research into the discourse strategies adopted by the participants and the functional and structural properties of the trials as such. Kahlas-Tarkka and Rissanen (2007), for instance, investigated the discourse strategies of "successful" and "unsuccessful" defendants in the Salem witch trials, while Hiltunen and Peikola (2007) focus on the material evidence of these trials, i.e. the handwritten records and the printed editions. Their contribution demonstrates vividly how important it is not to forget the communicative role of the scribe who commits the spoken words in the courtroom to writing and thus makes it available for future generations (see also Doty and Hiltunen 2002; Hiltunen 2004; Doty 2007).

5.2 The discourse of science

In the late medieval world, the discourse of science was multilingual. The main language for written texts was Latin, but texts started to be translated into the vernacular and the Greco-Roman tradition provided a model for scientific writing in the vernacular.

> In modern linguistics, "medical discourse" refers collectively to the communicative practices of the medical profession, both written and spoken. In the late medieval period, the medical profession consisted of heterogeneous groups of practitioners, including physicians, surgeons, barbers, midwives, itinerant specialists (e.g., bonesetters and oculists), herbalists, apothecaries, wisewomen, and others. They can be roughly divided into clerical and elite practitioners and tradespeople or ordinary practitioners; literacy was restricted mostly to the elite group (Taavitsainen 2006: 688).

Taavitsainen (2006) gives an overview of genres that were important for this discourse community. Compilations and commentaries of earlier studies were important for the dissemination of scholastic knowledge. Texts in question-and-answer format and pedagogical dialogues were also popular genres of scientific and medical writing that were adopted from Latin models into the vernacular. The volume edited by Taavitsainen and Pahta (2004) contains a range of detailed studies of medical and scientific writing in Late Medieval English. Mäkinen (2004), for instance, describes Middle English herbal recipes and recipes in manuals for medicinal plants and shows the textual traditions that link them together.

Valle (1999: vii) takes the view that "science has at least since the seventeenth century taken place within a knowledge-producing discourse community, and that this community will in some way be 'represented' in scientific texts, in forms which can be linguistically identified and studied". The totality of texts produced by this discourse community is, therefore, the discourse of science. In her study, Valle describes the discourse community of the Royal Society on the basis of a corpus of texts drawn from the *Philosophical Transaction*, spanning the three centuries from the beginning of publication in 1665 to 1965 (see also Valle 1997, 2006). Gotti (2006), too, deals with the discourse community of the Royal Society in London and illustrates some of the methods that were used by this community to spread the news about new discoveries and other scientific findings. Letters exchanged between scholars played an important role. They were not only exchanged between individuals, but they were frequently copied and passed on to new recipients. Some influential scholars at the centre of scientific networks regularly received, sent, and resent a large number of letters and thus had the role of clearing houses.

5.3 Early English news discourse

With the invention of the printing press it became possible to publish accounts of recent events and to disseminate them to a large audience. In the 16th and 17th centuries pamphlets and newsbooks were used for this purpose (Raymond 2003). The first newspapers in the modern sense appeared in the early 17th century, first

on the continent but soon also in England (Brownlees 1999; Studer 2008). The first newspapers or corantos, as they were originally called, consisted mainly of dispatches from correspondents from important places throughout Europe. These letters were inserted into the newspaper in the order in which they arrived at the editorial office in London. There was no other structural principle. It took another century for the first daily newspapers to be published in the early 18th century. As Sommerville (1996) has pointed out, the revolutionary aspect of this kind of news discourse consisted in the fact that newspapers appeared in regular intervals, weekly at first, twice or three times a week later, and then daily. Thus, news was no longer reported in response to important events, but a certain amount of space had to be filled with news on a regular basis.

The early news discourse has attracted a fair amount of research recently not only in collections of articles, such as Ungerer (2000), Herring (2003), Raymond (2006) or Brownlees (2006) but also in monographs. Studer (2008), for instance, develops a larger picture of the development of news discourse on the basis of the Zurich English Newspaper Corpus (ZEN). He argues that news discourse is shaped by such external factors as the historical context and technological innovations. News discourse both adopted and adapted generic conventions; that is to say, it used existing genres, e.g. in the form of the letters from correspondents in the early newspapers, and it transformed and shaped them for its own needs.

6 Summary and outlook

It is not possible to draw a principled distinction between historical topics that are treated with pragmatic tools of investigation and those that are treated with discourse analytical tools. Traditionally, those approaches that focus on the interactional and dynamic aspects of language belong to pragmatics while those that focus on the structural aspects of dialogues, conversations or discourses belong to discourse analysis. The application of pragmatic and discourse analytical tools to historical data has uncovered a rich area of investigation and thrown new light on much familiar data.

But a lot still needs to be done. At present, three areas of research appear to be particularly promising. First, the research on the history of speech acts has only just started to attract more than just occasional research efforts. In the volume edited by Jucker and Taavitsainen (2008a) a number of researchers have joined forces to investigate a range of different speech acts in the history of English and to develop the necessary methodologies. Recent advances in corpus technology have made it increasingly possible to locate some speech acts automatically.

Second, the research of the evolution of forms of dialogue is still in its infancy. Kilian (2005) has presented an introduction into historical dialogue research, in which he develops a detailed typology of historical types of dialogues and some methodologies to investigate a broad range of such dialogues, i.e. dialogues in which speakers and addressees take turns in their roles. Culpeper and Kytö (2010: 2) ask: "what was the spoken face-to-face interaction of past periods like?" in a systematic way and approach this question from various angles. In particular they look at the structure of conversations, at what they call "pragmatic noise", i.e. pragmatic interjections or discourse markers, and social roles and gender in interaction.

And third, the evolution of domains of discourse appears to be a very promising field of research. The existing work on courtroom discourse, the discourse of science and news discourse needs to be continued, and other domains should be tackled. The discourse of religion, for instance, would be an obvious candidate because there is wealth of historical material available consisting of many different text types, such as sermons, prayers, treatises and saints' lives. The compilation at the University of Cologne of a *Corpus of English Religious Prose* is very likely to be a first significant step in this direction (see Kohnen 2007).

Thus it seems that the new corpora and advances in corpus linguistics have had and are having a considerable impact on historical pragmatics and historical discourse analysis. The cooperation between corpus linguists and historical pragmaticists/discourse analysts has only just started, but it promises considerable advances in our understanding of human interaction and communication from a historical perspective.

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7 References

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7. Pragmatics

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Abstract

This chapter reviews core empirical phenomena and technical concepts from linguistic pragmatics, including context dependence, common ground, indexicality, conversational implicature, presupposition, and speech acts. I seek to identify unifying themes among these concepts, provide a high-level guide to the primary literature, and relate the phenomena to issues in computational linguistics.

Keywords context dependence, common ground, indexicality, conversational implicature, presupposition, speech acts

7.1 Introduction

The linguistic objects that speakers use in their utterances vastly underdetermine the contributions that those utterances make to discourse. To borrow an analogy from Levinson (2000: 4), "an utterance is not [...] a veridical model or 'snapshot' of the scene it describes". Rather, the encoded content merely sketches what speakers intend and hearers perceive. The fundamental questions of pragmatics concern how semantic content, contextual information, and general communicative pressures interact to guide discourse participants in filling in these sketches:

(i) How do language users represent the context of utterance, and which aspects of the context are central to communication?

(ii) We often "mean more than we say". What principles guide this pragmatic enrichment, and how do semantic values (conventional aspects of meaning) enable and constrain such enrichment?

The present chapter pursues each of these questions, starting with question (i): section 7.2 outlines techniques for modelling contexts, and section 7.3 reviews a wide

range of context-dependent phenomena. I then turn to question (ii): section 7.4 describes Grice's (1975) framework for pragmatics, with emphasis on conversational implicatures as a prominent kind of pragmatic enrichment, section 7.5 discusses the semantic and pragmatic interactions that deliver multifaceted meanings in context, and section 7.6 addresses the particularly challenging task of assigning speech-act force. I close (section 7.7) by summarising some overarching challenges and our prospects for meeting those challenges.

My overview of the field is necessarily selective. Every aspect of linguistic performance, including intonation (Büring 2007), physical gesture (Goldin-Meadow and Wagner Alibali 2012), and social identity (Eckert 2008), can convey meaning, and many fields can lay claim to aspects of the above foundational questions, including philosophy, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, dialogue management (Chapter 8, 'Dialogue'; Chapter 41, 'Spoken language dialogue'), and information extraction (Chapter 35, 'Information extraction'). My goal is to chart a short path through this large, diverse empirical terrain that conveys a sense for what the problems are like, how linguists seek to solve them, and why these results are important for computational research (Bunt and Black 2000).

7.2 Modelling contexts

Robert Stalnaker pioneered work on modelling context with a notion of **common ground** (context set, conversational record), as in definition 7.1. His foundational papers on this topic are Stalnaker 1970, 1974, 1998, which are collected in Stalnaker 1999, and Stalnaker 1973, 2002.

Definition 7.1 (Common ground)**.** The **common ground** for a context C is the set of all propositions that the discourse participants of C mutually and publicly agree to treat as true for the purposes of the talk exchange.

The notion of proposition in this definition encompasses all information. Realistic common grounds will include world knowledge, more immediate information characterising where we are and what goals we have, our beliefs about each other, our beliefs about those beliefs, and so forth. It will also include information about the nature of our language (its semantics, its conventions of use), which utterances have been made, which objects are salient, and so forth (Stalnaker 1998: §IV). This expansive view highlights the fact that propositions are not linguistic objects. Natural language sentences can encode propositions (among other kinds of information); this encoding is a focus for semantic theory (Chapter 5, 'Semantics'). Sentences can in turn

be used, in utterances, to convey content; pragmatics is essentially the study of such language-centered communicative acts.

The common ground is a shared, public data structure. Thomason (1990: 339) encourages us to think of it in terms of people collaborating on a shared task:

> What I have in mind is like a group of people working on a common project that is in plain view. For instance, the group might be together in a kitchen, making a salad. From time to time, members of the group add something to the salad. But it is assumed at all times that everyone is aware of the current state of the salad, simply because it's there for everyone to see.

Of course, the shared-database metaphor is an idealisation; there typically isn't a shared record, but rather a set of individual conceptions of that record. However, discourse participants will ("Unless danger signals are perceived"; Thomason 1990: 338) behave as if their own representation of the common ground were the only one, and they will adjust their understandings of it in response to apparent discrepancies with others.

We expect our utterances to be interpreted relative to the common ground, and the norm is to reason in terms of it. The common ground also responds to new events that take place, including linguistic events. Thus, the common ground shapes, and is shaped by, our language; "it is both the object on which speech acts act and the source of information relative to which speech acts are interpreted" (Stalnaker 1998: 98). In keeping with the public nature of the common ground, the task of updating it can be thought of as a coordination problem in which the speaker and the audience collaborate on the nature of the update (Clark 1996; Stone et al. 2007).

Strictly speaking, Stalnaker's model of contexts should suffice by definition: it encodes *all* information (though see Heim 1982: 21 and Kamp 1988 for arguments that discourse information is importantly different, and Stalnaker 1998: §IV for a rebuttal). Stalnaker in fact *identifies* context with common ground. However, whether or not this is right, it is often useful to break the context down into component parts. This might help us to identify kinds of information that are of special relevance to language, and it might be essential for building tractable computational models. Montague (1970), and Kaplan (1978, 1989) model part of the context in terms of tuples containing a speaker, an addressee, a time, and a location, largely for the purposes of interpreting indexicals (see section 7.3). Karttunen (1976) stimulated a number of theoretical developments and empirical findings about how to model discourse anaphora using structures that track which entities have been introduced and what properties they have (Heim 1982; Kamp 1981; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991; Bittner 2001; Asher and Lascarides 2003; see Chierchia 1995 for an overview and partial synthesis of these approaches). Related

approaches seek to predict the discourse status of information, using oppositions like old vs. new and topic vs. focus (Prince 1992; Ward and Birner 2004; Büring 2007). Roberts (1996) and Ginzburg (1996) propose that information exchange is driven by abstract questions under discussion, which define lines of inquiry and help to determine what is relevant (see also Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984; Lewis 1988; Roberts 2004). There is also an extensive literature about how to characterise and model the plans, preferences, commitments, and intentions of discourse participants (Cohen et al. 1990).

7.3 Context dependence

Natural language meanings are highly context-dependent: a single syntactic unit (morpheme, word, phrase, sentence) will often take on different values depending on the context in which it is used. It has long been widely recognised that this variability is pervasive (Katz and Fodor 1963; Bar-Hillel 1971b; Stalnaker 1970: 178). Partee (1989a: 276) conjectures that "the general case of lexical meaning is a combination of inherent meaning and dependence on context". The primary goal of this section is to provide a sense for the range of ways in which expressions can be context dependent. I close with a brief overview of some theoretical approaches to addressing these phenomena.

The purest examples of context dependence are **indexicals**. An indexical is an expression that gets its value directly from the utterance situation. Typical English examples include first- and second-person pronouns, *here*, *now*, *today*, *two days ago*, and *actually*. To know what proposition is expressed by "I am typing here now", one needs to know the time, place, and agent of the utterance. Kaplan (1989) is a seminal treatment of such expressions as directly referential (see also Montague 1970). For Kaplan, the recursive interpretation process is relative to both a model M, which provides fixed conventional meanings, and a context C, which provides a range of information about the utterance situation. When an indexical is encountered, its meaning is taken directly from C. (Haas 1994 addresses the challenges this poses for representation-based theories of knowledge.) Any syntactic unit that denotes a non-constant function from contexts into denotations (Kaplan called these functions **characters**) is said to be context-dependent.

One of the defining features of Kaplan's system is that, outside of direct quotation, morphosyntactic operators cannot shift the meanings of indexicals. This seems broadly correct for English. For example, *I* refers to the speaker even when it is embedded inside a sentential complement whose content is attributed to someone else, as in "Sam says that I am happy", which is not equivalent to "Sam says that Sam is happy". Kaplan took this to be a correct prediction. However, linguists have since argued that

indexicals can shift under certain circumstances, mostly in other languages (Speas 1999; Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 2004), but in certain non-quotational English settings as well (Banfield 1982; Schlenker 2004; Sharvit 2008; Harris 2012).

Indexical interpretation is often fraught with uncertainty. For first-person singular features, the referent is typically non-vague and easy to determine. Such crisp, certain resolution is the exception, though. English first-person plural features constrain their referents to include the speaker, but the rest of the membership is often unclear. Indexicals like *here* and *now* are more underspecified. They can be very general (planet Earth, this epoch) or very specific (this room, this millisecond), and they have extended senses (*here* as in 'on the phone', *here* as in 'conscious'). The semantic values of all these features constrain the possibilities, but determining their referents is generally a full-fledged pragmatic task.

Many expressions have both indexical and non-indexical uses. Third-person pronouns clearly display the range of possibilities. **Deictic uses** (Chapter 27, 'Anaphora resolution') are those that vary by context and thus involve indexicality. For example, if I say, *She is famous*, referring to a woman standing across the room, I might gesture toward her, or I might instead just rely on her salience as a referent in this particular utterance. These uses parallel those for pure indexicals, though pure indexicals generally have enough lexical content to make pointing unnecessary. However, third-person pronouns can pick up a wider array of referents than indexicals can. They can be **discourse anaphoric**, as in *A woman entered. She looked tired* (Chapter 6, 'Discourse'; Chapter 27, 'Anaphora resolution'), and they can be bound by quantificational elements, as in *No actress admitted that she was tired* (Chapter 5, 'Semantics'). Neither of these is possible for indexicals (though see Partee 1989a: fn. 3, Rullmann 2004, Heim 2008, and Kratzer 2009 for apparently bound indexicals).

Partee (1973) shows that tense elements pattern with pronouns. For example, in basic sentences, the simple past is generally defined relative to the utterance time; if *A* says, "I didn't turn off the stove", he likely doesn't mean that there is no past time at which he turned off the stove, but rather that there is a particular, salient time span before the utterance time during which he did not turn off the stove. This is a kind of indexical or deictic reading. Discourse binding is possible as well, as in *Mary woke up sometime in the night. She turned on the light*, where the prior time span against which we evaluate the second sentence is determined by the indefinite phrase *sometime in the night* in the first. Finally, quantificational binding of tense is common: *Whenever Mary awoke from a nightmare as a child, she turned on the light*. Partee (1989a) is a general discussion of expressions displaying this range of possibilities, including *local* (as in *a local bar*), null complement anaphora (*The baby started crying. Everyone noticed.*), and a wide range of perspectival elements (*two feet away*, *near*).

Not all context dependence involves entity-level expressions. For example, the domains for quantificational phrases are highly variable and context dependent. If I say to my class, "Every student did the homework", I almost certainly speak falsely if I intend *every student* to range over all students in the world. It is more likely that I intend the quantifier to range only over students in my class, or in the study group I am addressing. Implicit domain restrictions are the norm for quantificational terms in natural language, not just for nominals but quite generally — for adverbial quantifiers (e.g., *usually*, *necessarily*), modal auxiliaries (e.g., *may* and *should*; Kratzer 1981, 1991; Portner 2009; Hacquard 2012, topic–focus structures (Hajičová and Partee 1998; Büring 2007), and a great many others.

Recovering implicit domains from context is also important for interpreting gradable adjectives like *tall*, *expensive*, and *soft* when they are used in simple predications like *That computer is expensive* or *Gregory is tall*. These predications are made relative to a contextually-supplied set of entities called a **comparison class**, a scale, and a contextual standard on that scale (see von Stechow 1984, Klein 1991, and Kennedy 1999 for details on these ideas and alternatives to them). For example, *The watch is expensive* and *The watch is affordable* might be interpreted relative to the same comparison class (the set of all watches, the set of all objects in the store) and the same scale (prices), but they require different standards. The comparison class is often recoverable from the immediate linguistic context (say, *large mouse* has the set of mice as its context-set), and it can be spelled out explicitly with phrases like *large for a mouse*. However, even these cases are not always free of context dependence when it comes to this argument. For example, Kennedy (2007: 11) observes that *Bill has an expensive BMW* might be true even if he has the least expensive BMW — for example, if the comparison class is the set of all cars. Similar standard-fixing is required for interpreting certain quantificational elements. To evaluate a politician's claim that "Many people support my proposal", we need to know both whether there are additional domain restrictions (people in the city, people who own cats), and we need to have a sense for the current numerical standards for *many* (perhaps along with sense disambiguation for *many*; Partee 1989b).

Within theoretical linguistics, work on context dependence is predominantly about characterising and cataloguing the types of context dependence that are attested in natural language, which extends far beyond the above small sample. Thus, the literature is rich in generalisations about what is linguistically possible and theoretical characterisations of it. This is only one part of the story, though. We also want to know what actually happens — for example, what the preferences are for resolving discourse anaphora, setting contextual standards, and controlling vagueness. The computational literature has made a more concerted effort to provide theories of such

usage preferences and expectations. Of particular relevance to the facts reviewed above are theories of abductive inference (Hobbs 1979; for a review, see Hobbs 2004), centering (Grosz et al. 1995; Walker et al. 1997), and intention recognition (Cohen et al. 1990). There is also a rich body of psycholinguistic findings about context-dependence resolution (for overviews, see Gernsbacher 1994; Clark 2004; Gaskell 2009).

7.4 Gricean pragmatics

Broadly speaking, resolving context dependence, as described above, is a signalling game in the sense of Lewis (1969, 1975): the communicative goal of the discourse participants is to find a common understanding of the context-dependent elements in the overt signal (the language used). This is just one small aspect of the overall signalling problem, though, because, as foundational question (ii) suggests, the speaker's intended message can be considerably richer than what one would obtain from simply resolving this context dependence.

The philosopher H.P. Grice was the first to describe, in his 1967 William James Lectures (reprinted as part I of Grice 1989), a general theoretical framework for collaborative, purposive interactions of this kind. Grice was driven by a desire to reconcile mathematical logic with the insights of ordinary language philosophy, and he drew inspiration from the then-novel premise of Chomskyan generative grammar that the seemingly unruly syntax of natural language could be given concise formal characterisation (Bach 1994; Chapman 2005: 86).

The heart of Gricean pragmatics, as described in Grice 1975, is the **Cooperative Principle**, which is analysed into four **conversational maxims**:

Definition 7.2 (Gricean pragmatics)**.**

> **The Cooperative Principle**: Make your contribution as is required, when it is required, by the conversation in which you are engaged.
>
> - **Quality**: Contribute only what you know to be true. Do not say false things. Do not say things for which you lack evidence.
> - **Quantity**: Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not say more than is required.
> - **Relation (Relevance)**: Make your contribution relevant.
> - **Manner**: (i) Avoid obscurity; (ii) avoid ambiguity; (iii) be brief; (iv) be orderly.

The Cooperative Principle governs information exchange. The only presumption is that the discourse participants wish to accurately recognise one another's intended messages. This can be true even if their real-world objectives are in opposition, as long as each side still has incentives to accurately recognise the other's intentions. (Asher and Lascarides (2013) study communication in contexts with varying levels of cooperativity.)

The maxims of Quality, Quantity, and Relation govern the flow of information and thus are not inherently tied to linguistic forms. Grice (1975: 47) writes, "As one of my avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, behaviour, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations of presumptions connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their analogues in the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges", and he proceeds to give examples of these maxims at work in language-free collaborative tasks. It follows from this that two linguistic forms with the same information content will interact with these maxims in exactly the same ways (Levinson 1983: §3). Manner is the exception. It governs specific forms, rather than the meanings of those forms, and is most influential where there are two forms that are (near-)synonyms relative to the context of utterance.

One of the defining characteristics of the maxims is that discourse participants are rarely, if ever, in a position to satisfy all of them at once. For example, there are inherent tensions internal to Manner: brief utterances are likely to be ambiguous, and technical terms are generally less ambiguous, but more obscure, than non-technical ones. Similarly, Quantity and Manner can play off each other: one wishes to provide a full explanation, but it will take a long time to provide one. Which maxim dominates in these situations is typically highly variable, with the exception of interactions that pit Quality against a subset of the other maxims. In those cases, Quality typically wins decisively; the pressure for truth is arguably more fundamental than the others (Grice 1975: 27). For example, suppose one wants to provide relevant information towards resolving a question under discussion but lacks sufficient evidence to do so. In such cases, the cooperative speaker opts for a partial resolution of the issue (Quality trumps Relevance).

These tensions between the maxims lead to the main source of pragmatic enrichment that Grice articulated, the **conversational implicature**:

Definition 7.3 (Conversational implicature; Grice 1975: 49–50)**.** Proposition q is a **conversational implicature** of utterance U by agent A in context C just in case: (i) it is mutual, public knowledge of all the discourse participants in C that A is obeying the Cooperative Principle; (ii) in order to maintain (i), it must be assumed that A believes q; and (iii) A believes that it is mutual, public knowledge of all the discourse participants that (ii) holds.

To see how this definition works, consider the simple exchange in (7.1).

(7.1) *A*: "Which city does Barbara live in?"

B: "She lives in Russia."

Assume that *B* is cooperative at least insofar as he is known to be forthcoming about the relevant set of issues. In this context, the discourse participants will likely infer $q =$ *B* does not know which city Barbara lives in. We can show that q is a conversational implicature of *B*'s utterance, as follows: (i) holds by assumption. To show that (ii) holds, assume that *B* does not believe q. Then *B* does know which city Barbara lives in. By (i) (in particular, by Relevance), *B* is therefore uncooperative for not providing this more relevant answer. This contradicts (i), so we conclude that (ii) does hold. Condition (iii) requires that the discourse participants be sufficiently knowledgeable about the domain and about the underlying notions of cooperativity to reason this way about (i) and (ii). Assuming it holds, we can conclude that q is an implicature.

Conversational implicatures are extremely sensitive to the context of utterance. It is often striking how a conversational implicature that is prominent in context C can disappear in even slight variations on C. For example, if the cooperativity premise (i) is false (say, *A* is a spy who is reluctant to inform on Barbara), then q is not inferred as a conversational implicature. Changing what is relevant can also dramatically impact conversational implicatures. In (7.2), *B* uses the same sentence as in (7.1), but here the conversational implicature is absent, because we can consistently assume both that *A* is cooperative and that he knows which city Barbara lives in. Relevance demands only the name of a country; naming the city might even provide too much information, or be too indirect.

(7.2) *A*: "Which country does Barbara live in?"

B: "She lives in Russia."

Conversational implicatures can also generally be cancelled directly: the speaker can explicitly deny them without thereby speaking inconsistently (but see Eckardt 2007; Lauer 2013: §9). For example, in scenario (7.1), *B* could say, "She lives in Russia — in fact, in Petersburg". In some cases, cancellations will incur penalties from Manner, for being less concise than they could have been, but they can also serve important communicative functions, by manipulating which information is salient, revealing a chain of reasoning, or confronting expectations.

The above examples centrally involve Relevance. The general principle seems to be that an utterance U construed as a response to question Q will generate implicatures concerning all alternatives utterances U' that more fully resolve Q than U

does (Hirschberg 1985; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984; van Rooy 2003). Another well-studied class of conversational implicatures are the **scalar implicatures**. These involve sets of lexical items that can be ordered along some dimension of strength. For example, ⟨*all, most, some*⟩ is a standard pragmatic scale ordered by entailment (or something very close to it, if $all(X, Y)$ can be true where X is empty). Thus, if I am asked how well my students did on their exam and I reply, "Some did well", a fast lexical calculation will lead my addressee to conclude that it would have been infelicitous to say "Most/All did well", which will lead to conversational implicatures concerning the meanings those utterances would have had (e.g., that I don't know whether all of them did well, that I know not all of them did well, that I regard whether all of them did well as irrelevant or inappropriate to discuss, etc.). Lexical scales of this sort abound — for example, ⟨*must, should, might*⟩, ⟨*and, or*⟩, ⟨*adequate, good, excellent*⟩. Such scales can also have highly context-specific orderings (Horn 1972; Hirschberg 1985).

Horn (1984) identifies and explores the principle that marked expressions tend to be used to report unusual events, and unmarked expressions tend to be used to report normal events (see also Levinson 2000). For example, when it comes to driving a car, *stop the car* is less marked than *cause the car to stop*. Thus, speakers will assume that "Ali stopped the car" describes a normal situation involving her placing her foot on the brake, whereas "Ali caused the car to stop" involves something more unusual: a special device, a well-placed tree, etc. (McCawley 1978; Blutner 1998). The notion of markedness is extremely broad but certainly plays off of the sub-maxims of Manner, which will generally favour lexicalised forms over phrasal ones (unless the lexical form is rare or obscure).

Not all pragmatic enrichments can be classified as conversational implicatures (though see Hirschberg 1985: §2 on the challenge of actually ensuring this definitionally). For example, as a semantic fact, statements of the form *X said that S* convey nothing about the truth of *S*, simply because it is possible to say both true and false things. However, such statements commonly interact with information in the common ground so as to lead speakers to conclude from such statements that *S* is in fact true. For instance, if a respected newspaper prints the sentence *United Widget said that its chairman resigned*, then, absent additional information, readers will infer that United Widget's chairman resigned. This proposition, call it q, is inferred because the context contains the premise that companies generally report only true things about their personnel changes. However, there is no guarantee that q is a conversational implicature, because we can consistently maintain both that the author was cooperative and that he does not endorse q. (This might in fact be the pretense of the journalist, who wishes to be committed only to United Widget having made the report.)

It's an open question whether conversational implicature is behind the inferences associated with discourse coherence (Hobbs 1985; Kehler 2002, 2004; Chapter 6, 'Discourse'). A two-sentence sequence like *Kim took the medication. She got better* will typically license the inference that Kim got better *because* she took the medication. This inference presumably has its source in the pressures of cooperativity: given normal background information and the premise that the speaker will be relevant, this causal interpretation will be salient for the listener. This is a defeasible inference; the sentences uttered are consistent with a merely temporal relationship between the two events, for example, and so a speaker can easily continue with a denial that a causal link was intended. These are hallmarks of implicature. However, it seems clear that definition 7.3 is at best a partial explanation for coherence-related inferences, which seem to be defined and constrained by numerous lexical and constructional facts (Prasad et al. 2008).

The Gricean definition 7.3 is cognitively demanding: clause (i) presupposes independent criteria for whether an agent is cooperative, and clauses (ii)–(iii) assess whether complex pieces of information have the status of mutual knowledge. This might lead one to expect implicatures to be both infrequent and effortful. There is presently little consensus on whether these expectations are born out empirically. For instance, Paris (1973) reports relatively low rates of conversational implicature based on logical connectives (see also Geurts 2009), whereas Hendriks et al. (2009) report high rates for similar items, and van Tiel et al. (2013) find considerable lexical variation in implicature inferences. The picture is similarly mixed on the question of cognitive demands. For example, Huang and Snedeker (2009) find that implicature inferences are slow relative to truth-conditional ones, whereas Grodner et al. (2010) argue that the differences, where observed, can be attributed to other factors. Despite these conflicting viewpoints, I believe there is currently broad consensus around the idea that inferences consistent with definition 7.3 are widely attested, in children and adults, at least where contextual factors favor them and performance limitations do not interfere (Grodner and Sedivy 2008; Sedivy 2007; Stiller et al. 2011).

The utility of the maxims extends far beyond the calculation of conversational implicatures. For example, I noted in section 7.3 that the lexical content of indexicals typically underspecifies their referents, even when they are situated in context: *here* could refer to my precise global coordinates, but it could also mean that I am in my office, in the department, in California, on planet Earth. In context, though, some of these resolutions are likely to be uninformative and others are likely to be clearly false. Thus, Quantity and Quality will help delimit the possibilities, and information in the common ground (section 7.2) might further cut down on the possibilities, thereby getting us closer to an acceptable level of indeterminacy.

Grice offered the maxims only tentatively, as an example of how one might formulate a theory in the terms he envisioned (Chapman 2005: §5). There have since been a number of reformulations that maintain, to a greater or lesser degree, the broad outlines of definition 7.2 while nonetheless displaying different behaviour. Lakoff (1973) and Brown and Levinson (1987) add maxims for politeness (see also Grice 1975: 47) and show that such pressures are diverse and powerful. Horn (1984) is a more dramatic overhaul. Horn sees in the Gricean maxims the hallmarks of Zipf's (1949) balance between the speaker's desire to minimise effort and the hearer's desire to acquire relevant information reliably. Levinson (2000) builds on Horn's (1984) formulation, but with an explicit counterpart to Manner. Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 2004) denies many of the tenets of Gricean pragmatics, including the centrality of the Cooperative Principle, in favor of a complex, over-arching principle of relevance. More recent efforts using decision-theoretic tools seek to derive the effects of the maxims from more basic principles of cooperation and goal orientation (Franke 2009; Jäger 2012; Frank and Goodman 2012; Vogel et al. 2013), which is arguably a desirable approach given the extreme difficulty inherent in trying to formalise the maxims themselves.

7.5 Dimensions of meaning

Conversational implicatures are not the only additional meanings that utterances convey. Natural language meanings are multifaceted; a single utterance can make multiple distinct (but perhaps interrelated) contributions to a discourse. With "Sam passed the damn test", I convey p = Sam passed the test, but I also convey that I am in a heightened emotional state. (Presumably this has something to do with Sam's passing.) *Sam managed to pass the test* also conveys p, but now with an additional meaning that (roughly) we expected him not to (Karttunen 1971; Karttunen and Peters 1979; Nairn et al. 2006; MacCartney 2009). *Even Sam passed the test* again conveys p, but with an additional scalar meaning that Sam was among the least likely to pass (see Beaver and Clark 2008: §3 for discussion and references).

For each of the above cases, we can fairly reliably identify p as the primary contribution and others as secondary comments on p serving to contextualise it (Potts 2012: §3). Among the most extensively investigated questions in semantics and pragmatics are, (i) what is the nature of these secondary contributions, (ii) what is their source, and (iii) how do they relate to the primary contribution? Questions (i) and (ii) must be addressed largely on a case-by-case basis, since they involve the idiosyncrasies of particular lexical items and constructions. I largely set them aside here in favour of question (iii), which is the **presupposition projection problem** (Morgan 1969; Keenan 1971;

Karttunen 1973; Heim 1983, 1992; Beaver 1997), though I am here generalising it to all kinds of secondary semantic content, in the spirit of Thomason (1990), Roberts et al. (2009), and Tonhauser et al. (2013).

To begin, I pursue a line of investigation pioneered by Karttunen (1973), who identifies a range of semantic operators that allow us to distinguish primary contributions from secondary ones. Consider sentence (7.3) and the variants of it in (7.3a–d).

(7.3) Sam broke his skateboard.

a. Sam didn't break his skateboard.
b. Did Sam break his skateboard?
c. If Sam broke his skateboard, then he will be unhappy.
d. Sam must have broken his skateboard (or else he would be out cruising around).

The primary meaning of (7.3) is that, at some time prior to the time of utterance, Sam broke his skateboard. Call this proposition p. The secondary meaning of interest is the proposition q that Sam owns a skateboard. In some sense, (7.3) conveys $(p \wedge q)$, the conjunction of p and q. However, it is a mistake to treat the two meanings in this symmetric fashion. The asymmetries reveal themselves when we consider the variants (7.3a–d). The negation (7.3a) conveys $(\neg p \wedge q)$, with the negation $\neg$ scoping only over the primary content. The secondary content is untouched by negation. This observation generalises to a wide range of semantic operators that weaken or reverse commitment. The interrogative (7.3b) queries only p, with q an unmodified commitment (cf. *Does Sam own a skateboard that broke?*). The conditional (7.3c) conditionalises only p; the commitment to q remains. And, with the epistemic modal statement (7.3d), the speaker commits to q directly, with the modal qualifying only p.

One might worry at this point that we are looking, not at secondary dimensions of meaning, but rather at entailments of the primary dimension. Any given contentful claim will have numerous entailments. For example, (7.3) entails that Sam broke something. However, this meaning shows completely different behaviour with regard to the holes. For example, none of the examples in (7.3a–d) entail that Sam broke something.

The primary dimension of meaning is primary in the discourse sense as well. As a result, explicit challenges to an utterance are likely to be interpreted as challenging the main content only. If I utter (7.3) and you reply with, "Not true!" or a similar kind of denial, then you will likely be interpreted as denying that Sam broke his skateboard, but probably also agreeing with the claim that he has one. For more personal and participant-relativised content like that of *damn*, both affirmations and denials will

factor out this content; if I say, "Sam passed the damn test" and you accept or reject my claim, you are likely to be perceived as remaining silent about what my using *damn* did.

There are discourse-level methods for challenging secondary aspects of meaning. These are often referred to as *Wait a minute!* tests for presupposition, following Shanon (1976), who studied them in the context of presuppositions. If I assert (7.3), you could go after my secondary meaning by saying, "Wait a minute! I didn't know Sam had a skateboard!", or perhaps the stronger "Wait a minute! Sam doesn't have a skateboard!". A general characterisation of this discourse move is that it serves to ensure that a piece of de-emphasised secondary content, offered by the speaker as an aside, is moved into the spotlight, where it can be discussed and debated as a primary contribution. For additional discussion of this discourse move in the context of presuppositions and related kinds of meaning, see von Fintel 2004 and von Fintel and Matthewson 2008.

There seems to be a great deal of conventionalisation regarding how words and constructions determine which aspects of a sentence are primary and which are secondary. However, this is also subject to considerable influence from general pragmatic and contextual factors, making it a full-fledged pragmatic problem, rather than one that can be handled entirely in the semantics. For example, the morphosyntax of *We regret that the pool is closed* would lead one to expect that the primary contribution is that the speaker has a certain emotional state (regret). However, if this sign is hanging on the gate leading to the pool area, the primary contribution will certainly be that the pool is closed, even though this is expressed in an embedded clause and is arguably not even invariably an entailment of the sentence in a narrow semantic sense (Thomason 1990: 331). Similarly, if I exclaim to my co-author "We need to finish this damn paper", the primary content is well-known and thus merely evoked for the purposes of my conveying urgency using *damn*.

Much of the literature on dimensions of meaning in this sense concerns whether they are purely the result of pragmatic reasoning or whether they trace to conventionalised facts about words and constructions. Discussion of this issue often turns on how reliably the secondary dimensions are present. We expect pragmatic meanings to be malleable and cancellable, as discussed in section 7.4, whereas we expect semantic facts to be rigid and non-negotiable (setting aside vagueness). This debate formed part of the earliest discussions of presuppositions and presupposition projection (Karttunen 1973; Boër and Lycan 1976), and it continues today (see Simons 2006 for an overview).

Another central question of this literature is whether there are distinct subtypes of secondary content. Potts (2005) argues that we can reliably distinguish Grice's (1975) **conventional implicatures** (as opposed to conversational) from both presuppositions and regular semantic entailments, but this remains a controversial claim, one that is

deeply entwined with the sense in which presuppositions can be informative for the hearer (von Fintel 2008; Beaver and Zeevat 2007; Gauker 2008) and the ways in which meanings project in a complex array of environments. For discussion, see Karttunen and Peters 1979; Bach 1999a; Potts 2007, 2012.

7.6 Speech acts

One of the most widely studied connections between computational linguistics and pragmatics is speech-act theory (Searle 1969; Searle and Vanderveken 1985), and there are a number of excellent existing resources on this topic (Jurafsky 2004; Leech and Weisser 2003; Jurafsky and Martin 2009: §21, 24). I therefore concentrate on the issue of how **speech act** (**illocutionary**) force is assigned to utterances, casting this as a problem of context dependence and highlighting the ways in which the context and Gricean reasoning can help.

Speech-acts broadly categorise utterances based on the speaker's intentions for their core semantic content, indicating whether it is meant to be asserted, queried, commanded, exclaimed, and so forth. It is often assumed that there is a deterministic relationship between clause-types and speech-act force: imperative clauses are for commanding, interrogative clauses are for querying, declaratives are for asserting, and so forth, with the deviations from this pattern seen as exceptional (Sadock and Zwicky 1985; Hamblin 1987). However, the factual situation is considerably more complex than this would seem to suggest. I illustrate in (7.4)–(7.10) with imperatives, using data and insights from Lauer and Condoravdi 2010:

(7.4) "Please don't rain!" (plea)

(7.5) Host to visitor: "Have a seat." (invitation)

(7.6) Parent to child: "Clean your room!" (order)

(7.7) Navigator to driver: "Take a right here." (suggestion)

(7.8) To an ailing friend: "Get well soon!" (well-wish)

(7.9) To an enemy: "Drop dead!" (ill-wish)

(7.10) Ticket agent to the crowd: "Have your boarding passes ready" (request)

Example (7.6) involves an imperative with command force. There seems to be little basis for taking this particular example as basic, though. The others are equally familiar and natural in context, and some of them do not meet basic requirements for issuing orders: the addressee does not have sufficient control in (7.8) or (7.9), and it is not even clear that (7.4) has an addressee at all (Schmerling 1982). What's more, it is easy

to find other clause-types issued with the force of commands; the demanding parent from (7.6) could intend to issue a command with either the declarative (7.11) or the interrogative in (7.12).

(7.11) I want you to clean up your room.

(7.12) Why don't you clean your room already?

Indirect speech-acts highlight additional complexities. When the mobster says, "Take care not to let your dog out at night", he might indeed intend this to be a suggestion, but this is not the only identifiable force. The utterance might primarily be a threat. This kind of indirection is important to issues in language and the law, because many legal disputes turn on whether certain speech acts were performed — with utterance U, did the speaker invoke the right to counsel, grant the police permission to enter, issue a threat, assert something untruthful (Solan and Tiersma 2005)?

Thus, while clause-typing is an important factor in inferences about utterance force, it is not the only factor. The problem can fruitfully be thought of as one of resolving context dependence through a combination of linguistic knowledge, contextual reasoning, and general pragmatic pressures. For example, I noted above that it seems beyond the addressee's control to bring about the propositions implicit in (7.8) and (7.9). However, a general precondition for felicitously ordering an agent A to bring it about that p is that A has the power to achieve that goal. Thus, the preconditions are not met in these cases, so the Cooperative Principle will steer discourse participants away from such a construal. Conversely, the discourse conditions for issuing a command are perfectly met in (7.6), so that reading is naturally salient (as in (7.11)–(7.12), for that matter). Examples like (7.7) are even more complicated: depending on the power relationship between speaker and addressee, and their goals, the utterance might manifest itself as a complex blend of request, suggestion, and order. Indeed, such examples highlight the fact that it is not speech-act labelling per se that is important (often it unclear which labels one would choose), but rather identifying and tracking the effects that these utterances have on the context.

7.7 Challenges and prospects

The phrase "the pragmatic wastebasket" evokes a messy, neglected place. It seems to have been coined by Bar-Hillel (1971a: 405), who warns against "forcing bits and pieces you find in the pragmatic wastebasket into your favourite syntactico-semantic theory". That was an era in which Chomskyan linguists saw syntax wherever they looked. The present-day concern is usually about the reverse direction. As Bach (1999b) writes, "In linguistics the category of pragmatics has served mainly as a bin for disposing of

phenomena that would otherwise be the business of semantics (as part of grammar) to explain." The winking presumption is that we can have elegant formal theories of semantics as long as we agree that the messiest stuff belongs to another field.

Despite the prominent "waste" metaphor, I think the outlook for the field is bright, for three central reasons. First, we have a clearer empirical picture than ever before, thanks to a number of important corpus resources (Stoia et al. 2008; Thompson et al. 1993; Prasad et al. 2008; Calhoun et al. 2010) and increasing consensus about which psycholinguistic methods are most effective for exploring meanings in context. Second, the field is moving towards collaborative models, in the spirit of pioneers Lewis (1969, 1975) and Clark (1996). Whereas earlier models were overwhelmingly focused on the interpretive (listener) perspective, these new models truly embrace the fact that we are all constantly shifting between these roles as we work collaboratively in discourse (Benz et al. 2005; Stone et al. 2007). Third, pragmaticists are establishing, or re-establishing, connections with cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, and natural language processing, which is having the effect of adding to their theoretical toolkit, sharpening the empirical picture, and making results more relevant and accessible than ever before.

Further reading and relevant resources

The papers collected in Horn and Ward 2004 provide fuller introductions to all of the topics addressed here, among others, and they also connect with other areas of linguistics, psychology, and computer science. From that collection, Jurafsky 2004 is an apt companion to the present paper; its empirical focus is narrower, but it builds a forceful case that computational and algorithmic perspectives can shed new light on pragmatic phenomena.

The papers in Stalnaker 1999 form a detailed picture of context, common ground, and their role in semantics and pragmatics. Thomason 1990 begins from a similarly general view of context but makes direct connections with computation and artificial intelligence. Thomason also deliberately blurs the distinction between presupposition and implicature within his interactional model.

On the topic of Gricean pragmatics and conversational implicature, Horn (2006) is a lively overview of the phenomena and how they relate to semantics. Hirschberg (1985) focuses on scalar implicatures, broadly construed in terms of context-sensitive partial orders on expressions, but she also offers a general perspective on Gricean pragmatics and the challenges of computational implementation. Jäger (2012) describes the iterated best response model, a decision-theoretic approach that characterises the Gricean definition of conversational implicature in probabilistic terms, using techniques related to those of Lewis 1969; see also the papers collected in Benz et al. 2005.

Recent overviews of multifaceted linguistic meaning, going beyond the short overview of section 7.5, include Potts 2012, Beaver and Geurts 2012, Tonhauser et al. 2013, and the papers in Ramchand and Reiss 2007: §III. Green 2007 is a detailed empirical and historical overview of speech-act theory (section 7.6), and Condoravdi and Lauer (2011) and Lauer (2013) seek to establish direct connections between speech-act inferences and preference-driven interpretation.

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TEACHING FOR JOY AND JUSTICE

5: Language and Power



Steve Liss/GETTY IMAGES

Uncovering the Legacy of Language and Power

"You will never teach a child a new language by scorning and ridiculing and forcibly erasing his first language." —June Jordan

Lamont's sketch was stick-figure simple: A red schoolhouse with brown students entering one door and exiting as white students at the other end of the building. Kahlia's illustration depicted a more elaborate metaphor: She drew a map of Africa hanging from a tree; tightly closed red lips cover the heart of the map. A U.S. map flies over the tree, and sentences swirl around it: "I cannot speak my language. My identity is gone. My African language is gone. The language I grew up with has been taken from me."

In the classroom, according to my students who study the linguistic history of the colonized, too often the job of the teacher is to "whitewash" students of color or students who are linguistically diverse.

Over the years, students have drawn mouths sewn shut, tongues nailed to the ground, languages squeezed out or buried under stacks of English grammar books, a Spanish voice box removed, graveyards for indigenous languages, a mouth rubbed out by an eraser with the word English written across the top, and language trees with the withered leaves of Korean, Spanish, Russian, African languages dropping off while the red, ripe English fruit flourished. As my students' drawings depicted over and over in a variety of ways, schools and societies erase language and culture.

Our schools do not have linguistic genocide as their mission. In fact, most schools and school boards fashion mission statements about "embracing diversity." Multilingual banners welcome visitors in Spanish, Russian, Vietnamese on the hallway walls of most school buildings these days, but in the classroom,

according to my students who study the linguistic history of the colonized, too often the job of the teacher is to "whitewash" students of color or students who are linguistically diverse.

English Only laws in many states have banned Spanish and other languages from some classrooms. Ebonics was used as fodder for racist jokes after the Oakland School Board proposed teaching Ebonics. Native American languages were decimated in boarding schools during a time when "Kill the Indian, Save the Man" directives gave straightforward instructions to teachers. Although I intentionally invite and acknowledge the variety of languages and voices from our community into the classroom, I learned this wasn't enough. I can tell students to use their home language in their poems and narratives, and I can bring August Wilson's plays, Lois-Ann Yamanaka's stories, and Jimmy Santiago Baca's poetry into my class to validate the use of dialect and home language; but without examining the legacy of language supremacy, I maintain the old world order because I haven't explored why Standard English is the standard and how it came to power, and how that power is wielded to make some people feel welcome and others feel like outsiders.

After years of teaching and tinkering with this language unit, I finally realized that I needed to create a curriculum on language and power that examined the colonial roots of linguistic genocide and analyzed how schools continue to perpetuate the myths of inferiority or invisibility of some languages. I also discovered the need for stories of hope: stories of people's resistance to the loss of their mother tongues and stories about the growing movement to save indigenous languages from extinction.

Depending on how many pieces of the unit I include, this curriculum takes between five and 10 weeks. Students read literature, nonfiction texts, poetry, and watch films. They write narratives, poetry, and a culminating essay about language. For their final "exam," they create a "take-it-to-the-people" project that teaches their chosen audience an aspect of our language study that they think people need to know in order to understand contemporary language issues. The curriculum includes any of the following five segments: Naming as a Practice of Power; Language and Colonization; Dialect and Power; Ebonics; and Language Restoration.

Linguistic Genocide Through Colonization

Max Weinreich, a Yiddish linguist, wrote, "A language is a dialect with an army and a navy." In other words, it's about power. In order for students to understand how some languages came to be dominant, they need to understand how and why indigenous languages were wiped out or marginalized. According to the Living Tongues Institute for Endangered Languages, over half of the world's languages have become extinct in the last 500 years. In fact, David Harrison, a linguistics professor at Swarthmore, says, "the pace of their global extinction exceeds the pace of species extinction." Students need to understand how this invisible legacy that privileges some languages—and people—and excludes or decimates others continues to affect us today.

Teaching about language and power is huge and complex and messy because language policies and colonial practices played out in different ways across the globe. In some places, the languages died with the people who spoke them, as colonial powers took both the land and the lives of the people they "encountered." In some instances, indigenous groups were pitted against each other. In many places, colonists renamed every nook and cranny, banned native languages, and created governments, schools, and economic systems using the language of the colonizer's home country.

Today, language is still contested territory in many parts of the world. Because most political, educational, and commercial interactions take place in the language of the colonizer or the primary language, many indigenous languages have become marginalized or extinct. Parents are frequently forced to choose between teaching their children in their home language or pushing them to study the language of the dominant social groups. In a workshop in San Francisco, a teacher talked about how the educational and economic necessity of learning English pressed her to put her Vietnamese language aside. "I didn't feel like I had a choice." Ultimately, this forced choice causes a disconnect between generations of language speakers and a loss of family ties, traditions, and cultural memory.

Because of time, my classes didn't study each language situation in depth; instead, we looked for patterns across the stories. In many places, the colonizers taught people shame about their "primitive" or "backward" language and cultural practices. As Ngugi wa Thiong'o, a Kenyan teacher, novelist, essayist, and playwright, wrote in his essay "The Language of African Literature":

> The real aim of colonialism was to control the people's wealth … [but] economic and political control can never be complete or effective without mental control. To control a people's culture is to control their tools of self-definition in relationship to others. For colonialism, this involved two aspects of the same process: the

> destruction or the deliberate undervaluing of a people's culture, their art, dances, religions, history, geography, education, orature and literature, and the conscious elevation of the language of the colonizer. The domination of a people's language by the languages of the colonizing nations was crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the colonizers.

Ngugi stopped writing in English and started writing in his native tongue—Kikuyu—as a protest against the devaluing of his mother tongue, but also as a way to revive and celebrate literature in his language. This "conscious elevation of the language of the colonizer" and the parallel domination of the "mental universe" that Ngugi wa Thiong'o describes is echoed in stories from Kenya to Ireland to Australia to the United States.

I need to teach students how and why some languages have power and others don't.

The "domination of the mental universe of the colonizers" continues today in the daily interactions that "nonstandard" language speakers must negotiate when they enter the halls of power—schools, banks, government and employment offices. Whether it's the marking down of essays because of "poor" grammar or the conscious or unconscious way that lack of linguistic dexterity marks a speaker or writer as "unfit" for a position—a job, a college, or a scholarship—language inequality still exists. The power of the standard language is so pervasive and so invisible that students need to uncover what they take for granted and internalize as personal failure. But I also need to teach them how and why some languages have power and others don't.

The Linguistic Tea Party

To familiarize students with the context and characters they will meet during our journey into language and colonialism, I wrote a tea party to introduce the personalities and events they will encounter as we read stories or watch movie clips. The roles also alert students to the patterns that emerge in the unit—loss of languages, humiliation, shame, and beatings, as well as the heroic efforts to save dying tongues. I tried to make the tea party entice students into curiosity about language study—admittedly, not a subject that most students initially rate as the number one topic they want to learn about.

As George Bernard Shaw wrote in the preface to his play *Pygmalion*, which I typically teach as part of the unit, "I wish to boast that Pygmalion has been an extremely successful play all over Europe and North America as well as at home. It is so intensely and deliberately didactic, and its subject is esteemed so dry, that I delight in throwing it at the heads of the wiseacres who repeat the parrot cry that art should never be didactic. It goes to prove my contention that art should never be anything else." Although I hesitate to crow like Shaw, the "dry" and "didactic" subject of language engages students because language is so closely tied to culture and home.

In constructing the tea party roles, I write in first person, so students feel more comfortable introducing themselves as the person. Bud Lane's role, for example, gives students a sense of the urgency around the issue of language preservation. Although Oregon was once among the most linguistically diverse places on earth, it is now infamous as a language-death hot spot according to the Living Tongues Institute for Endangered Languages, because there are few remaining first speakers—people who learned the language as children:

> Some people already count my language as dead. I speak Oregon Coastal Athabaskan. At 50, I am one of the youngest speakers of my language. Here in the Northwest, we are a hot spot for language extinction. I'm hoping to change that. You see, I think that the language and the people are the same. I didn't grow up speaking my language either, but I found an elder Siletz woman who knew the words, but who never spoke them in public. She'd been taught shame of her native tongue by white society. But Nellie Orton found her voice and taught me my language. Now I teach our language at the local school, so that our children can save our native tongue.

Each character can answer at least one question on the tea party question sheet. (See p. 226.) For example, Lane's character answers the question, "Find someone who started or joined an organization to preserve his or her language. Who is the person? Why did the individual decide to take this action?" Most of the tea party questions can be answered by more than one person.

Students meet a spectrum of characters, including Distinguished Professor Geneva "Dr. G." Smitherman; Irish poet Gearóid Mac Lochlainn; Hawaiian writer Lois-Ann Yamanaka; Carmen Lomas Garza, a Mexican American artist; Hector Pieterson, a 12-year-old boy killed in the Soweto Uprising; and Neville Alexander, a South African linguist working to restore mother tongue literacy in Africa. (See pp. 218-225 for the full roles.)

After I distribute a role and tea party questions to students, I ask them to read the role and underline key facts that their classmates need to know: Where is this person from? What is his or her experience with language? I also tell them to highlight any piece of information they find particularly compelling. Then I tell them to turn the role sheet over and write those key facts on the back. Students are more likely to remember the facts if they read them, write them, and recite them. Once most students have completed these tasks, I demonstrate what I want them to do. I pretend I am one of the characters, say Esther Martinez, and I walk to a student across the room and say, "Hi, I'm Esther Martinez. I want to tell you a few things about myself." I ham it up, so they won't feel awkward pretending they are a character from our tea party. Students are stiff and unsure the first time they introduce themselves as their character, but after a few conversations, they own their role; they've become John Rickford or Hector Pieterson.

After the tea party, I ask students to write a paragraph about what they learned about language and power and then we talk. During our post-tea party discussion, Deandre said, "[The society] tried to take people from what they were raised to believe in, and I don't believe that was right." When I pressed him, "Who was one person you met who had something taken away from them?" he talked about his own character, Joe Suina. He said, "Well, myself. My name is Joe Suina. I am currently a professor of Curriculum and Instruction at University of New Mexico. I was punished at school for speaking my language, and they tried to teach me that my language was not right. They tried to turn me into what was the dominant culture. They tried to make me believe what everyone else believed in."

Reading the School Stories: Finding the Patterns

After the tea party, we dive into the readings and movies. I want to saturate students in the stories—memoirs and fiction—about language. We begin by examining five memoirs about language and boarding schools—two from the United States, one from Australia, one from Kenya, and one from Canada. These are short 2- or 3-page excerpts from longer pieces and two video clips. In addition to reacting to each piece about language and boarding schools through writing and discussion, students keep track of each person's experiences on a chart, including a description of the race and class of each main character. I tell them to record who is forced or encouraged to change their language, who doesn't have to change, and who forces the change. (See Story Retrieval charts on pp. 228-229.) Because the unit is long, the charts help them collect evidence over the span of the unit, so they can quickly go back and retrieve evidence for the culminating essay or project.

I begin by examining what happened to Native Americans. The video *In the White Man's Image*, a documentary about Native American boarding schools, shows the Carlisle Indian School established by Captain Richard Pratt, who attempted to assimilate Native American children into white society from 1879 to 1918. Today Pratt's mission is widely viewed as cultural genocide. Pratt's

Bettman Archive/CORBIS

(Left) Chiracahua Apaches as they looked upon their arrival at the Carlisle Indian School, an institution dedicated to inducing Native Americans to abandon their traditional ways. (Right) Chiracahua Apaches after four months at the Carlisle Indian School.

motto was, "Kill the Indian and save the man." In order to "kill the Indian," he punished children for practicing their religion and speaking their language. He renamed them, cut their hair and took away their clothes. Native students resisted Pratt's attempts to "deculturize" them as one of my students, Harold, put it. Many died, others ran away, few graduated, and ultimately, most maintained their Native American identity. Pratt used before and after photographs of the students to sell white audiences on the success of his school.

In the White Man's Image portrays the boarding school system at work, but doesn't focus as much on the individual stories, except for Ernest White Thunder, who resisted the campaign to take away his culture by running away

Dee said, "If you kill the Indian culture, you might as well kill the Indian because nothing about him is really him."

from the school and refusing to eat. Ultimately, he died. His resistance was a touchstone for some students who referenced White Thunder and later wanted to review his section of the video for their essays and projects. Dee said, "If you kill the Indian culture, you might as well kill the Indian because nothing about him is really him."

Joe Suina's essay, "And Then I Went to School: Memories of a Pueblo Childhood" (see p. 230), describes his experiences at a boarding school where he learned to be ashamed of his language and his home:

> My language, too, was questioned right from the beginning of my school career. "Leave your Indian at home!" was like a school trademark. Speaking it accidentally or otherwise was punishable by a dirty look or a whack with a ruler. This reprimand was for speaking the language of my people which meant so much to me. It was the language of my grandmother. . . . [I]t was difficult for me to comprehend why I had to part with my language. . . . I understood that everything that I had, and was part of, was not nearly as good as the whiteman's. School was determined to undo me in everything from my sheepskin bedding to the dances and ceremonies which I had learned to have faith in and cherish.

Because the video clips are only about 15 to 20 minutes each and the stories are short, we mostly read them aloud in class together, filling in the chart individually, then discussing each piece as a class, as we move through the stories. The boarding school stories, videos, and discussion take about a week. As we read one story after another, students see the pattern of punishment and shame that permeate the stories. When I asked, "What do these stories have in common? What do you learn about language and power?" Josh said, "When people weren't allowed to speak their own language, and when they were punished for speaking it, people felt inferior and stupid. It crumbled the community."

After learning about language policies in Native American boarding schools, we look at similar practices in Australia and Africa. Molly Craig's experiences in Australia, recounted in the film *Rabbit Proof Fence*, parallel Suina's experience in Native American boarding schools. Molly was part of Australia's "stolen generation" of mixed-race children who were taken from the "bad influence" of their families and isolated in boarding schools where they were trained as maids and day laborers—another forced assimilation into the white society. Part of the process of merging "half-caste" children into white culture was separating them from their language as well as their religion. After watching a video clip from *Rabbit Proof Fence*, I asked students to respond to Molly's story in an interior monologue or poem. Throughout these stories, students connected with loss of culture and heritage, but they also connected with Molly's resistance. In the following poem, Jennifer Overman takes on Molly's point of view, expressing her resistance:

> *Write that I was a half-caste,*
> *taken away from my family and my home*
> *to be cleansed of my aboriginality,*
> *to be a slave.*
>
> *When you speak of me,*
> *Say that I refused to be erased,*
> *That my blood would stay the same,*
> *That I would not serve my other half.*

Maria succinctly captured this resistance to "whitewashing" in her piece from Molly's perspective when she wrote simply, "You can never wipe the brown from my skin."

In her memoir *Unbowed*, Wangari Maathai, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for her work on the Green Belt Movement in Kenya, describes the ongoing process of humiliation that caused students to abandon their language at school, at home, and later when they became part of the country's educated elite. Her words echo the pain heard in the other stories we read:

> A common practice to ensure that students kept pressure on one another was to require those students who were found using a language other than English to wear a button known as a "monitor." It was sometimes inscribed with phrases in English such as "I am stupid, I was caught speaking my mother tongue." At the end of the day, whoever ended up with the button received a punishment, such as cutting grass, sweeping, or doing work in the garden. But the greater punishment was the embarrassment you felt because you had talked in your mother tongue. In retrospect I can see that this introduced us to the world of undermining our self-confidence. . . . The use of the monitor continues even today in Kenyan schools to ensure that students use only English. Now, as then, this contributes to the trivialization of anything African and lays the foundation for a deeper sense of self-doubt and an inferiority complex.

When I asked students to make connections between the stories, they pointed out both the enforced changes as well as the changes that students in the readings adopted to avoid embarrassment. Although students initially laughed at Denzell Weekly's comparison of the boarding schools to the movie *Men in Black*, ultimately, they agreed with his explanation. He said, "This is like the movie *Men in Black.* For anyone who's seen *Men in Black*, there is a flashlight. They're looking and they're flashing and they erase all of your memory. They tried to come in and just brainwash, basically take away their language and their culture." When students become passionate about a subject, this is what they do: search their own experiences to make original, unusual connections to the curriculum.

A number of students wrote their essays about assimilation. (See "Writing Wild Essays from Hard Ground" for a full description of the essay-writing process.) While some students merely summarized the series of events, Dennise Mofidi focused on children who resisted assimilation. "The children who did not fear punishment were the ones who fought for their culture. They were the ones who suffered horrible consequences, including the loss of their lives." She went on to relate this to her relationship with her grandmother and Farsi:

> Today assimilation is still happening. Children go to school and see that everyone else is speaking English and feel different if they are the only one who does not speak English at home. My family came here from Iran and speaks both English and Farsi. My mother and father taught me to speak Farsi, and I do at home and when I'm with my family. My younger brothers, on the other hand, do not speak Farsi. I asked them why and they told me, "I don't want people to know that I speak another language or ask me how to say a word in Farsi because then they will want me to talk in Farsi all the time and we live in America, not Iran." I couldn't believe that being different at school was so hard that they would not want to be able to talk to their family. . . . My grandmother and I talk all the time in Farsi. She tells me about Iran and what it is like there. She also shares stories of life when she was younger. I love talking with my grandmother and couldn't imagine being like my brothers and needing someone to translate.

Gideon Mendel/CORBIS

April 1994, Soweto, South Africa — Members of a Soweto school drama group reenact the events of the 1976 Soweto student uprising.

In his final essay, Daunte Paschal wrote about Carmen Lomas Garza's experience in school. "In 'A Piece of My Heart/Pedacito de mi corazón,' Garza wrote about her life growing up as a full-blooded Chicana in a predominantly white school. . . . Because of those girls at her school making fun of her, she started to feel ashamed about her food that her mother had made. Garza was verbally assaulted, and she eventually felt as if she was born in the wrong race and wrong culture. Assimilation will do that to you."

Resistance: Soweto Uprising

On the day we studied the Soweto Uprising, I started class by projecting the image of Samuel Nzima's famous photograph of Mbuyisa Makhubu carrying the dead body of 12-year-old Hector Pieterson. I played "Nkosi Sikelel´ iAfrika" (God Bless Africa) while students entered the classroom. Then we read and listened to a podcast about this historic event where thousands of students marched out of their schools in a mass demonstration against the use of Afrikaans as the language of instruction. Students refused to learn in the "oppressor's tongue." This protest against the education that blacks received in South Africa was

built on years of grievances against the Bantu Education Act established in 1953 as well as years of grievances against apartheid, racism, and exploitation. Black schools were overcrowded and underfunded, preparing students for a life in the mines, not the university. The imposition of Afrikaans pushed the radicalized student movement to action against the language as well as the government.

As students listened and read about the Soweto Uprising, I asked them to take notes in three columns: one column on the details for the demonstration, one on their reactions, and one on connections they made to the other pieces we had studied. A number of students admired that people their age "took matters in their own hands," as Kalia Haa Watts wrote. Annie Oldani, who wrote her essay on the uprising, noted that "[The students] felt so isolated from their culture and their families that they didn't think they would support their cause. The adult generation is resigned to taking their place in the society and not fighting the oppression of their people." Michael's reaction to the story of the uprising echoed the feelings expressed by a number of students:

> I know a lot of kids put their well-being on the line for their education, and I respect that more than anything because I don't know too many people who'd be so quick to stand up and plan the gathering of thousands of students and say this is what we need to do to create change and better opportunity. I like how they didn't tell their parents and were resourceful enough to band together and do what they had to do. A line that stood out to me was "the parents are immune to the yoke of oppression."

After gathering information about the Soweto Uprising, students wrote from the point of view of a witness to the day's events. I encouraged students to think of people, but also to think about inanimate objects. Their list included: rocks students threw, Hector Pieterson's sister (from the photograph), the school, a burned-out car, a student involved in the uprising. (See "Unleashing Sorrow and Joy: Writing Poetry from History and Literature," p. 50, for a full explanation of how I teach these poems.) Annie wrote from the point of view of a student who watched Hector Pieterson die:

We no longer march
Now we fight
Not just for our language
Not anymore
But for ourselves
For Hector
Who wanted to laugh
Wanted to cry
Wanted to speak the words of his family
The words of his people

Jayme's poem as Hector's classmate uses the "Write that I…" frame (see p. 52) that helped some students move into their poems:

Write that I
sang as loud as I could
in unison with my brothers and sisters
until a deafening "Nkosi Sikelel´ iAfrika"
was all that could be heard.
Write that I,
along with my people,
posed no threat to the police
except for
the threat of our knowledge
the threat of our desire
the threat of our power
marching united and strong
like a pack of lions.

Students demonstrated both pain and outrage through their poetry and interior monologues, a fitting memorial to the children of Soweto. But their poetry is also an expression of their understanding of the events in a way that quizzes or discussions miss.

Metaphorical Drawings

Once we've read the memoirs about the boarding schools in the United States and Kenya, watched video clips from Australia and Ireland, and listened to and read about Soweto, I bring boxes of crayons and colored pencils and large pieces of blank paper to class. I ask students to create a visual representation of language and power, telling them, "Don't worry about your drawing ability. I'm looking for the quality of your ideas, your ability to work with all of that information you've collected over the last quarter." After the initial excitement of using crayons in a high school class and the initial groans that they can't think of a single metaphor, the ideas start rolling. We begin the conversation by recalling the definition of a metaphor and brainstorming a few examples. I walk a fine line of giving them enough models to jumpstart their imagination, but not so many that my ideas crowd out theirs. I show them a couple of drawings from former students, including stick figure sketches, so they can see a range of possibilities, but

also because I don't want their drawing skills to get in the way of their ideas. When they complete the drawing, they write a paragraph explaining their metaphor.

As I noted in the opening of the chapter, student metaphorical drawings of lips sewn shut, language coffins, and severed tongues are evocative. Michael Moser drew three boxes, each locked with a padlock. The writing on the first one said, "Freedom of thinking, knowledge, freedom of speech"; the second box had a heart with the words "family, name, culture, homeland" on the exterior; the third one said, "religion, soul, language, culture." Michael wrote:

> To assimilate someone you take way their mind, heart and soul. Their mind is the right to think and their freedom to speak their own language. To take away their heart is to take the things they love, like their family and their home. The third is how the boarding school kids were taken from their families and forced to adopt a new religion and new language. And to take someone's soul is to take everything they stand for.

Kirkland Allen drew a picture of a dark-skinned woman with her black hair pulled straight by a comb with the word "school" across it. On the side of his picture, he drew a series of cans and jars labeled "Proper English Magic Grease," "Plan B Insurance," and "After School Bands." The title on his drawing read, "If You Can't Achieve It, Weave It." He wrote:

> In this piece a nappy-headed woman is getting her hair done. Proper English Grease moisturizing it, a school comb working with the grease, forming it into a white version. After-school rubber bands hold the hair together, giving her the thought that going back is bad.

Deandre, a talented rapper, excels in assignments that call upon him to bring his gifts of rapping to bear on the content of our unit. He drew a stage with two flags, a U.S. flag and a flag with "Africa" written on it. A microphone stood in front of each flag. The U.S. mic was plugged in. A hand unplugged the African microphone. He said, "It's about unplugging our voice."

When students shared their drawings with the class, I pushed them to fuller explanations. "What's that tell us about language and power? What's your explanation? What does your drawing illustrate?" While the student drawings demonstrated understanding, their discussion of their drawings bordered on generalizations, littered with indeterminate pronouns. For example, a number of students said, "They beat students for speaking their language." I pushed them to identify who "they" were, to name names. "Who beat them? Where did this happen? Locate it." At one point, I said, "Let's name them together. Whose languages and cultures were taken away? Who took them away? You need to be specific." This is an important part of the activity because too often students describe or recite events, but in the past I've failed to push them to analyze their drawings. Students know things in their bones, and the metaphorical drawings tap this "bone knowledge." But without pressing kids to precisely articulate their analysis, the brilliant insights revealed in their drawings may stay in their bones.

Although the drawings might seem like a day of child's play—and we do have fun on those days—they also serve a critical purpose: They help students rehearse the creation of a thesis and support for their upcoming essay. Even if the students do not use the drawings and metaphors in their language essays, creating an image that summarizes their understanding about language pushes them to think more deeply about the patterns they saw across the readings and to start articulating those understandings as they draw, as they write their explanation, and as they present their piece to their peers. This class-talk about the topic, the use of specific and varied examples, the building on each other's ideas, helps them later as they construct their essays.

Farah Nosh/GETTY IMAGES

Brothers Gwaai (left) and Staas prepare to perform a Haida language play at the Haida Heritage Centre at Skidegate beach, Haida Gwaii, Canada. The language of the Haida is considered highly threatened with fewer than 70 fluent speakers left in the world.

Language Restoration

Because of time limitations, we never spend as much time on the language restoration movement as it deserves. But after all of the death and destruction, I want students to become familiar with some of the current work across the globe to save indigenous languages. Students need to critique, but they also need to learn how to build and rebuild. The inspiring stories of language preservation from Ireland to Kenya to South Africa to Hawaii and the Oregon Coast provide great models of how grassroots people—from grandmothers to youth activists—are creating language schools as well as lobbying for legislation to keep languages alive.

For example, Neville Alexander, Director of the Project for the Study of Alternative Education in South Africa (PRAESA), created the National Language project to bring "mother tongue" literacy back into the lives of African people across the continent. He recognized that because of colonization many people had become illiterate in two languages—their mother tongue and the colonial language. As the Language Plan of Africa states, "Colonial conquest, imperialism and globalization established a hierarchy of standard languages, which mirrors the power relations on the planet. The overall effect of this configuration has been to hasten the extinction of innumerable language varieties and to stigmatize and marginalize all but the most powerful languages." His organization promotes a culture of reading and writing in African languages, and works with publishers to develop a market for African language writing and literature. Alexander and others in his organization have also initiated programs with teachers to help develop materials and strategies to bring back mother tongue literacy in the schools.

In the United States, language activists, including Esther Martinez, pushed for legislation to keep the remaining 150 of the original indigenous languages alive. The Esther Martinez Native American Languages Preservation Act, H.R. 4766, was passed in 2006. This legislation provides money to support Native American language immersion programs: language nests, survival schools, and language restoration programs. As the website Cultural Survival points out:

> Native American languages are not disappearing because they are obsolete. They are disappearing because of a U.S. government policy to specifically terminate American Indian language. Under this program, which lasted until the 1950s, children were taken from their homes and forced into boarding schools where they were beaten and had their mouths washed out with blistering lye soap for speaking their language. With that background of brutality, they did not speak their language in their homes as adults, so their children never learned it—the chain was broken. But the remaining Native American languages can be saved. There are proven techniques that enable elders to pass on their languages to their children and grandchildren. Immersion schools surround Native youngsters with their own language and build fluency quickly and naturally. Native Hawaiians launched an immersion program in the 1980s, when there were fewer than 30 speakers of Hawaiian under the age of 18. Today there are 2,000 speakers in that age range.

Other tribes have set up similar schools, with similar results. Others are teaching Native languages to adult learners who will pass them on to their tribes' children.

To bring the point home, we read our local paper's article, "Last of the Siletz Speakers," about Bud Lane's work to keep the Oregon Coastal Athabaskan language alive by teaching at Siletz High School. He recorded the elders in the community and developed a dictionary for the language. Now he teaches the language to students at Siletz High School and works with researchers at the Living Tongues Institute in Salem, Ore., to preserve his language.

In retrospect, I should have spent more time on the incredibly exciting language preservation work, perhaps by assigning student groups different language projects to research and report on as part of the unit. Next time.

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