(A COMPILED COURSE-BOOK FOR TEACHING AND EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY)

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Modern Linguistics (Theories & Approaches)

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4th YEAR ARTS

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A Y (2022-2023)

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Introduction

Modern linguistics is one of the most outstanding revolutions of the twentieth century. It is related to linguistic studies where the original focus from prescriptive grammar and the purpose of improving how people write and speak shifted to the idea that a language can be viewed as a self-contained and structured system situated at a particular point in time. Pragmatics, a subfield of linguistics, studies how people comprehend and produce a speech act in a concrete speech situation. Language is a tool of human interaction. Via language the speaker conveys his or her intended information to the addressee who receives it and responds to it by providing the requested information and asking the speaker, now the addressee, for the information he or she is interested in.

Communication, then, is a two-way interaction: it involves the speaker and the addressee. This holds good for both dialogues and monologues, the only difference being that the addressee in a dialogue turns into the speaker while in the monologue the addressee is the reader or the listener, only: this type of addressee never turns into the speaker.

For a long time language was treated as an autonomous system, a system detached from its manifestation in the actual situation. So, for instance, traditional linguistics was concerned with the functions of language units: the functioning of language as a means of communication in the actual situation was not considered. True, traditional grammarians spoke of the four communicative (pragmatic) functions of the sentence:

They distinguished declarative, interrogative, imperative, and exclamatory sentences – sentences which expressed the corresponding direct speech acts. However, traditional grammarians did not know the term *speech act* and did not go any further.

Linguistic pragmatics, which is concerned with the use of language in the situation, was still on the horizon: it had to wait until the 20th century, when Morris (1901–1979) introduced the term *pragmatics* defining it as the study of the relation between signs and their interpretants.

However,*linguistic pragmatics* is associated with another language philosopher, Austin. Austin (1911–1960) put forward an original theory of speech acts in his monograph *How to Do Things with Words* (edited posthumously, in 1962). This work marked the beginning of linguistic pragmatics, a radical change in the traditional approach to linguistic studies. However, in the meantime linguists continued to busy themselves with the 'internal' problems of language: the functions of the linguistic units (traditional linguistics), the structure of language (structural linguistics), and the generation of linguistic structures – word-combinations and clauses or clauses only(transformational-generative grammar). But do we have the right to blame the linguists for ignoring speech, language in action? This question can be answered by another question: can we study the manifestation of language if we have not made a thorough study of language? The study of language makes it possible to see better what belongs to language and what does not.

What does not belong to language as a system, but is expressed by it in a situation, belongs to speech, or pragmatics. To paraphrase Yule's words, pragmatics is the wastebasket of linguistics.

<u>Pragmatics,</u> as a branch of linguistics, came into existence as a reaction to an autonomous language approach, an approach initiated by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1917) and carried to extremes by linguists in the United States. Linguists gradually came to understand that language cannot only be studied as a closed system: time came to look at language from the outside,

i.e. to see what the speaker does with language.

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Speech Acts

R. Eckardt

In 1962, Austin delivered his series of lectures on "How to do Things with Words". The research program that is laid out in these lectures promised to carry the study of semantics beyond the dullness of asserting information. The magic of speech acts seems to consist in the fact that the speaker can change the world's course by a mere utterance. Say Sesamy, open! *(?iftaH ja simsim*) and the mountain moves.

Of course, true magic speech acts reside in fictuous worlds, but even in our own world, ritual declaratives can irrevocably change the state of the world. I hereby declare you husband and wife, uttered under the correct circumstances by the right person, brings about changes that, at times, were almost impossible to undo.

Similarly, the magic spell You are hereby fired can change the economic situation of the addressee dramatically. Interestingly, we expect that speech acts should be part of communicative exchange. The following kind of effect, caused by an utterance, does not intuitively qualify as a speech act.

(1) A speech recognition system is connected to your front door. It is programmed

to react to your voice, and opens the door if you utter „Sesame, open!“ loudly

and clearlyافتح يا سمسم .

For one, someone could cheat the system with a tape recorded utterance made by you.

More generally, the system cannot distinguish whether the magic words are mentioned or used, used with the intention to open the door, or used in a narration of "Ali Baba", etc. The speech recognition system is too robust, in a way. It performs its magic under circumstances where “true” utterances of “true” speakers of “real” magic words would fail to bring about a speech act.

Ever since Austin, it has been clear that saying so does not necessarily make it so. This motivates the classical distinction between locution, illocution and perlocution.

locutionary act = S utters a certain string of words

illocutionary act = all circumstances being correct, S brings about a speechact by the locutionary act

perlocutionary act = effects of the speech act on the ad

Locutionary acts without illocutionary force occur when the speaker lacks the intention to perform the respective illocution, if the speaker or hearer are not of the right kind, or other circumstances do not meet the conventions of the act. Some examples:

S utters “I hereby dismiss you” towards her secretary, in order to practice for the

upcoming event of firing an employee.

The employee responds: “What do you mean by ‘I hereby dismiss you’?

There are, however, trickier cases in which all interlocutors firmly believe that they

perform a certain illocutionary act and yet fail to do so. In the comedy “Das Haus in Montevideo” (“It’s a gift”), a marriage takes place that does not actually have the intended perlocutionary effect, because circumstances do not fit legal regulations: Marriages, according to the plot, may only be performed on ships, and the vessel in question, Atlanta, was 27cm short of being a ship, as was discovered only later.

Perlocutionary acts are ways of the addressee to react to the speech act. For instance, if a speaker issues a command “get me the hammer” the addressee might go and fetch the hammer. This is a perlocutionary act intended by the speech act. However, the addressee might additionally get nervous because the speaker never does well with hammers. Hence, the command has the extra perlocutionary effect of frightening the hearer. Perlocutionary acts are particularly interesting, however, when they are intended by the speaker as a side effect of a speech act. Effects like annoying, amusing, boring are usually side effects of assertions. I might assert “You are anidiot.” with the intention that this information is suited to annoy you. I might tell you a funny story about my boss in order to amuse you. It’s important to observe that such acts don’t have corresponding explicit performatives. It is not possible to state I hereby annoy you and hope to cause anger. It is not possible to state I hereby bore you in order to bore someone—even though the intended perlocutionary effect will most likely be achieved, if you reiterate “I hereby bore you” long enough.

Felicitous and infelicitous acts

Not any utterance of the appropriate form causes an act to take place. In this section, we will review Austin’s list of (types of) background conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for a speech act to succeed.

(A.1) There must be an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further

(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and (B.2) completely.

(C.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further

(C.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. (Austin 1962: 14f.)

We will not comment on these rules extensively (though it is instructive to invent examples where exactly one rule is violated and all others fulfilled). One comment is in place, though. Rules A and B are intended to cover all linguistic and social conventions that make some act possible, and that regulate under what circumstances the act has actually taken place. To list some aspects, if there is no institution of marriage, persons can assert as long as they want that they marry each other without effect. If a society does not know the practice of betting then its members can not bet, or at least only in an explicit contract-like manner. If a marriage is interrupted in the middle, the couple still counts as unmarried, no matter whether they seriously intended to get married or not, and so on.

The Rules classed under Care of a different nature. Austin's comments amount to the view that insincere speech acts count as performed acts nevertheless.

For instance, an insincere promise is still conceived as binding for the one who promises. An insincere bet will still, if accepted, be binding for the one who offered it, and the one who accepted it. Unsincere marriages, as we know, are binding marriages even if the couple secretely hates each other while uttering “yes, I will”. Insincere acts are in danger of causing problems afterwards (because the parties do not behave as expected—violating C.2) but count as successful illocutionary acts to start with. So much for Austin.

In later years, Searle suggested that the lexical content of performative verbs and the conditions of use should be tied in a more systematic manner.We will not turn to his more definition-shaped system to talk about felicity and other context conditions. (A copy of Searle 1969, p.66+67 is useful to see some examples as he envisaged the rules to tbe used.) He proposes the following types of rule:

propositional content rules

preparatory rules

sincerity rules

essential rule

The essential rule corresponds, roughly, to Austin's observation that the language community must have a convention that such-and-such utterances, all other rules obeyed, counts as an act to achieve such-and-such. We will return to the question how "count as" can replace "be". As we will see below, Searle claimed—at least in his classical papers—that the act comes about because a friendly audience understands the speaker's intentions and gracefully grants him the act. (It might be desirable to develop a better understanding of what makes the act.)

The sincerity rules mirror Austin's C.1 and C.2; in a full description of any specific speech act type, these rules should specify in which respect the speaker—and perhaps the addressee as well—needs to be sincere. However, Searle cherishes a somewhat more differentiated picture of sincerity rules. This becomes clear when we look at his propositional content rules, and preparatory rules. They are devised in order to ensure that e.g. a bet is about an unknown fact, not a known one; a promise is about something that the speaker believes the addressee will appreciate; a promise is moreover about something the speaker is actually able to do, etc.

The propositional content rules rest on the observation that many acts seem to be about a proposition that something that has happened (=e.g. thanking, asserting, lamenting), or that will happen in the future (promising, ordering, betting). Usually, the nature of the speech act limits the possible propositions that can be addressed in the speech act; examples in the literature are usually clear and convincing.

Yet, the consumer of Searle's theory might ask, somewhat uneasily,

• how we know in general that each speech act is bound to have some proposition that it addresses? • whether and how there is any systematic way in which we can recover the addressed proposition from the utterance?

• if it is possible to understand the “nature” of an act in a more elementary manner from which the propositional content rules should follow rather than just being listed in an instruction-like rule sheet.

For example, we feel that there should be a definition of what it means to bet from which it necessarily follows that one can not sincerely bet about p if both speaker and addressee know the truth value of p. Searle’s instruction sheets look as if a different society could agree to adopt a verb bot which works like bet with the sole difference that botting is about past propositions of known truth value, whereas betting is about propositions about the future, or of otherwise unknown truth value. Of course, this is senseless—but a proper theory of speech acts should be able to predict such senselessness.

The preparatory conditions cover “all the rest”, so to speak. They can host elaborate descriptions about ceremony, as well as speaker attitudes towards the propositional content of an act, as well as facts about the belief state of the speaker (for asking), the intentions of the speaker before, and after the act (would S have done p anyway, or has he just declared a change of mind by promising?) etc.

In this sense, Searle's system is certainly sufficient to devise schematic descriptions for any speech act one could think of. However, his writings (up to 1989) fail to elucidate clearly why speech acts can be fully described by four types of rules rather than three, six, or eight;

why it should be these exact categories and no other; and whether some of the alleged descriptive rules should follow from something more essential about an act.

One final observation about Searle's use of rules seems important. Sometimes, the content of the propositional content or preparatory rules seems to interfere with the plausibility with which the hearer can assume that the speaker intends to be sincere in a speech act. This becomes clear when we look at Searle's discussion of a advise which is a type of act characterized (in the given system) as follows (S= speaker, H=hearer).

1. propositional content: p must describe a future act a of H.

2. preparatory rules: S has reason to believe that a will benefit H. It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do a in the normal course of events.

3. sincerity rule: S believes that a will benefit H

4. essential rule: Counts as an undertaking to the effect that a is in H's best interest.

Obviously, if p describes a future act of H which looks like a stupid thing for H to do, H will not primarily object that S performed an infelicitous act of advising but will seriously challenge S’s sincerity. Similar interactions arise in other types of acts.

• If all conditions are observed, the hearer has little reason to doubt the speaker’s sincerity (“hey, are you joking?”)

• If all conditions are observed, the hearer has little reason to refute or turn down the speech act, or to otherwise signal that the locutionary act failed to achieve the intended illocutionary effect. Ways to change the future course of things: Another large class of speech acts is typically used by the speaker to cause some change in how the world will most likely develop in the future. These acts differ in who takes responsibility for these changes to come about.

Speaker responsibility: The speaker S can take responsibility, like in offers, promises, threats, to do certain things in the future.

Hearer responsibility: The speaker can express that the hearer H should be responsible for these changes. Typical examples are commands, requests, begging and the like.

Bilateral responsibilities: The change in future plans might be a joint responsibility.

This is the case in bilateral acts that commit both speaker and hearer to act according to a given plan. Economic transactions might come to mind first. When speaker and hearer agree that S hereby sells c to H at the price of x, they have embarked on a joint enterprise in the course of which money and goods will be exchanged. Similar agreements are betting, lending where both speaker and hearer promise to comply to certain plans.

However, many more speech acts might involve responsibilities on both, hearer and speaker side. Consider a command:

(5) Go to bed now!

Imperatives like these, at first sight, look like an attempt to establish a new obligation for the hearer, namely the obligation to bring it about that ‘H is in bed’ becomes true.

However, the full content of the imperative is a more differentiated message about the future, something like ‘Either you go to bed soon, or I will do something that is unpleasant for you’.

As all parents will know, no imperative like (5) will ever express a successful command unless the parent is willing and has means to come up to his or her commitment to ‘do something unpleasant’ within reasonable limits. In many cases, the ‘something unpleasant’ for imperatives like (5) may be unspecific, but the early steps in establishing a position of authority always involve working out reasonable specifications of ‘or I will do something unpleasant’ and live up to the commitment to do these things if necessary.

The example of the tacit or clause in imperatives takes up a more general proposal in Truckenbrodt (2009) who dubbs the alternative as ‘or something is going wrong’. Truckenbrodt’s alternative is more flexible in that it can also capture cases where some commitment by A is not fulfilled for reasons beyond A’s power. We maintain the more specific or-clause here to make a point that commitments, and specifically those expressed by speech acts, are rarely unilateral.

Societal responsibilities:

Finally, it can be the entire society’s responsibility to function differently as a society after the speech act in comparison to before. If a person gets sacked from his job, then that person is no longer obliged to work for the company, the company is no longer obliged to pay, but the state may be obliged to pay the dole, and the person may be obliged to call in at the job center regularly in order to earn that payment. Hence, the successful speech act ‘I hereby fire you!’

involves changes in a far-reaching network of obligations. Similar cases can be made for all acts which change the social or legal status of people: Married persons are treated differently form singles, naming changes the most likely linguistic behavior towards a person or thing, opening a building causes that access to that building will no longer be prosecuted as illegal trespassing, etc.

Searle (1989: 553) rephrased for an attempted insult:

1. S uttered the sentence "I hereby insult you".

2. The literary meaning of the sentence is such that by very utterance, the speaker intends to make it the case that he insults me. [which seems not to hold true— but why couldn't that be?]

3. Therefore, in making the utterance S manifested an intention to make it the case by that utterance to insult me. [S certainly manifested an intention to insult me; why not possibly be that utterance?]

4. Therefore, in making the utterance S manifested an intention to insult me by that very utterance.

5. Insults are a class of actions where the manifestation of the intention to perform the action is sufficient for its performance, given that certain other conditions are satisfied. [this condition seems to fail for insults: but isn't it a bit lame to state that "insults are just simply not the kind of action"? After all, showing an intention to insult me is very often already sufficient for me to be insulted. An utterance like "Hey piglet" can certainly be an insult if the speaker shows an intention to insult me.]

6. We assume that those other conditions are satisfied. [whatever they may be]

7. S insulted me by that utterance. [somehow didn't go off because conditions 2 and 5 did not hold true, for reasons that are hard to see.]

8. S said that he insulted me, but did not make it the case that he insulted me.

Therefore, he made a false statement. (why?)

I hereby congratulate you.

1. He is saying “I hereby congratulate you”.

2. He is stating that he is congratulating me.

3. If his statement is true, then he must be congratulating me.

4. If he is congratulating me, then it must be his utterance that constitutes the congratulation (what else could be ?)

5. Presumably, he is speaking the truth.

6. Therefore, in stating that he is congratulating me, he is congratulating me.

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Anaphora

Anaphora – a tie where an element in a text is connected with some previously mentioned element, pointing back to the text, cf.

Ex:Mr. Kaplan rose, inspiration in his eyes. His smile was so wide that his face seemed to be one ecstatic cavern. He cast majestic glances to both sides, as if reading the tribute in the faces of his fellow students. (Rosten, Leo. The Education of Hyman Kaplan. London: Prion, 2000, p. 34)

Cataphora

It is a tie where an element in a text is connected to an element that follows later in the text, when an item points forward to the text, cf.

Ex: This is how you get the best results. You let the berries dry in the sun, till all the moisture has gone out of them. Then you gather them up and chop them very fine. (H+H, 1976:17, example 1:29)

Note: in a cohesive ties not only single elements are involved, but also a large chunks of text, typical of the demonstrative 'this' as in our example.

Cataphoric reference is often signalled in writing with a colon (:)

Exophora

It is a relation where one element points outside the text to the context (situation) in which it is

embedded, cf.

Ex: By this time Mr. Parkhill was genuinely delighted with the inexorable logic which Mr. Kaplan was following. 'That's precisely the point. Come *to* ***the board*** *and make the change, Mr. Kaplan.'* (Rosten, Leo. The Education of Hyman Kaplan. London:Prion, 2000, p. 52)

Note: It is quite possible that the definite article in **the board** refers back to the preceding text, to some earlier mention of the board. But it is also possible that it refers to the environment in which the dialogue is taking place – to the 'context of situation', as it is called where the board in question is present and can be pointed to if necessary. The interpretation would be 'the board there, in front of us'. This type of reference takes us outside the text altogether.

Exophoric reference is not cohesive, since it does not bind the two elements together into a text. (H+H 1976: 18).

Cohesive ties – typology

Cohesive ties – grammatical (reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction)

– **lexical** (reiteration and collocation)

1. Reference

- Personal

- Demonstrative

- Comparison

Personal Reference

- Personal pronouns

- Possessive pronouns and adjectives

3rd person inherently cohesive (typically anaphoric)

1st, 2nd person primarily deictic (exophoric), cohesive secondarily

Generalized person (whatever means of expression) is always exophoric, and thus not cohesive,

e.g. *Banana bread is good for **you***.

Demonstrative reference

- Demonstrative pronouns (*this*, *these*, *that*, *those*) and adverbs (*here, there*, *then*)

- The definite article

This, that,(it) – may refer not only to preceding nominal items, but also to extended passages

This,(it), here – used also to point forward, intersentential cataphora

Reference by comparison

= two-member relation: ‘A thing cannot be just like; it must be like something.’ (H+H, 1976:78)

- Comparison proper (e.g. *higher than…., not as good as…,* etc.)
- Use of expressions like *so*, *such as*, *similar*, *(an)other*…

2. **Substitution** (= replacement of one form by another)

- Nominal, *one(s), the same*

(5) *That was a great meeting. Let’s settle on the date for the next* ***one****.*

(6) “I’ll have clam chowder.” “I’ll have ***the same****.”*

- Verbal, *do*

(7) *Thursday looks good and so* ***does*** *Friday*.

- Clausal, *so, not*

(8) *“Have all the people left?” “I’m afraid* ***so****.”*

(9) *“Have all the people left?” “I hope* ***not****.”*

3. **Ellipsis** (= substitution by a zero element)

Ellipsis is formally defined as a defected structure in which the missing elements are uniquely

recoverable. Semantically, it is fully anonymous with the corresponding non-elliptical structure.

Ellipsis is to be distinguished from fragmentary utterances (unfinished utterances which cannot be completed unless the speaker finishes them) and from irregular structures, such as verbless sentences (e.g. *The door*!), which are semantically, communicatively and intonationally sentence equivalents.

Function of ellipsis in a text:

to create cohesion by leaving out what can be taken over from the preceding discourse.

- Nominal

(10) *"Which topic will you discuss?" "I'll do the first. [**topic**]"*

- Verbal

(11) *If she works hard, I don't have to [**work hard**].*

- Clausal

(12) *He'll bring it tomorrow. – [**He'll bring it tomorrow**] Unless he forgets, as he usually does.*

4. **Conjunction** (intersentential linking in a broader sense, not just as a part of speech→ conjunctions, conjuncts, other expressions)

Partly a lexical and partly a grammatical device, a transitional area between grammar and lexis (Duškova 1999:302-3)

= a specification of the way in which what is to follow is systematically connected to what has gone before (H+H, 1976:227)

(13) *Exactly how much deviation from the norm it takes to be classed as eccentric is a moot sporný point.*

***Moreover**, eccentricity is not the same as neurosis.*

(14) *She believed it was the real thing and thought he'd marry her when she fell pregnant.* ***But*** *it wasn't to be – and we didn't see him for dust*.

- Additive, adversative, causal, temporal, sequential (listing, e.g. *first…..seco*nd)

5. Lexical cohesion

Reiteration of lexical elements:

Repetition…*There was a large* ***mushroom****. She peaked behind the* ***mushroom*** *and….* Synonym…*Suddenly I saw a* ***boy****. The* ***lad*** *was all shaking with cold*.

Superordinate term…*Suddenly I saw a* ***boy****. The* ***child*** *was all shaking with cold*.

General word…

 Neutral… typical examples of general words: *people, person, creature, thing, object, stuff, question, idea*, etc.

 Evaluative… *Suddenly I saw a* ***boy****. The* ***idiot*** *wanted to steal my car.*

- Collocation: a pair of words semantically related…*boy –girl* (oppositeness, complementarity), *ascent*

(climb) – descent, *Tuesday – Thursday* (a couple from ordered series), *red – green* (unordered lexical sets),etc.

The cohesive effect = the tendency to appear in similar contexts

Psycholinguistics

Inherently, linguistic communication involves the resolution of uncertainty over a potentially unbounded set of possible signals and meanings.

▲ How can a fixed set of knowledge and resources be deployed to manage this uncertainty?

This is the study of language processing.

▲ And how can such knowledge and resources be learned from finite input?

This is the study of language acquisition. Psycholinguistics studies these problems, through observational studies, experiments, and computational modeling.

What is “language processing”?

- *Language processing* is the study of how humans comprehend and produce language (sentences, words within sentences, and sequences of sentences, etc.) in real time.
- We can divide this into *language comprehension* (understanding what is spoken and what is written) and *language production* (choosing what to say or write based on what you want to "mean")
- *Language acquisition* is the study of how humans acquire knowledge of their native language (as infants and as children)

Sense Relations

Let us first have a look at the sense relations that have been most extensively discussed: **synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy,** and **meronymy.** In this paragraph, we briefly introduce the most common terminology associated with these concepts, together with subclassifications that have been proposed for the various relations.

The terms hyponymy and hyperonymy both refer to the relationship of semantic inclusion that holds between a more general term such as bird and a more specific one such as finch. Terminologically speaking, the more general term is the hyperonym (sometimes hypernym) or superordinate term. The more specific term is the hyponym or the subordinate term. In this respect, subordination or hyponymy could be thought of as the relationship of the hyponym with regard to the hyperonym, whereas superordination or hyperonymy would be the relationship of the hyperonym with regard to the hyponym.

In practice, this shift of perspective is largely disregarded, and both terms are used interchangeably, with hyponymy – following the terminology introduced by Lyons (1963) – as the most popular one.

Words that are hyponyms on the same level of the same hyperonym are co-hyponyms. Thus, for instance, robin, swallow, and finch are cohyponyms of bird.

The reference to level in this definition of co-hyponymy is necessary because hyponymy is a transitive relationship:

if tit is a hyponym of bird, and titmouse and titlark are hyponyms of tit, then titmouse and titlark are also hyponyms of bird, but clearly, titmouse and titlark could not be co-hyponyms of finch, which is situated on a different hierarchical level with regard to bird.

It may also happen that the same term occurs on different levels of a taxonomy, such as when dog contrasts with cat on one level, but with bitch on a lower level of the taxonomy. Dog in the reading 'member of the species Canis familiaris' is then a hyperonym of dog in the reading 'male member of the species Canis familaris'.

Dog is, in other words, an auto-hyponymous term. It will also be clear from this example that hyponymy, like synonymy and antonymy, is not strictly speaking a relationship between words, but between words in a particular reading.

A hierarchical structure of hyponyms and hyperonyms is a taxonomy. Distinguishing between an 'is a kind/type of'-relation and a straightforward 'is a'- relation, Cruse (1986) distinguishes taxonomies from non-taxonomical inclusion: whereas spaniel is a hyponym of dog, and kitten is a hyponym of cat, it is normal to say a spaniel is a kind of dog but awkward to say a kitten is a kind of cat. Cruse suggests to use the term taxonomy only for the first situation, which involves a hierarchical organization of kinds and species. This restricted use of taxonomy is not the general practice, but the distinction pointed at by Cruse is relevant nevertheless.

Traditionally, hyperonyms play in an important role in defining. As we mentioned a few pages ago, in the scholastic conception of definition, an analytical definition (a definition that describes concepts in terms of characteristic or essential features, in contrast with a synonym definition) is supposed to consist of a genus proximum, i.e. the next higher superordinate term in a taxonomy, to which are added differentia specifica, i.e. the attributes that distinguish the concept to be defined from its co-hyponyms. And clearly, this model of definition also underlies the basic ideas of componential analysis. The definitional importance of hyponymy can be further specified by having a look at the notion of inclusion. The relationship of inclusion that lies at the basis of hyponymy may be viewed from an extensional point of view or from an intensional one, with a different selection the including term and the included one in each case. Extensionally, the set of birds includes the set of finches; more generally, the referential range of the more general term includes that of the more specific one.

Intensionally, the relation is reversed: the concept 'finch' includes the concept 'bird', in the sense that a finch is a bird; all the attributes that have to be used in defining birds will also have to be used in defining finches, and more particularly as that part of the concept 'finch' that specifies the birdiness of finches. More generally speaking, the definition of the more general term is included in the definition of the more specific one.. If, along the lines set out by prototype theory, it is accepted that categories need not be definable by means of a necessary-and-sufficient set of attributes, the parallelism between the intensional and the extensional conception of hyponymy breaks down. For instance, penguin and swallow are both hyponyms of bird, but if it is accepted that there is no single, essentialist set of attributes defining the category ‘bird’, the kind of birdiness that is relevant for penguin is a different one than the one for swallow. Being able to fly for instance is not part of the birdiness of penguins.

This is the problem of inheritance: hyponyms inherit all the attributes of their hyperonymical category if the latter is uniquely defined in the classical way, but what are the inherited attributes if the superordinate category cannot receive a traditional, essentialist definition?

2. Synonymy is a relationship of semantic identity, either between readings of a word or between words. The first perspective involves comparing words with their full range of applications, the second comparing words as they appear with a specific reading in a specific sentence. In both cases, the relationship may be complete or partial.

If synonymy is defined as a relationship between words in context, two items are synonymous if they may be substituted for each other in a given context, while retaining the semantic value of the expression as a whole. The substitution must work in both directions, to rule out hyponymous substitutions. In Kim was fined for speeding, a substitution to Kim was penalized for speeding is possible.

Conversely, it is more difficult to go from Kim was penalized for speeding to Kim was fined for speeding, because the penalization may take other forms, like the withdrawal of Kim's driver's license. Partial synonymy between words in a context exists if substitutable items differ in some aspect of their meaning. This is particularly clear when non-denotational aspects of meaning, like emotive or stylistic shades of meaning, are at stake. Taking for granted that both words do not exhibit differences of emotive or stylistic meaning, film and picture are completely synonymous in the reading 'cinematographic representation' with regard to a context like Did you see the latest – with Kate Blanchett? Movie and picture, on the other hand, would be merely partially synonymous in the same context, given that the former word is more informal than the latter. Similarly, whore and prostitute may refer to the same person, but the former has a more negative charge than the latter. Such differences of stylistic or emotive meaning are often associated with specialized language:

Where as gonorrhoea belongs to medical jargon, clap is the more popular (and more emotional) term. But language variation of this kind may also occur among words that are denotationally and connotationally identical in all other respects: underground and subway are only distinct to the extent that the former is typical for British English and the latter for American English.

If synonymy is defined as a relationship between words, total synonymy implies that the synonyms, first, have the same range of meanings, and second, are substitutable for each other in all relevant contexts without changing the meaning of the sentence as a whole. Words are partially synonymous if they are substitutable in one or more but not all of their readings, or if their readings are partially synonymous in the sense defined above. For instance, if picture and film share the reading 'cinematographic representation of a story' but not the reading 'painted or drawn portrait', this explains why film is substitutable for picture in the context Did you see the latest – with Kate Blanchett?, but not in the context This is the famous – of Dr Gachet by Van Gogh.

Partial synonymy defines sets of near-synonyms, like burial, deposition, entombment, exequies, funeral, inhumation, interment, last rites, obsequies or aurora, break of day, crack of dawn, dawn, daybreak, daylight, first light, light, morn, morning, sunrise, sunup.

There is a relation here with the notion of co-hyponyms. If for instance we are willing to accept funeral as a general term for the ritual act of disposing of a dead body, then the other terms are co-hyponyms.

Because the attribution of synonymy at the level of words clearly relies on a preliminary identification of synonymy at the level of senses, it is important to see that such a decision is not always obvious. In some cases, to begin with, the presence of identical readings does not seem to guarantee substitutability. This is often the case in idioms and collocations. For instance, dead has the reading 'completely' in expressions such as dead drunk and in dead silence, but although complete(ly) can replace dead in these expressions, the reverse is not the case in a context such as a – victory. Here, we would probably not want to say that there is a semantic reason behind this non-substitutability, but rather that there is an idiosyncratic formal restriction on the combination of dead and victory. Further, how to describe the subtle nuances among near-synonyms is often uncertain.

What exactly is the relation between funeral and burial? From one point of view, burials are a kind of funeral, next to cremations. But burials also apply to animals whereas we primarily think of human beings in the case of funerals. So perhaps burial isn’t a hyponym of funeral after all? Or should we say that burial has two readings, one associated with people and one associated with animals? But how should we decide? And how does burial differ from last rites?

Is it only a difference of stylistic value, or could we say that last rites focuses more on the ritual behaviour that is part of the funeral, whereas burial rather highlights the act of laying the dead body in a grave or tomb? But if that is the case, wouldn’t there also be many contexts in which that distinction of focus is neutralized, roughly in the way in which Erdmann noticed how certain specifications of the concept ‘German’ may be contextually irrelevant? In short, the identification of synonymy rests on a prior analysis of the polysemy of lexical items, and there are various indications that establishing polysemy is a non-trivial matter

3. Antonymy, or oppositeness of meaning, is probably the most intensively researched of the sense relations, and various classifications and terminological proposals compete with each other. Our purpose here is not to compare these proposals, but only to introduce some frequently cited types of oppositeness of meaning. (The following classification is based on Lyons 1977 and Lehrer

2002.) A basic distinction opposes binary gradable, binary non-gradable and multiple

antonyms. Within each of these classes, further types may be distinguished.

Gradable antonyms of the type tall/short consist of endpoints on a gradable scale; there are intermediate positions which may be lexicalized (like warm, tepid, cool on the scale defined by hot and cold), or which may be expressed by modifiers such as somewhat or very. Three subclasses of gradable antonyms may be distinguished.

In the first place, polar antonyms exhibit both symmetrical entailment and markedness. The symmetrical entailment means that the affirmation of one of the antonyms entails the negation of the other: tall implies not short, and short implies not tall. The markedness criterion means that one of the terms may be used as a neutral one which is not committed to one of the poles on the scale: the question How tall is he? may receive the answer short.

One of the terms in the antonymous pair is thus treated as co-hyponymous.

In the second place, committed antonyms are characterized by symmetrical entailment, but not by markedness: in the pair ferocious/meek, neither of the terms functions as a superordinate. In the third place, asymmetrical antonyms like good/bad, clever/stupid, healthy/ill are ones in which there is an unmarked term, but which express an evaluative meaning that appears to restrict the symmetry. In polar antonymy, one can say both John is shorter than Mary, but both are tall, and John is taller than Mary, but both are short. In the case of asymmetrical antonyms, the first of these possibilities is blocked: *John is worse than Mary, but both are good versus John is better than Mary, but both are bad.

Non-gradable antonyms involve pairs like dead/alive, which do not define endpoints on a gradable scale. Again, we may mention three subclasses. In the first place, complementaries consist of items that logically exclude each other without a third possibility or an intermediate position, like dead/alive.

In the second place, perspectival opposition or converseness involves two terms that are positively related, in the sense that predication of one term entails that the other can be predicated too (and similarly for their negation); typically, however, predication of the opposite term involves a shift of perspective in the linguistic construal of an identical real-world situation or event. Thus, subject and prepositional object of be the husband of/be the wife of switch places: if A is the husband of B, B is the wife of A, and if A is not the husband of B, B is not the wife of A. In the same way, if A sells B from C, then C inevitably buys B from A. In the third place, directional opposition involves various forms of spatial orientation relative to a point of reference, either in a static sense (as in the case of north/south or up/down), or in a dynamic sense (such as when a path is traversed in opposite directions, as in come/go). In the latter case, the term reversives is sometimes used. The spatial orientation may be a literal one, as in come/go, but it may also be figurative, as in ask/answer, which may be conceptualized as one message moving from one person to another, and another message moving back, or in to be born/to die, where a metaphorical transition in and out of life is at stake.

The different types of multiple opposition are subclassified according to the number of semantic dimensions involved. In the most common type, the scale, there is only one semantic dimension, such as temperature in the case of hot/warm/tepid/cool/cold.

Clearly, this is the filled-out form of a binary gradable antonymy. Typically, the dimension of a scale is continuously gradable, and the terms in the scale indicate various degrees on the graded dimension.

Ranks are one-dimensional as well, but the relevant dimension is discontinuous and not gradable; an example is the set of items denoting military ranks (general/colonel/major/captain/lieutenant etc.).

In cycles such as the days of the week or the months of the year, there is again only a single conceptual dimension (in this case: time), but the dimension does not have a polar structure (in the sense that there are two extremes like hot and cold).

Finally, examples of multidimensional multiple opposition can be directional, in which case various binary directional opposites are combined into a complex system of coordinates (north/south/east/west, or, taking the human body as a point of reference, left/right/in front/behind/up/down). More common, however, are examples of incompatibility, which is here used as a general term for the contrast between lexical items in a semantic field. As will be obvious from the examples of lexical fields that we discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, the words in a field are usually distinguished along various dimensions; for example, to distinguish ewe, ram, and lamb, at least the dimensions of age and sex are necessary. It should be noted that the strength of the semantic contrast has weakened considerably when this area of the classification is reached: the opposition between ram, ewe, and lamb is less specific than that between complementaries like odd and even.

In line with the basic assumptions of relational structuralist semantics, antonymous relations such as these are assumed to be stable, fixed configurations in the lexicon, as part of the structure of the language. But how sure is that?

Based on actual textual evidence, Mettinger (1994) makes clear that there are many ‘non-systematic’ antonyms, which are not as entrenched in memory as the intuitively obvious examples that we have so far considered, but that are activated in a specific textual or situational context. Oral and rectal contrast in the context of methods for taking body temperature, but would they be recognized as binary opposites apart from that highly specific situation? Mettinger adduces examples of texts in which, among others, to live by one’s wits contrasts with to live by one's looks, scholarship with domesticity, romance with real life, and listening with looking.

In all of these cases, an understanding of the opposition relies on situated knowledge that is encyclopaedic and textual rather than structural and purely linguistic. The contextuality of the oppositions is further supported by the observation that one lexical concept may enter into different relations of contrast depending on a particular construal in a given text.

4. A taxonomical, hyponymous relation is to be distinguished from a part-whole relation or meronymy.

Meronymy holds between pairs such as arm and elbow: arm is the holonym and elbow the meronym.

Meronymy can be identified in terms of the predicates 'has' and 'is a part of' (an arm has an elbow, and an elbow is part of the arm), rather than in terms of the 'is a'-relationship that obtains in the case of hyponymy (a finch is a bird). As analysed in Winston, Chaffin and Herrmann (1987), the part-whole relation is not a unitary one, but rather comprises a number of subtypes, like the relation between component parts and the material entity to which they belong (keyboard/computer), the relation between a member and the collection to which it belongs (soldier/army), the relation between a material and the object of which it forms an ingredient or a constituent element (wood/door), or the relation between a component action and the overall activity of which it forms part (paying/shopping).

Word: a combination of vocal sounds, or one such sound, used in a language to express an idea (to denote a thing, an attribute, a relation), and constitute an ultimate minimal element of speech having a meaning as such; a vocable.

The same word?

n. fish vs. v. fish the same lexical root

n. fisher vs. v. fish

v. fish vs. fished

Word form – the inflected form of a word represented by a stem and a list of inflections to be attached: fish, fishes, fished, fishing, etc.

Lexeme – grouping of one or more word forms.

fish, fishes, fished, fishing; house, houses;

lexeme 1 lexeme 2

Definition 1: A small pellet made out of mud and saliva which a bear inserts into his anus before hibernating for the winter, to stop the ants getting there *tompion, tampion [A plug for stopping an aperture]*

Definition 2: To face west on a sunny morning while doing something quickly.

-utility

-culture-dependency: certain meanings need to be communicated (*snow*-terms in eskimo)

Structural constaints on lexicalization:

The woman drank the wine slowly

drink+slowly ok (compare: quaff, sip)

drink+wine ok (compare: drink = ‘drink alcoholic beverages’)

*the+woman+drank

*the+wine+slowly

Sense Relations

semantic relations between units of meaning

Types of sense relations:

-syntagmatic: hold between items which occur in the same sentence.

SYNTAX

**The girl thought across the field* vs. *The girl ran across the field*

-derivational: word families (*fish, fisher, fishy*) MORPHOLOGY

-paradigmatic: reflect the semantic choices available at a particular structure point in a sentence.

I'll have a glass of ----- *John* ----- *across the field*

Synonymy

class A and class B have the same members_ Narrow definition of synonymy: sameness of meaning. Functionally unmotivated (introduces redundancy intolanguage)_ Wider definition: synonyms are words whose semantic similarities are more salient than their differences

Absolute synonymy

• Absolute synonymy: complete identity of meaning

• In a contextual approach: absolute synonyms are items which are equally normal in all contexts (two lexical items X and Y can be considered absolute synonyms if in any context in which X is fully normal, Y is, too). Contextual or syntactic approach

(i) *brave : courageous*

Billy was so brave at the dentist's this morning. (+)

Billy was so courageous at the dentist's this morning. (-)

(ii) *big : large*

He's a big baby, isn't he? (+) vs. He's a large baby, isn't he? (-)

(iii) *die : kick the bucket*

Apparently he died in considerable pain (+)

Apparently he kicked the bucket in considerable pain (-)

Differentiating contexts may be harder to find for:

sofa : settee; pullover : sweater

Near-synonymy

• The language users do have intuitions as to which pairs of words are synonyms and which are not.

• What meaning differences do and which do not destroy synonymy?

• Can we say that there is a scale of semantic distance and that synonyms are words whose meanings are relatively close?

Let us test it:

Entity	*process*
living thing	*object*
animal	*plant*
animal	*bird*

dog *cat*

spaniel *poodle*

Near-synonymy

• Meaning differences that apparently do not destroy synonymy

_ Adjacent position on scale of 'degree': *fog:mist, laugh:chuckle, hot:scorching, big:huge, disaster:catastrophe, pull:heave, weep:sob*;

_ Certain adverbial specialization of verbs: *amble:stroll, chuckle:giggle, drink:quaff;*

_ Aspectual distinctions: *calm:placid* (state vs. disposition)

_ Difference of prototype center: *brave* (prototypically physical): *courageous* (prototypically involves intellectual and moral factors)

Can we background major distinction?

pretty (“female” presupposed) vs. *handsome* (“male” presupposed) good-looking

Inclusion: hyponymy (hyperonymy)

• II. Inclusion: class B is wholly included in class A

• Hyponymy can be paraphrased in ordinary language as X is a type/kind/sort of Y, where X is the hyponym of Y, and Y is the hypernym of X.

Ex.: *apple* is a *fruit*; *car* is a *vehicle*

• The class denoted by the hypernym includes the class denoted by the hyponym as one of it’s subclasses.

• Hyponymy defined in terms of entailment: the sentence containing the hyponym entails the one containing the hypernym:

It’s an apple entails (but is not entailed by!) *It’s a fruit*

Inclusion: hyponymy (hyperonymy)

Entailment is context independent, and human judgments on hyponymy are context sensitive.

Dog:pet is a good example of hyponymy?

This is a dog does not necessarily entail *This is a pet*

If A=spaniel, B=dog, C=animal, then

A spaniel is a (kind of) dog.

A dog is an (kind of) animal.

A spaniel is an (kind of) animal.

But the transitivity in linguistic hyponymy does not hold always:

A car-seat is a type of seat.

A seat is a type of furniture.

**A car-seat is a type of furniture.*

A car-seat may not be a prototypical piece a furniture, and the linguistic intuition of the speakers is sensitive to this information.

Inclusion: hyponymy (hyperonymy)

• Syntagmatic consequences of hyponymy, expressions which prototypically require items related hyperonymously: *apples and other fruit* vs. *?fruit and other apples*, *?apples and other pears*

Apples are my favourite fruit vs. *?Fruit are my favourite apples*

Inclusion: meronymy (holonymy)

• Meronymy is the lexical reflex of the part-whole relation X is a part of Y, where X is the meronym of Y, and Y is the holonym if X. Ex.: *hand:finger* *teapot:spout* *wheel:spoke* *car-engine*

Does entailment work with meronymy?

This is a finger does not entail *This is a hand* BUT

If X is a meronym of Y, then for entity A, *A is in X* entails (but is not entailed by) *A is in Y*.

John has a boil on his elbow entails *John has a boil on his arm*

There are a lot of exceptions though:

The wasp is on the steering-wheel entails *The wasp is IN the car* does not entail *The wasp is ON the car* meronymy (holonymy)

Meronymy, even more strikingly than hyponymy, displays a prototypic character. What features contribute to the centrality of the concept in terms or meronymy?

_ Necessity

Some parts are necessary to their wholes, whereas others are optional.

A beard is a part of the face, but it is not necessary to the face.

_ Integrality

Some parts are more integral to their wholes than others. When we can say that a part is attached to the whole, its level of integration into whole is not very high:

The handle is a part of the door; The handle is attached to the door

vs. The fingers are a part of the hand; ?The fingers are attached to the hand

_ Discreteness

The more discrete (easily detachable) a part is, the more prototypical the relation is

The arm is more discrete with respect to the body that the tip of the tongue with respect to the tongue.

meronymy (holonymy)

_ Motivation

Prototypical parts have an identifiable function with respect to their wholes.

The handle of a door is for grasping and opening and shutting the door; the wheels of the car enable it to move smoothly over the ground, etc.

Are pieces a good example of parts? A piece of broken vase:

(a) Is it necessary? The criterion does not apply.

(b) Is it integral to the vase as a whole? It doesn’t apply (the unshattered whole vase has no pieces).

(c) Is it discrete? Pieces are discrete once they have been formed, but in the unbroken state of the whole they are not distinguishable, not discrete.

(d) Do they have a function with respect to the whole? No

Disjunction: incompatibility

co-hyponymy

• III. Disjunction: class A and class B have no members in common

-Hypernym: *animal*

-Hyponyms: *dog, cat, mouse, lion, sheep*

If something is a mouse, then it is not a dog, horse or elephant:

nothing in the world can belong simultaneously to the class of mice and the class of dogs.

Co-hyponymy in terms of features:

horse = [animal][equine]

stallion = [animal] [equine][male]

mare = [animal] [equine][female]

[male] and [female] are semantic features which cannot be simultaneously present.

co-meronymy

• If X and Z are sister meronyms of Y, then if the relation is a strictly logical one, no meronym of X is simultaneously a meronym of Z. In other words, sister parts do not overlap.

But CONCEPTS are not clear-cut: the boundaries of parts often display a degree o vagueness which destroys the strict logical relationship.

Ex.: the extend of the upper arm and the lower arm. What aboutthe elbow?

Opposites : antonyms

Main characteristics:

(i) Both terms are fully gradable:

very/slightly/rather/quite/too long

vs. *?very/slightly/rather/quite/too dead*

(ii) They occur normally in the comparative and superlative degree

long-longer-longest; light-lighter-lightest

Even when used in the positive degree, they typically need to be interpreted comparatively in relation to some reference value. A *long poem* is taken to be a poem that is longer than

the average poem. (*Small elephant* vs. *big mosquito*)

(iii) They indicate degrees of some objective, unidimensional physical property, one which can be measured in conventional units (centimetres, kilograms, miles per hour).

(iv) They are incompatibles, but not complementaries

It's neither long nor short is not a contradiction

(v) Comparative forms stand in a converse relationship

A is heavier than B

entails and is entailed by

B is lighter than A

Opposites : antonyms

(vi) The comparative forms of both terms are impartial: use in the comparative does not presuppose that the term in the positive degree is applicable.

X is longer than Y does not presuppose that *X is long*.

(vii) One of the terms yields an impartial question in the frame

How X is it? and an impartial nominalization.

How long is it? Merely enquires about the length without any presupposition

vs. *How short is it?* The presupposition is that it is short

It is the term that indicates more of the relevant property that

yields the impartial question*How long/strong/big/thick/wide is it?*

Opposites : reversives

• Reversives are directional opposites which include

-straightforward directions such as

up:down,

forwards:backwards,

into:out of,

north:south,

-extremes along some axis: *top:bottom*

• Reversives have the peculiarity of denoting movement (or change in general) in opposite directions, between two terminal states.

• They are all verbs:

rise:fall, advance:retreat, enter:leave

More abstract examples of reversity (change between twostates): *tie:untie, dress:undress, roll:unroll, mount:dismount*

The manner of the process and details of the path do not count, it is the effective direction from origin to goal which matters.

Compare *tie* and *untie*: both are different actions, but the states in the beginning and the ends of both are the same.

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Sociolinguistics

There are two qualitatively different ways of sociologically probing into language. They are not only thematically and historically (or to be more precise periodically) delineated. One of them is mimetic - it believes language and communication and their functioning mechanisms reflect or represent the social structures, layers and mechanisms. This trend of sociolinguistic theorizing and analysis could be termed traditional or linguistic sociolinguistics. The second sociological approach to language and communication is rhetorical and believes that communication shapes our identities. Consequently, the two mainstreams, despite their common sources and shared goals, concentrate their efforts on quite different problems.

Traditional (co-relationist) sociolinguistics is preoccupied with defining variation, linguistic change, dialect, bilinguialism, register, style, pidgin and Creole language formations, code-switching, the different languages men and women use, language variation and change, language planning and linguistic policy.

This type of sociolonguistic approach to language issues is corelationist in essence and implies a conception of the independent, though connected autonomous categories. Sociolinguistics analyses the match between these closely related but complete in themselves systems. The rhetoric trend deals predominantly in issues of the following type: identification and language, linguistic approach to socialization, empirical studies of verbal habits of human groups, enculturation processes, engendering process, enactment of role relations, ethnographic problems, anthropological investigations and others. This latter might be better termed linguistic sociology in opposition to the first which quite deserves the name social stratification of language or sociolinguistics.

"Social categories must be interpreted in terms of situational constraints" is this approach's founding assumption. Status and role are not permanent qualities of speaker, rather they are abstract communicative symbols. The distinction between social and linguistic categories is obliterated. Communication is not governed by fixed social rules. It is a two-step process in which the speaker first takes in stimuli from the outside environment, evaluating and selecting among them in the light of his own cultural background, personal history and what s/he knows about his/her interlocutors. Then the speaker decides on the norms that apply to the situation at hand. These norms determine the speaker's selection from the communicative options available for encoding his intent.

For any communication to be possible we need a code. This the rule system for matching overt linguistic behaviour with meaning. Often language and code are equated. This a gross simplification and over generalisation because it precludes the vistas of functional, social, register and various other types of codes that constitute everyday communicative exchange in all spheres of life.

Men and women are claimed not to share the same communicative competence. Their rule systems for the use and interpretation of utterances are different as a result of their different patterns of socialisation into two contrasting subcultures. Women are said to develop a co-operative repertoire of verbal behaviour with other women, where intimacy, connectedness and empathy are the powerful structuring parameters. Men are believed to acquire and employ a competitive repertoire of verbal behaviour. The ethos of power, the strife for institutionalised hierarchisation and paternal leadership are the factors shaping and motivating the communicative

competence of men. When the two subcultures interact, the character of the parameters of communicative competence and linguistic strategy change.

In men-women interaction men tend to be overprotective, to simplify their meaning and to sound overtly and purposefully endearing. Women on their part become less assertive and demonstrate eagerness for subordination. The communicative styles and rule systems of men and women are overlapping and not mutually exclusive.

Men and women do know equally well how to do the same things communicatively but are subject to different contextual constraints.

Men gossip. This is not e type of verbal behaviour characteristic of women only, but they do it in different circumstances and under a different name or label. The construction of gender identity through socialisation takes different paths for boys and girls. Cultural stereotyping is an integral part of socialisation.

“Boys will boys” is self-explanatory and there is not a parallel expression to capture symbolically the stereotype of girls. That is the male stereotype gets named and what is not specified there remains as an attribute for the other gender. The linguistic differentiation between men and women is that of style, not one of competence.

The distinction between the communicative behaviour of men and women is not coterminous with the notion of linguistic engendering. The latter refers to the ways attitudes are conveyed in and through language. Hailing and interpellation are the two phases of one and the same process of fixing identities. Public communication legitimises ways of being. By the way we address one

another we enact and mutually impose identities.

We should distinguish between sociolinguistics and sociology of language. According to Hudson 1980:

“sociolinguistics is the study of language in relation to society”, whereas the sociology of language is “the study of society in relation to language”.

The major field of interest for all approaches trying to uncover or at least bring to the fore the relations between language and society can be subdivided into the following allotments:

a) linguistic diversity and the speech community;

b) language and social interaction;

c) language and representation;

d) the role of language in processes of

socialisation and ideology construction;

e) language, culture andsociety.

The first allotment is further subdivided into:

language and regional variation - accent and dialect; language and ethnic identity - national varieties, pidgin, Creole and substandard variants.

The second one is portioned in the following areas: language and social class: restricted and elaborated speech variants; language and situation - register (functional variants), accompanied by the study of styles of making meanings which are overt markers (though multifaceted and complex ones) of social distancing (colloquial speech, informal, etc.);

the third bifurcates into ethnography of communication and anthropological investigations;

the fourth into language and subcultures: antilanguages; the last interests in language and gender, language and identity, instituionalisations and many others.

This last subdivision takes for granted that the existence of ideologies makes life and communication easier. We assume agreement by the commonplaces of ideologies and do not have to reinvent the wheel every time we want to use it. Or to put it Benjamin Lee Whorf's words: "Whenever agreement or assent is arrived at in human affairs . . . this agreement is reached by linguistic processes. Or else it is not reached." One obstacle for not reaching agreement is the phenomenon of aberrant decoding (a term coined by Umberto Eco to name the mismatch between intentionally encoded meaning and decoded sense). The major reason still remains the fact that we speak a particular kind of English (or any other national language) depending on which region of the country we come from (accent and dialect), which class we are most strongly affiliated with (restricted and elaborated speech variants), which subculture we belong to, what type of situation we have to behave in accordance with (register), what is our relation to the other participants in the communicative event (style), etc.

Register helps to clarify the interrelationship of language with context of communication by subsuming it under three main headings: field, tenor and mode. Field terms the ongoing activity wherein utterances are embedded so that they help sustain and shape the activity itself. Not all instances of language are closely embedded in sets of actions (like "scalpel, clips, etc. directly refer to surgical proceedings). In such cases the notion of field refers not so much to the ongoing activity, rather to the subject matter of the communicative act. The field is extrinsic in relation to activity-based talk and intrinsic to 'text' with degree at least remote from the immediate circumstances of activity. (The classic example of the latter being news) The particular aspect of language most affected by “field” is the vocabulary.

Technical, field-specific and specialized vocabularies are portions of lexis which are topic-oriented or activity based and can be looked upon as model generated semantic fields with no specific domain structure but with a topical definitional base.

Tenor refers to the kind of social relationship enacted in or by a text or communicative act. This notion highlights the way in which linguistic choices are affected not just by the topic of communication but also by the type of social relationship within which communication is taking place. The aspects of social relationship most crucial under the heading of tenor include politeness, degrees of formality and the relative statuses of participants. These dimensions of interpersonal relations affect a whole range of linguistic choices. In addition to considerations of topic and social relationship, language is also sensitive to the means adopted for communication. Herein surface notions of phatic communication of social fillers and props, backchannel behaviour (speech is shaped in such a way as to prompt immediate and ongoing responses from other participants) and markers of sympathetic circularity (ways of inviting the listener to assume the speaker’s point of view).

The most common way of describing the relation between language and social class is by distinguishing between two habitual modes of utterance organisation involving contrasting orientation to the production of meaning in and through language. The founder of this approach (Basil Bernstein) has termed the two differing principles of utterance-organisation as the *restricted* and the *elaborate(d)* code.

These two modes of generating meaning are closely related to two kinds of social formation which not only adopted the former but also are the ultimate cause for their emergence. The first type of social formation is characterised by strong bonds between its members, with clear and well defined social roles.

The social identity of the individual members is defined on the basis of relatively set and stable sets of parameters such as sex and age, etc. The social roles are ascribed on relatively fixed and public criteria. The role system is *positional* and *closed*. This formation reduces role discretion to fixed positions and closes off potential role ambiguities. Within such a social formation the shared knowledge and assumptions between members of the subculture are high, so that communication goes on against a dense background of meanings held in common which rarely need to be stated explicitly. In the other type of social formation, persons achieve

a social role and identity not so much on the basis of publicly obvious and self-evident criteria, but more on the basis of individual disposition and temperament. Within this type of social formation members negotiate and achieve their roles rather than have them there ready-made in advance to step into. In this way, who they are and where they stand is subject to constant definition and redifinition. The respective role system is *open* and *personal*. The individual intentions and viewpoints of the speaker need to be spelt out and made explicit. Within a positional or closed role system language is used to affirm solidarity and to invoke shared understandings.

Meanings of utterances are implied and taken for granted. Within the personal or open role system language is used to explore and construct individual identities. There is pressure on language to be more explicit.

Between these two extreme and well defined formations we recognise an amorphous social formation which uses antilanguage as a means of communication. Antilanguages may be understood as extreme versions of social dialects.

Antilanguages are basically created by a process of *relexicalization* - the substitution of new words for old. The grammar of the parent language may be preserved, but a distinctive vocabulary develops, particularly - but not solely - in activities and areas that are central to the subculture and that help to set it off most sharply from the established society. Accounts of ‘pelting speech’, for example, contains over twenty terms for the classes of vagabond including ‘rogue’, ‘wild rogue’, ‘prigger of prancers’ (horse thief), ‘counterfeit crank’, ‘bawdy basket’ and so on. Similarly, the language of the Calcutta underworld contains over forty words for the police and twenty words for bomb.

Taboo Words

Le and Le (via Fakuade, 2013: 120) argue that the level of prevention of taboo words in language are specific in culture since the parameter of “taboo” from one culture to another depends on the cultural views and beliefs of the linguistics communities towards a certain topic.

Supporting that idea, Trudgill (1986: 29) states that taboo language is simply a matter of agreement where the normal employment of an item in language is possessed by specific social value and belief. In addition,

Akmajian et al., (2004: 303) also state that what is called as taboo is usually described by culture and not by anything which are usually attached in the language. In the same sense, Farb (in Fakuade et al., 2013: 120) states that any kinds of words including taboo words are at first only contain a mere collection of sounds but they are changing after the community gives them other connotation so that they cannot be employed in a certain speech situation. In detail, Farb explain that the words become taboo because the community encloses them with symbolic value which belongs to specific culture.

Since taboo and the words which denote it are related to a specific culture, people should learn about what things they “should” or “should not” do in a particular society to understand the term. The process of differentiating what is taboo and what is not usually begins when a person becomes a part of a particular society which shares ideas through language. Moreover, the person should understand the norms which exist in her or his living place since there is no one in this world born with innate knowledge about taboo words. Therefore, the knowledge about language in one society is accomplished through socialization process (Jay in Doyle, 2009: 1).

The socialization process will allow the language users to know that every society has something that should not be said and certain words contain a strong connotation so that they cannot be used in a polite situation. Uttering or doing taboo words is strongly against the social value because it will bring embarrassment and offensiveness to the members of the society.

Embarrassment has a tendency to be connected with sexual activity and its outcomes. Offensiveness is identified with different substance like the body, and the distinctive forms of physical, mental, and social abnormality. Being more specific, in An Introduction to

Sociolinguistics, Wardhaugh (2006: 239) defines taboo in the following way:

Taboo is the prohibition or avoidance in any society of behavior believed to be harmful to its members in that it would cause them anxiety, embarrassment, or shame. It is extremely strong politeness constraints.

Consequently, so far as language is concerned, certain things are not to be said or certain objects can be referred to only in certain circumstances. In the statement above, Wardhaugh tried to emphasize that a certain object can only be referred to only in certain circumstances. It also means that the use of taboo words can create misunderstanding between two people who are involved in a conversation if they have different knowledge since they belong to different societies

and different circumstances. This idea is also brought by Freitas (2008: 26) who states that certain words and expressions may be considered as taboos for certain people, especially when these words and expressions are used by other social class members. An example of this case is the use of taboo words like *n*gg*r*. The word *n*gg*r* can be extremely offensive if white persons use it. However, it may be used freely by some groups of black people without feeling being offended. Therefore, it can be concluded that the parameter of certain words or expressions which are thought to be taboo usually depends on the values in one society, the relationship between the speaker and listeners, and also the circumstances where the words are uttered.

Since taboo words are expressed in different ways by different societies, it is important to present specific taboo words in one culture in which this research tries to investigate. Thus, in the next section the explanation of taboo words in western society is provided.

Functions of Taboo Words

Taboo words are usually uttered because there is a reason behind them. According to Wardhaugh (2006: 239), taboo words are disregarded in particular occasion because they have several functions such as to draw attention to oneself, to show contempt, to be provocative, and to mock authority. To give a clear explanation of the functions of taboo words, below are brief descriptions of the functions completed with examples in conversations

To Draw Attention to Oneself

Sometimes people utter taboo words in order to get the attention from the listener. Mc Edward (in Mc Guire 1973: 5-6) explains that the speakers should gain the interest through the use of strong, powerful language whose connotation can stimulate an instant reaction from the audience. Therefore, people use taboo words which are believed to have power in gaining listener's attention because of its strong connotation. The explanation below is the example of taboo words which function to draw attention to oneself.

Example: The f**king car just died.

To Show Contempt

The use of taboo words in conversation between two people can also mean to show contempt. According to *Oxford Advance Learner's Dictionary* (1995: 249) *contempt* means the impression in which a person or may be some thing is totally useless and cannot be regarded. In other words, when someone tries to show contempt by using taboo words, he or she will insult the addressee by uttering words that can offend their pride.

c. To Be Provocative

When someone utters taboo words, he or she may have an intention to provoke a certain response such as violation or anger from others. This is in line with Rothwell (in Fitzgerald 2007: 17) who says that verbal obscenity can be the most efficient symbolic process offered to protester intended for inviting chaotic reaction. Taboo words are considered successful when the response is suitable with the speaker's expectation. Here is the example in the conversation.

Sometimes people use taboo words when they are not satisfied with public images such as government and institutions. Rothwell (in Mc Guire, 1973: 6) asserts that verbal obscenity communicates a significant hatred for society's rule, a rebellion against power as well as impertinence for things that are considered sacred. In other words, people used taboo words because they want to express their disappointment about reality that are different from what they have expected.

Therefore, some people may prefer to use certain taboo words that are directed to mock authority in order to show their disbelief about governmental stuffs. **(F. N.Anggita, 2015)**

ANAPHORA

What is anaphora? In fact, answering this question is more difficult than one would think. As an illustration of this, compare the following two, more or less randomly chosen definitions. Reinhart (1999) claims that: (1) “The term anaphora is used most commonly in theoretical linguistics to denote any case where two nominal expressions are assigned the same referential value or range.” Notice that this statement disqualifies most of the aforementioned phenomena as anaphora. What is more, this statement also includes phenomena which are commonly not thought of as anaphora. For instance, in example (2), ‘Wim Kok’ and ‘the prime minister of the Netherlands’ are coreferential, but not anaphoric with respect to each other. In particular, neither of the noun phrases *depends* for its interpretation on the other noun phrase (cf. Lee & Stenning, 1998; Kibble & van Deemter, 1999).

(2) *Wim Kok is the prime minister of the Netherlands.*

Another definition is the following fromCarter (1987), *op cit.* in vanDeemter

(1992). According to this definition, anaphora is [(3) "(...) the special case of cohesion where the meaning (sense and/or reference) of one item in a cohesive relationship (**the anaphor**) is, in isolation, somehow vague or incomplete, and can only properly be interpreted by considering the meanings of the other item(s) in the relationship (**the antecedents**)."

Notice that all phenomena mentioned above fall within the scope of this definition. Furthermore, this definition takes into account the fact that there is a relation of dependency between the anaphor and the antecedent. However, the definition is arguably too general. As van Deemter (1992) points out, according to Carter's definition the phenomenon of contextual disambiguation is anaphoric as well. Although certain forms of contextual disambiguation (e.g., the resolution of pronouns) are classical examples of anaphora, there are other forms of contextual disambiguation which are traditionally not thought of in terms of anaphora, e.g., word sense disambiguation.

In (4), the sense of the word ‘bank’ is most likely perceived to be that of a *financial institution*. This interpretation appears to be induced by the direct linguistic context (“needed some cash”) and yet we hesitate to say that therefore the word ‘bank’ is an anaphor.

(4) *John needed some cash so he went to a bank.*

Let us pause here for a moment and reflect on what we are trying to achieve when we attempt to define the notion of ‘anaphora’. Basically, we are trying to find a set of properties such that:

Anexpression is used anaphorically *if and only if*.

Unfortunately, in the literature there exists no consensus about what the properties are. To our knowledge, all of the proposed definitions have been subjected to criticism of one of the following two types:

(A)

It is argued that a particular property is not a *necessary property* of anaphorically used expressions (e.g., that the expression should be nominal, as required by the definition given under 1). This involves contesting the '*only if*' part of the definition. (B) It is argued that the properties in the definition are not *sufficient* (e.g., another criticism of the definition under 1. Is that coreferentiallity is not a sufficient property for anaphoricity). This involves questioning the '*if*' part of the definition.

Reference

Reference is commonly construed as an act in which a speaker, or writer, uses linguistic forms to enable a listener, or reader, to identify something. In other words, reference is concerned with designating entities in the world by linguistic means. Matthews (1997:312) states that "reference is the relation between a part of an utterance and an individual or set of individuals that it identified."

It is important to note that reference is often contrasted with the notion *sense*. While reference deals with the relationship between the linguistic elements (language) and the non-linguistics elements (the world), sense is exclusively concerned with the intra linguistic relations, particularly words (Palmer, 1981). Thus, the sense of *tulip*, for instance, relates to sense of other words such *flower* (known as hyponym), and the sense of *profound* relates to the sense of *deep* (known as synonym). The relation among words is also known as *sense relation*. The linguistic forms or the linguistic means used to identify or designate entities are called *referring expressions*, which can be proper nouns (*Edison, Bandung*), noun phrases that are definite (*the woman*, *the singer***)**, or indefinite (*a man*, *an island*), and pronouns (*he*, *her*, *it*, *them*). Noun phrases, proper nouns are called primary referring expressions, while pronouns are termed secondary referring expressions (Kreidle,1998).

In addition, Kreidler (1998:130) states that referring expression is "a piece of language that is used in an utterance and is linked to something outside language, some living or dead or imaginary entity or concept or group of entities or concepts."

When the sentence *Einstein is a famous scientist* is uttered to make a statement, we will say that the speaker refers to a certain individual (*Einstein*) by means of a referring expression. The thing or things (or the individual named Einstein in this case) in the world referred to by a particular expression is called its *referent(s)*. Thus the notion *referent* is an expression for the thing picked out by uttering the expression in a particular context (Saeed, 1997:27). Sentences may also contain two or more referring expressions.

For example, if the sentence *Bill kissed Mary* is uttered, with its characteristic force of making a statement, both *Bill* and *Mary* would be referring expressions, their referents being the individuals identifiable by names as *Bill* and *Mary*.

Types of Referents

Kreidler (1998) provides a comprehensive account of different types of referents used by a language to identify entities in the world. According to him, there are essentially three kinds of differences in referents. Each of these will be discussed below.

Unique and Non-Unique Referents

A referent has a unique entity or unique sets of entities if its referring expression has fixed reference. Thus entities like *the Rocky Mountains, the Louvre, the Pacific Ocean, Germany* designate unique entities that can be found only in certain places, and knowledge of it is part of one's general knowledge. On the other hand, a referent may have a non-unique entity if its referring expression has variable reference. Entities such as *that woman, my brother, a mountain,* are not unique since they are different every time they are used, and knowledge of it is a matter of specific knowledge. It is the physical and linguistic contexts that help the speakers to identify those entities.

Concrete and Abstract Referents

Concrete referents are denoted by concrete or tangible objects such as *book*, *lamp*, *tree*, *brick*, whereas the abstract ones are designated by abstract or intangible entities such as *beauty*, *democracy*, *knowledge*, *philosophy*. It is interesting to note that lexemes with different kinds of denotation generally occur in different kinds of utterances and may have different effects on other lexemes. Thus the lexeme *key* has a concrete referent in the phrase *the key to the front door*, bearing literal meaning, and an abstract one in *the key to success*, bearing figurative meaning.

Countable and Non-Countable Referents

It is the property of noun phrase that merits the notion countable and noncountable, both of which can be concrete and abstract. Concrete countable expressions are those that are separate from one another, and those that can ordinarily be counted one by one. This includes such entities as *pencil, bags, chairs, and watches*. Abstract countable nouns include such entities as *problem, experience, and suggestion*. Concrete non-countable phrases have three kinds of reference: those that refer to continuous substances (*ketchup, sauce, milk, ink*), those that name substances consisting particles not worth counting (*rice, sand, sugar*), and those that refer to collections (*furniture, jewelry, luggage*). The feature that distinguishes countable noun phrases from non-countable ones is that the former recognize the division between singular and plural forms while the latter do not. Thus we can say *an apple, a hat, an umbrella*, the overt specifier being present preceding the singular nouns, and *some apples, some hats, some umbrella, some apple sauce, some mud, some ink*, with a zero specifier preceding both plural countable and non-countable. In a language such as English the names of the animals that are countable by nature become uncountable when referring to food.

An instance of this is the lexemes *(a) lamb, (a) chicken, and (a) turkey*. Finally, some nouns phrases may have dual class membership in that it can be countable and noun-countable, depending upon the items it designates. Such entities as *(a) paper, (a) iron, (a) glass, (a) coffee*, etc. can be countable and non-countable.

Anaphora

Halliday and Hassan (1976), in a lengthy discussion of textual cohesion in English, classify reference into two types: exophora and endophora. When we utter *his shirt* or *your uncle*, we refer to some entity in the real world: real world reference is called *exophoric reference*. But we can also refer to the referents in the text items using linguistic means: reference in text is called *endophoric reference.* Consider the following sentence:

(14) *Danny* doesn't like *hamburger*. *He* avoids eating *it* whenever possible *Danny* and *hamburger* are two nouns with exophoric

reference, while *he* and *it* have endophoric reference: they refer to *Danny* and *hamburger* in the context, and not directly to real-world entity. Traditionally they are called *pronouns*. Endophoric reference can be classified into anaphora and cataphora depending on the position of the antecedent.

Observe the short passage below:

In the film, a man and a woman were trying to wash a cat. The man was holding the cat while the woman poured water on *it*. *He* said something to *her* and *they* started laughing.

The pronouns (*it*, *he*, *her*, and *they*) in the passage are subsequent reference to already mentioned referents, which are known as anaphoric reference or anaphora. Technically speaking, the subsequent reference is called *anaphor* and the initial or already introduced reference is known as *antecedents*. Quirk et. al. (1985) states that anaphoric reference is used where the uniqueness of reference of some phrase *the X* is supplied by information given earlier in the discourse. They further distinguish two kinds of anaphora:

Direct and Indirect.

In direct anaphora, the referents have already occurred in the text, and thus can be identified directly, whereas in indirect anaphora the hearer identifies the referents indirectly from his knowledge by inferring what has been mentioned. Consider the following sentences:

1) John bought a TV and tape recorder, but he returned the *tape recorder*.

2) John bought a car, but when he drove *it* one of the wheels came off.

Sentence (1) exemplifies the use of direct anaphora where the referent the *tape recorder* can be identified directly, while sentence (2) contains the indirect anaphora where the noun *car* has been substituted by anaphor *it*.

Cataphora

The notion *cataphora* is less common in use than that of anaphora. Cataphora is the relation between an anaphoric expression and an antecedent that comes later (Matthews 1997:48). Thus cataphora refers to entity that is mentioned latter in the discourse. Consider this sentence:

(3) I turned to the corner and almost stepped on *it*. There was *a large snake* in the middle of the path.

The pronoun *it* (the cataphor) in the sentence can be interpreted as referring forward to a noun phrase *a large snake*, (the antecedent) and is said to have cataphoric reference. Cataphora is also known as *anticipatory anaphora* or *backward anaphora*.

Deixis

The notion *deixis* has become one of the important topics that merits our attention. Deixis is a semantics notion, which is originally derived from a Greek word meaning *pointing* or *indicating* via language. Any linguistic form used to accomplish this *pointing* is called a **deictic expression**. The adjective deictic (*deikticos*) has the sense of *demonstrative.*

When we notice a strange object and ask, "What's that?" we are using a deictic expression (*that*) to indicate something in the immediate context. Deictic expressions are also sometimes called **indexical**.

The notion of what deixis is relatively uncontroversial among the linguists. Lyons (1977:637) offers the following definition of deixis: "the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically of a single speaker and at least one addressee."

Similarly, Yule (1996:9) argues that deixis is a form of referring that is tied to the speaker's context, with the most basic distinction between deictic expressions being "near speaker" versus "away from the speaker."

If the referents being referred to are near the speaker, the **proximal terms** such as *this, here, now* are used. By contrast, the **distal terms** such as *that, there, then* are employed provided that the referents are away from the speaker.

Matthews (1997:89) states that deixis is "they way in which the reference of certain elements in a sentence is determined in relation to a specific speaker and addressee and a specific time and place of utterance." From the three definitions given above, it can be inferred that the notion deixis involves the pointing of certain referents that belong primarily to the category of persons (objects), speaker-addressee relationship, space, and time, context of utterance. Respectively, this category is termed **person deixis, social deixis, spatial deixis, temporal deixis,** and **discourse deixis.** We shall examine each of these in detail.

Person Deixis

Person deixis basically operates on a three-part division, exemplified by the pronouns for first person or the speaker (*I*), second person or the addressee (*you*) and third persons or other participants (*he, she*, *it*). What is important to note here is that the third person singular forms encode gender, which is not deictic by nature because it is not sensitive to aspects of the speech situation (Cruse, 2000). Another point worth making with regard to the person deixis is the use of plural pronouns, which can be in the **representative** or **true** use (Cruse, 2000:320). If the pronoun *we* is spoken or written by a single speaker or writer to represent the group he or she refers to, it is the case of representative use. On the other, if it used to refer to the speaker and the group, the pronoun *we* is employed in its true sense.

The representative and true use of pronoun *we* are also called **inclusive** and **exclusive** *we*, respectively. The inclusive-exclusive distinction is explicable in the utterance *Let's go* (to some friends) and *Let us go* (to someone who has captured the speaker and friends). The action of going is inclusive in the first, but exclusive in the second.

Social Deixis

In many languages the deictic categories of speaker, addressee, and other(s) are elaborated with markers or relative social status (addressee with higher status versus addressee with lower status). Expressions that indicate higher status are described as **honorifics**.

A widely quoted example to describe the social deixis is the so-called TV distinction, from the French *tu* (referring to familiar addressee), and *vous* (referring to non-familiar addressee).

Other languages that make a distinction between the social status are German with the distinguishing pronoun *du* and *Sie*, and Spanish with *tu* and *Usted*.

In the social context the higher, older, and more powerful speaker will tend to use the *tu*

version to a lower, younger, and less powerful addressee, and be addressed by the *vous* form in return.

Spatial Deixis

The concept of distance is relevant to spatial deixis, where the relative location of people and things is being indicated. As Cruse (2000:320) puts it "spatial deixis manifests itself principally in the form of locative adverbs (*here* and *there*) and demonstratives or determiners (*this* and *that*)." In English the spatial deictic system is indicated by two terms labeled **proximal** and **distal.**

Such terms as *here* and *this* indicate that the location is relatively close to the speaker, and hence proximal. Conversely, the terms *there* and *that* indicate the relative distant of the location from the speaker, and hence distal In considering spatial deixis, Yule (1996) warns that the location from the speaker's perspective can be fixed mentally and physically. Speakers temporarily away

from their home location will often continue to use *here* to mean the (physically distant) home location, as if they were still in that location. Speakers also seem to be able to project themselves into other locations prior to being in those locations, as when they say "I'll come later" (movement to addressee's location). This is sometimes described as **deictic projection**.

Temporal Deixis

Cruse (2000) asserts that temporal deictics function to locate points or intervals on the time axis, using the moment of utterance as a reference point. The time axis can be divided into three major divisions: before the moment of utterance, at the time of utterance, and after the time of utterance.

The time adverbial that forms a basic concept in temporal deixis in English includes *now* and *then*. *Now* displays the same capacity for indefinite extension, which can refer to a precise instant, such as *Press the button-now*!; or it can accommodate a wide swathe of time like *The solar system is now in a relatively stable phase* (Cruse, 2000:320). However, very often *now* indicates the time coinciding with the speaker's utterance; for example, *I am reading a novel now* (the action done at the moment of the speaker's utterance). *Then*, on the other hand, designate the time period which is distal from the speaker's utterance. *Then* is normally interpreted from the context, as the following sentences indicate:

(1) Watching movies at 8.30 tonight? Okay, I'll see you then.

(2) December 23 rd , 2002? I was in Solo then.

Apart from the time adverbial, there are essentially other types of temporal deixis worth mentioning here. One type is related to calendric notions that include both clock time as in [1] and calendar time as in [2]. Other temporal deictic related to calendric system includes such expressions as *today, yesterday, tomorrow, this week, last week ,next* week, *this month, last moth, next month, this year, last year, and next year*. The last type of temporal deixis in English is related to the verb tense, as illustrated in the following sentences.

(3) We live here now.

(4) We lived there then.

The verb tense in (3) is in simple present and is normally treated as close to (proximal) the speaker's current situation, whereas in (4) the verb tense is simple past, and is thought as distant (distal) by the speaker.

Discourse Deixis

Discourse deixis is actually a linguistic device used to designate an entity in the discourse. The linguistic devices can be the deictic expressions *this* and *that*, the expression *hereby* in the explicit performative sentence, and sentence adverbs such as *therefore* and *furthermore*. The following sentences exemplify each of these devices.

(5) Listen to this, it will kill you!

(6) That has at least two implications.

(7) Notice is hereby served that if payment is further delayed, appropriate legal action

will be taken.

(8) That rationale is controversial; furthermore…………

The deictic expression *this* in (5) and *that* in (6) respectively refer to future discourse element and past discourse element. Similarly, the *hereby* in (7) points to current discourse. Finally, the sentence adverb marker in (8) refers to what follows in the future discourse. Discourse deixis is not, however, to be confused with anaphora, the difference being that the latter might extract a referent from an extralinguistic entity. Thus the anaphor *she* in sentence (9) below does not strictly refer to the word *Susan* itself.

(9) Susan is indeed sexually attractive. She has been admired by many men. *Reference, Anaphora, and Deixis (S. Sugiharto)*

The deictic center

A linguistic phenomenon that crucially relies on this ability is deixis. As Bühler (1934) and other theorists have pointed out, the use of deixis involves a particular viewpoint called the *deictic centre* or the *origo* (cf. Bühler 1934; Lyons 1977). The deictic centre is the centre of a coordinate system that underlies the conceptualization of the speech situation.

In the unmarked case, the deictic centre is defined by the speaker's location at the time of the utterance. Deictic expressions are used to indicate a location or point in time relative to the deictic centre. For instance, the spatial adverbs *here* and *there* can be used to express a contrast between two different locations based on their relationship to the origo:

here marks the area that is conceptualized as the deictic centre, and *there* indicates a location that is not included in this area. In the literature, *here* and *there* are commonly characterized as proximal and distal deictics, but the attributes 'proximal' and 'distal' must not be taken in the absolute sense of these terms because the deictic centre and the speech situation are conceptual units that cannot be equated with the physical location in which the speech event occurs. Consider for instance the use of the spatial deictic *here* in examples (1a-e).

(1) a. *Here* where I am

b. *Here* in this room

c. *Here* in Jena

d. *Here* in Germany

e. *Here* on this planet

What these examples illustrate is that the area included in the deictic centre (denoted by *here*) varies with the construal of the speech situation. In (1a), *here* refers to a location that is further specified by the pronoun *I* , indicating that the deictic centre is basically identical with the speaker's body; but in all other examples the deictic centre includes a much larger area organized around the speaker's location at the time of the utterance: In (1b) the deictic centre is the room in which the speech event is taking place, in (1c) it is the city of Jena, in (1d) it is a country, and in (1e) the deictic centre consists of the whole planet. In other words, the referent of *here* varies with the conceptualization of the speech situation. The distal term *there* is used in contrast to *here* ; it can refer to any location in the speech situation as long as it is not included in the area conceptualized as the deictic centre. In general, *here* and *there* , and other proximal and distal deictics, do not express absolute measures of distance, but differentiate between two different locations relative to the deictic centre within the current construal of the speech situation.

In conversations, the deictic centre is constantly changing between the communicative partners. Every time a new speaker adopts the turn, the speech event is conceptualized from a different point of view, which means that expressions such as *here* and *there* and *I* and *you* refer to different entities when used by different speakers. Adult speakers are so used to this procedure that they do not realize the constantly changing perspective that is involved in the use of deictic expressions; but children have great difficulties with the alternating point of view. Although English-speaking children begin to use deictic expressions very early, they often misinterpret their meaning and use (cf. Clark 1978; Tanz 1980; Wales 1986). For instance, it is well-known that some children begin to use the personal pronouns *I* and *you* as fixed expressions for the child and an adult speaker.

Consider for instance the dialog in (2) between a two-year-old English-speaking boy and his mother (cf. Clark 1978: 101).

(2) Mother: What do you want? Child: Daddy toothbrush.

Mother: Oh you want Daddy's toothbrush, do you?

Child: Yes . . . *you* want to put the frog in the mug. [you = I]

Mother: I think the frog is too big for the mug.

Child: Yes *you* can put the duck in the mug [you = I]

make bubble . . . make bubble.

Mother: Tomorrow. Nearly all the water's run out.

Child: *You* want Mummy red toothbrush . . . yes [you = I]

you can have Mummy old red toothbrush.

In this example, both the boy and his mother use the pronoun *you* with reference to the child, suggesting that the boy misinterprets the term as some sort of proper name. The same absolute use of personal pronouns has been observed in many other studies.

Check yourself test

A. Discuss the following:

What is meant by pure and impure deictics?

Deixis is said to be related to distance. Explicate it.

What is the recycling of deictics? Give examples.

Tense is a deictic category. Could you comment on it?

Discuss deictics used in the following sentences; describe the situations in which the sentences may be used:

1. That/ this is a nice cottage.

2. This book was published last year.

3. The theatre is on the left.

4. We're going to New York next week.

5. We're coming to New York next week.

6. I don't like that man.

7. The student there is a friend of mine.

8. John looked up when she came in.

9. She is an actress.

10. What's that? What's that thing?

11. Who's that? Who's that person?

12. My friend here will show you the way.

13. Here's the money you lent me.

14. I was born in London and have lived here/there all my life.

15. Hey, you over there! Get out of here!

16. You have to be 21 to buy alcohol in Florida.

17. How are we feeling today, Mr. Robson?

18. Shall we stop for a coffee?

19. I like this movie today better than that concert last night.

20. It was quite a large fish – about that long.

21. There was an accident there.

22. John’s uncle died last week.

23. John’s grandmother had died the previous week.

24. That’s true. I agree with you there.

25. He missed hitting the car in front by that much.

26. Do come in / Do go in.

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