



Historical Texts

(قسم التاريخ - الفرقة الثالثة)

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Introduction

Studies based on historical documents as a scientific researcher on the original must be reviewed when the study of history is general and modern and contemporary history in particular . Being of importance due to the learners modern and contemporary history of what happened to the evolution of the governance and administrative systems in modern states , were is the official correspondence, which emerge from this departments as that received the original documents of interest to researchers in the science of history.

If we add to the importance that he researchers depends on the opinion and the opinion of others in his study , the importance of historical documents and texts that were set in foreign languages reports of the ministries of foreign Affaires , as well as documents of international organizations like the United Nation and the Security Council is given a good results of the researchers to the subject of his study , and enrich the study of this subject .

From this standpoint , this study was to make the student in the department of history , the initial stage of university education stands at the end to learn to deal with these documents , through the translation , when used as a scientific study of historical topics . For that contained the translated documents , and documents tat require the student translated it , and thus learn how to use these documents in historical studies , and more able to make it in the future to provide opinion and other opinion in these studies .

Dr. Sayed Abd El -Aal

Part (I)

Documents with Commentary

Firstly : British Foreign Office And The Project Of
Extending Privilege Suez Canal 1909 .

Secondly : British and the Egyptian Revolution of
1919 .

Third : The French occupation and the bombing of
the Syrian cities 1945 .

Firstly

British Foreign Office And The Project Of Extending Privilege Suez Canal , 1909

**F. O., No. 9500 : Sir E. Gorst to Edward Grey . Calro,
January 21, 1909.**

Sir, I have the honour to report that during the past month confidential negotiations have been proceeding between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company on the subject of the extension of the latter's Concession. these negotiations have now arrived at the point when the two parties have been able to agree provisionally upon certain general conditions which would form the basis of a new arrangement. These conditions are as follows :

1. The Concession of the Suez Canal Company to be prolonged forty years from 1968, which is the date when the existing Convension comes an end. This will allow .the Company to continue in existence for 100 years from the present time.

2. During the further period of forty years the profits of the undertaking to be equally divided between the Egyptian Government and the Company.

3. As it is impossible to foresee to-day what the annual profits may be in 1968, and as neither the Egyptian Government nor the Suez Canal Company desire to embark on a transaction of such magnitude on a speculative basis, the amount due for the extension of the Concession to be fixed in 1970 on the basis of the average profits for the five preceding years, namely, 1965 to 1970. The price required of the Company will be the equivalent of an annuity for forty years of half the average profits thus ascertained.

4. The Suez Canal Company to pay to the Egyptian Government a lump sum of £ 3,200,000, payment being spread over four years from 1910.

5. The Company to give the Government a share in the profits from 1911 onwards. The share from

1911 to the end of 1920 to be 2 per cent., rising to 4 per cent. in 1961.

6. The payments prescribed by the two preceding paragraphs to be considered as payments on account of the price which will ultimately be fixed for the extension of the Concession, and a definite account to be established in 1970 of the sums so paid, with compound interest. If the total amount thus ascertained is less than the price fixed in accordance with the conditions of paragraph 3, the Company to pay to the Government (in addition to the 50 per cent. of the profits) an equivalent annuity spread over the remaining forty years of the Concession. If on the contrary, the sums already paid by the Company exceed the price, the corresponding annuity to be deducted from the Government's share of the profits.

7. The present tariff for ships using the Canal to be reduced on the 1st- January, 1910, by 50 centimes, and subsequently to undergo successive reductions of 50 centimes.

**F. O., No. 33243, Sir H. Austin Lee to Mr.
McKinnon Wood, Paris, September 2, 1909.**

Dear Mr. McKinnon Wood , IT will interest you to know that at the meeting of the Managing Committee of the Suez Canal Company this morning Prince d'Arenberg said that it was his intention, at the meeting of the Board on Monday, to submit formally to them the question of the extension of the Canal concession, and ask for authority to lay the matter officially before His Majesty's Government .

The Prince added that he had reason to believe that the Foreign Office were favourably disposed to the scheme, and that he hoped that at the recent meeting at the Treasury the officials of that department had been shown that the proposals, as modified, would be beneficial to the shareholders, As I understand that the Treasury does not view the scheme with favour, and considers the proposed terms onerous to the shareholders .

I thought it advisable, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, to say that I had no information as to the view held by the Foreign Office, but that it was a matter that primarily concerned the Treasury, as representing the financial interests of His Majesty's Government, who was the principal shareholder. I added that it was possible that the Board of Trade also might have to be consulted in the matter.

Yours very truly, H. AUSTIN LEE.

**F. O., No. 34774, British Suez Canal Directors to
Sir Edward Grey, Paris, September 11, 1909.**

Sir, WE have the honour to inform you that the president of the Suez Canal Company took the opportunity of his visit to Egypt last winter to enter into unofficial negotiations with the officials of the Egyptian Government with a view to the prolongation for forty years of the concession first granted to the company in 1854, which will expire in 1968.

At the meeting of the council, held on the 6th instant, Prince d'Arenberg gave an account of the conversations that had taken place at Cairo and submitted the question formally to the council. He stated that before coming to a decision on the matter it would be advisable to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government, as the largest shareholder, with regard to the terms which had been agreed on between the enclosed copy of the report of the proceedings at the council, which comprises a statement made by the secretary-general of the company giving the terms of the proposed agreement between the Egyptian Government and the company.

Prince d'Arenberg added that he hoped to be in a position to ask the council, at its next meeting on the 4th October, to come to a decision on the principle of such an agreement; and we await your instructions with regard to our action, as the representatives of His Majesty's Government, when the question comes up for discussion .

**F. O., No. 40381, Sir E. Gorst to Sir Edward Grey,
Cairo, November 2, 1909**

THE Grand Vizier has sent to His Highness the Khedive a telegram, in which he enquires as to the proposal to extend the Suez Canal concession, and implies that in the arrangement Turkey ought to be consulted.

In the reply which is being sent it is stated that negotiations are now proceeding between the company and the Egyptian Government on the subject, and it is pointed out that the contract of the 22nd February, 1866, which was made between the company and the Government. and was formally sanctioned by a firman, provides for the prolongation fo the concession.

**F. O., No. 40874, Sir E. Gorst to Sir Edward Grey,
Cairo, November 6, 1909.**

Extension of Suez Canal concession .

The objections pointed out in your telegram No.9, Commercial, certainly apply to article 2. Both the

Financial Adviser and I fully realised them at the time when the proposal was brought forward. No such stipulation appeared in the original scheme, and it was with the utmost reluctance that we accepted it, chiefly because the British non-official directors were very strongly in favour of it.

In order to minimise the danger of a diversity of interests between the company and the Government, the former had agreed, with that object in view, to include in an exchange of letters certain precautionary stipulations. It appeared, moreover, and, indeed, still appears to us, that the contingency is most improbable in which guarantee would come into operation. Strong exception has, however, been taken here to the point raised in your telegram, and the General Assembly will probably refuse to accept the scheme unless some other arrangement can be found.

It has therefore been decided by the Council of Ministers, in agreement with the Financial Adviser, to inform the company that, unless the stipulation of a

guaranteed minimum receipt for the company during the extended period is dropped, they will be unable to recommend the arrangement to the General Assembly.

The question is now under consideration of the compensation to be offered in return. It will probably take the form of prolonging the period of extension for a few years. While the financial effect on Egypt of such an arrangement would be probably less favourable than the proposal of a guarantee, it is free from the serious objections to which you draw my attention; moreover, the absolute solidarity of the interests of the two parties are thereby secured.

F. O., No. 41040, Prince d' Arenberg to Sir Edward Grey, Paris, le 6 November, 1909-

M. Le Ministre, J' AI l'honneur de vous confirmer les déclarations relatives aux detaxes, faites par M. Maxime Bertrand, secrétaire général adjoint de la Compagnie du Canal de Suez. Ces déclarations sont les suivantes : Le Conseil d'Administration de la

Compagnie du Canal de Suez proposera a l'assemblee generale du mois de juin 1910 de decider :

1. Qu'une detaxe de 50 centimes sera faite a compter du 1er. janvier, 1911.

2. Que le tarif sera ensuite abaissé par fractions non inférieures à 50 centimes et remené à 6 fr. une année après celle au cours de laquelle le tonnage aura atteint 19,000.000 de tonnes nettes.

3. Que le tarif sera ramené à 5 fr. une année après celle au cours de laquelle le tonnage aura atteint 22,600,000 tonnes nettes. Mais il doit être bien entendu qu'aucune publicité d'aucune sorte ne sera donnée aux formules ci-dessus avant que la compagnie ait pu les faire connaître elle-même a ses actionnaires .

Veillez, Le President du Conseil d'Administration,
Prince Auguste D'Arenberg.

F. O., No. 40874, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gorst.

Foreign Office, November 8, 1909.

Suez Canal concession.

Following is for your personal information only :
We have, with some reluctance, resolved to give instructions to the British official directors to vote with the other members of the board for the proposed extension of the Suez Canal concession, provided we receive satisfactory assurances that the rates on shipping will be reduced. But it is also the desire of His Majesty's Government to regain some influence in filling up vacancies which occur amongst the British nonofficial directors. Present nonofficial directors have, however, opposed us on this point, and I should therefore wish you not to make any concession with the special object of meeting their views.

It is not my desire that the Egyptian Government should be used as a lever to stort concessions for ourselves from the Suez Canal Board; but, on the other hand, it must be made quite clear that the Egyptian Government make good terms for Egypt, and that they are not prepared to accept any scheme

as a result of pressure having been brought to bear on them .

We have entirely set aside the objections raised by the Treasury, and our actions, in so far as they concern the Suez Canal Board, have been solely directed with a view to obtaining good terms for British shipping as regards future representation and rates. We shall raise no objections to any alteration of the scheme, provided they are consistent with these objects.

**F. O., Sir E. Gorst to Sir Edward Grey. Cairo, April
16, 1910.**

Sir, In my despatch No. 24, Commercial, of the 27th March, I had the honour to inform you that the committee of the General Assembly had presented their report on the proposal for the extension of the Suez Canal concession, and that the time had arrived when the question would be considered by the full body of the assembly.

The actual discussion did not begin until the 4th April, and the project was summarily disposed of on the 7th April by its rejection by an unanimous vote. For all practical purposes two sittings only were devoted by the assembly to the consideration of the question upon which the delegates had been specially summoned to give their opinion.

An account of the proceedings which led to the adverse vote not only shows that the rejection of the scheme was due to an acute manifestation of Anglophobia, but throws valuable light on the present capacity of the Egyptian to take any useful part in the management of the affairs of their country.

It became evident at an early stage that the General Assembly would be inspired in its view of the canal scheme by the hostile attitude of the Nationalist press, and its most prominent members substantially identified themselves at this juncture with the extremists .

Previously to the sitting on the 9th February, and before the Egyptian Government were able to explain the reasons in favour of their proposals, a number of members of the assembly met at the house of Mahmoud Suleiman Pasha, one of the vice-presidents, and came to an agreement as to the most certain method of ensuring the rejection of the scheme, namely, by procuring its reference to a committee of nineteen, of whom fifteen were chosen for their known hostility to the project.

A resolution for the appointment of a committee to report on the Government scheme was accordingly moved in the assembly, the actual composition of the committee being included in the resolution, so as to prevent a choice being made in the ordinary way, which might have resulted in the election of a really representative committee.

This motion was carried. Thereupon the four members of moderate views included among the committee, realising the falseness and difficulty of

their position, refused to serve. The committee, thus modified, henceforward dominated the assembly itself, which ceased to take any independent part in the proceedings.

The committee's report, which took more than a month to prepare, was forwarded, with the official reply to it, in my despatch No. 29, Commercial, of the 7th instant. Both these documents were printed and circulated to the members, and a discussion of the whole question took place on the 4th April. The Prime Minister then explained the attitude of the Government and their reasons for consulting the assembly on the subject. He recapitulated the history of the project, and stated his opinion that it would be found to be in the interests of the country.

After expressing a hope that the Ministerial reply to the observations of the committee would be conscientiously considered, he announced that, though the assembly had merely a consultative voice, the Government, as an exceptional measure, did not

intend to proceed with the scheme without their approval, and that consequently the responsibility would lie on the assembly if an adverse vote were given.

The Minister of Justice, Saad Zagloul Pasha, subsequently addressed the members in a long speech, refuting one by one the arguments contained in the committee's report, and urging the acceptance of the extension of the concession as a financial measure of advantage to Egypt, which should be treated on its own merits, and not confused with purely political issues and aspirations .

The Minister of Public Works, Ismail Sirry Pasha, followed, and explained at length the purposes, connected with the development of the country, for which the sums to be derived from the arrangement were to be employed. On behalf of the assembly two prominent members, Abaza Pasha and Soufani Bey, replied to the Ministers, thanking them for the concession involved in their promise to make the as-

sembly's vote decisive, but from the outset strongly opposing the measure itself. The debate was then adjourned.

There is reason to believe that at this point the Ministers speeches had some effect on the less partisan elements of the General Assembly, but in the interval of three days, before proceeding were resumed, on the 7th instant, the prevailing the upper hand. At the second sitting, Abaza Pasha again condemned the Government proposals, and another extremist then rose to announce that a counter reply had been prepared to the Government's criticism of the committee's report.

This reply, he moved, should be read, and an immediate vote taken on the main issue. The document a mere reiteration of the former report of the committee, concluding with a vigorously worded exhortation for the rejection of the scheme - was accordingly read and received with shouts of applause.

The closure of the discussion and exclusion of the Ministers from any chance of influencing the result was a prearranged maneuver, and, as appeared later, this further reply of the committee, which took an hour to read, had not even been presented to the President of the assembly previously to the sitting. Saad Zaghloul Pasha attempted, on behalf of the Government, to protest against an immediate vote, but he was met with a chorus of interruption, led by Abaza Pasha, and after a scene of confusion and uproar, the rejection of the Canal scheme was decided upon, only one vote that of the Coptic member, Morcos Simaika Bey, being recorded in favour of the project.

A demonstration had been prepared outside the building, and a crowd of students cheered the result with cries of hostility to British rule, which plainly showed that the Anglophobe character of the attitude of assembly was generally recognised.

Two days later the General Assembly was formally dissolved, the sitting providing an opportunity for another speech by Abaza Pasha, in which he again thanked the Ministry for their attitude in accepting the verdict of the assembly, and made it quite clear that this was interpreted by himself and his friends as the prelude to a constitutional regime.

I have, &c.

Eldon Gorst.

F. O., The Suez Canal Company's Concession.

The concession held by the Suez Canal Company expires in November 1968, and has therefore rather more than fifty nine years to run. At that date the whole concern falls into the hands of the Egyptian Government Being in want of ready money, that Government would like to anticipate a portion of the profits to which it will be entitled after 1968; and the proposal now before us is that the concession should be extended for forty years, and that the Government should sell to the Company a half share in the profits of the undertaking during that period.

The price would be paid in the following form ,The Company to advance to the Government :

1. A sum of 4,000,000, in equal annual installments spread over the next four years (1910 - 1913); and
2. A proportion of the profits of the undertaking during the years from 1921 to 1968, namely: (4 per cent. from 1921 to 1930.) , (6 per cent. from 1931 to 1940.) ,(8. per cent. from 1941 to 1950.) , (10 per cent. from 1051 to 1960.) ,(12 per cent. from 1961 to 1968.) .

The sums so paid over are to be accumulated at 3.5 percent . compound interest, and treated as an advance by the Company to be repaid out of the future profits of the concern by an annuity spread over the forty years of the extended concession.

During this period the Company and the Government will Each the entitled to a half share in the profits; but the annuity to the Company will be secured by a cumulative first charge en the aggregate

profits (before division) to the extent of 2.00060001. a year. The Government will then take a cumulative second charge for its half share.

It is, of course, impossible to form any useful estimate of the total sum which will be duly by the Egyptian Government to the Company in 1968, because it must depend on the profits realised by the Canal during the next sixty years. On the assumption, however, that the dividend remains stationary, the total amount of the advances accumulated at 3.5 per cent. will be about 50,000,0001., and the annuity required to repay this sum in forty years would be about 2,310,0001.

In order, therefore, that the Company may secure anything beyond the bare repayment of its advances, the profits must exceed 4.620,0001. They are at present about 2,800,0001. If they increased progressively during the next sixty years, the Company's advances, and the annuity to repay them, would also increase. The course of events most

favourable to the Company would be that the profits should decrease or remain stationary down to 1968 and should then expand.

If, however, they expanded from 1921 to 1968 and then began to fall off, the Company would be involved in a heavy loss. It will be observed that the sole inducement to the Company to enter into this arrangement is the prospect of largely increased profits during the period of the extended concession . But even assuming a continuous increase in the annual profits for the whole period from the present time until 2008 of 1 per cen. per annum, and also assuming that no new capital expenditure is incurred - and these assumptions are really mutually exclusive - the Company would not obtain a penny beyond the bare annuity necessary to repay the actual advances, until 1987.

As regards the rate of interest allowed (3.5 percent) it is to be observed that the security is not that of the Egyptian Government, but merely that of

the net profits of the Canal from 1968 to 2008. If there are no profits, the Government is not responsible.

Even in the case of an ordinarily secure undertaking few investors would care to look up their money in a speculation which could only be realised in from 60 to 100 years' time, unless the return was likely to be more than 3.5 percent. There is still less inducement to do so in such an undertaking as the Suez Canal, the profits of which are peculiarly liable to be affected by physical, economic, and political changes. In sixty years' time there may be no canal at all; or ships may have ceased to use it; or ships themselves may have become obsolete and be replaced by cargo-carrying aeroplanes.

It must also be borne in mind that as the dues are more likely to be diminished than increased no considerable growth of net revenue can be expected without further capital outlay for the purpose of enlarging the Canal and other necessary works. The

interest upon and sinking fund for such additional capital would have priority over the charge for repayment of the proposed advances.

If the shareholders in the Canal wish to look so far into the future as the closing years of this century, they had better roll up a Sinking Fund for themselves in sound 3.5 per cent securities instead of investing their surplus profits in a loan to the Egyptian Government, on a rather speculative security, and with rather a remote chance of recovering anything beyond their actual advances.

The present value of the Suez Canal capital is about 67,500,000l., and the annuity necessary to replace this sum in fifty-nine years would, at 3.5 per cent., be 357,000l. In the case of the shares held by the British Government, the operation would involve setting aside about 155,000l per annum out of our present annual dividend of 1,058,000l.

I do not know what considerations of policy (either towards the Egyptian Government or the Canal Company) may demand; but as a purely financial transaction the proposal seems to me to have nothing to commend it; and I think the British directors should be instructed to oppose it.

F. O., No. 26. Memorandum by Mr. Anstruther Suez Canal Negotiations , August 14, 1909.

As a complement to my note of the 2nd March last, I have to report that the official directors of the Suez Canal Company were asked to attend at the office in Paris on the 2nd instant in order to be made aware of the state of the negotiations between the Canal Company and the Government of Egypt . The situation arising out of the more recent correspondence between M. Bonnet, general manager of the Company, and M. Harvey, representing the Egyptian Government, is this.

The principles of articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the provisional agreement of February remain, namely :

1. The prolongation of the concession from 1968 to 2008.

2. The equal division of the net profits of the undertaking between the Canal Company and the Egyptian Government, during the period of the extended concession, subject to conditions to be laid down in substitution for article 5 of the provisional agreement.

3. The advance by the Canal Company of a capital sum by way of loan to the Egyptian Government, in four equal instalments each at a year's interval. (This sum is in certain events to be raised from £ E. 3,200,000 - about 83,000,000 fr. - to a sum of 100,000,000 fr.).

4. The participation by the Egyptian Government in the net profits of the undertaking, dating from the period of the new convention, and based upon a progressive scale of percentage. rising from 2 per cent. to 12 per cent. at intervals of ten years. (In the event above indicated (3) the suppression of the first

stage of this scale would be the compensation for the increase of the principal of the loan).

The most important modification brought to our notice was the suppression of article 5 of the provisional agreement, and the substitution for it of a guarantee by the Egyptian Government of the charge for the annuity of the loan, before taking any share in the profits of the canal. This annuity is to be of the minimum of 50,000,000 frs., representing the value, capitalised at 3.5 per cent C.I., and repayable during the extended period, of the sums advanced by the Canal Company to the Egyptian Government.

The annuity is to become a «cumulative first charge» on the net revenues of the canal in favour of the shareholders of the Canal Company. and conversely the moiety of the net profits to which the Egyptian Government becomes entitled under the convention is to be a cumulative second charge» on the net revenues of the undertaking during the currency of the extended period. (The formula by

which effect is to given to this arrangement is not yet drafted. - H.T.A.).

For several reasons, the parties to the negotiations have thought it better to withdraw the question of the détaxes in the tariff of the canal from the purview of this convention. At the same time, the managers of the Suez Canal do not in the least degree withdraw from the " position that they took up at the commencement of the pourparlers

In the letter of His Majest's Treasury of the 17th March the proposed systematic reduction of the rates was urged as one reason for which His Majesty's Government should be advised to without consent to the draft agreement entered into by the Government of Egypt.

The rate of the tariff does not directly concern the finances of the Government of Egypt, and it would appear to be more politic not to utilise this question as 3 makeweight in securing the consent of His Majesty's Government to the new convention.

Besides this, the Canal Company is legally advised that the Société Civile - a syndicate that has become the assignee of the proportion of the profits of the canal originally allotted to the Khedive - has no title to become a party to the proposed convention, and therefore it would resent any bargain bearing upon the rate of the charges which would appear f' prejudice or to compromise in advance its share in the profits of the company.

The omission from the formal agreement of the undertaking to reduce the dues as soon as the profits permit need not retard the avowed policy of the council in this respect.

H. T. Anstruther .

Little Coullage Street, Westminster, August 14,
1909.

Secondly

British and the Egyptian Revolution of 1919

**F. O. 371/3204 , From Sir. Wingate(Cairo) To Foreign
Office in London , November 17, 1918 .**

I have received visit from three Egyptians , Saad pasha Zaglul , Abdel Aziz Bey Fahmy and Ali Pasha Sharawi , all of whom will be known to you as politicians of complete autonomy for Egypt which would leave to great Britain only a right of supervision in the matter of public debt and facilities for our ships traversing Suze Canel .

They disowned methods of Mustafa Kamil and Mohamed Faried though agreeing with their principles they profess gratitude and friendship with us and stated their desire to go to London in order to put forward their demands . Directly afterward Rushdi Pasha came to suggest that himself and Adly Pasha should visit London in immediate future to discuss Egyptian affairs Sultan of Egypt he stated having already approved of this plan .

Rushdi informed me at the same time that he was aware of scheme of nationalist leaders and that in his opinion it would be good thing for them to be allowed a hearing in London , as in the event of their request being refused charge of inadequate representation of Egyptian questions could not then be brought against responsible Egyptian Ministers as might be the case of only latter went to London .

I am aware that the three nationalist leaders visited Sultan of Egypt before approaching me and there is little doubt that neither Sultan of Egypt nor Ministers feel strong enough to oppose nationalist demands however unacceptable they may appear to be .it the portable new movement will soon take a more pronounced form and meetings to discuss question are I hear contemplated by prominent Egyptians . I should be glad to have any instructions his Majesty's Government Consider desirable to give me .

Should two Ministers be permitted to proceed to London . I would propose to send Sir William Brunyate and Sir M. Cheetham at the same time- former would be specially valuable in connection with capitulations question and latter is fully conversant with all current Egyptian matters .

**F. O. 371/3204 , Telegram from Earl Curzon to Mr.
Balfour . March 13 , 1919 .**

Sir Mr. Cheetham's Telegram No. 403 of 17 March discloses a more serious situation in Egypt than any previous reports had led as to expect . I understand General Allenby arrives in Paris today . I am sure that you will agree that his early return to Egypt is advisable , and I trust therefore that you can arrange that , his business in Paris should be expedited , and that he should be able to leave for Egypt by the end of the week . We are consulting Sir Wingate in regard to the situation , and are also consulting with the military authorities as to any further military action that may become necessary .

**F. O. 407/184 , From Sir M. Cheetham To Earl Curzon ,
Cairo , March 15, 1919.**

Mischievous attempts on communications are proceeding large crowds have assembled at Kaliub and Wasta , holding up trains , destroying permanent way , and cutting telegraph wires .

All communications with Upper Egypt are interrupted for present . troops have left for Kaliub and are being sent to Wasta up to date there are no reports of attacks on foreigners beyond rumor that English railway employe was killed at Wasta . Men in railway repair shops in Cairo stuck work this morning , a minority yielding to threats . this strike is not of great importance if temporary , but if continued will be serious .

The refusal of the native bar to appear before native courts appears now to have become general . A military proclamation is to be issued suspending legal provisions requiring prisoners to be assisted by counsel in criminal cases and empowering courts to

appoint members of parquet to defend . proclamation will also provisionally suspend exclusive right of Bar to appear for parties in civil suits . proclamation will only apply to native course .

Above facts point to a grave situation . I have seen General Officer commanding in Egypt , who agrees that a large number of troops will be necessary to re – establish and maintain communications and to guarantee good supplies in Cairo .

**F. O. 407/184 , From Earl Curzon To Sir M. Cheetham ,
Foreign Office , March 21 , 1919.**

General Allenby is now on his way to Egypt , you should inform the Sultan at once that , in view of the grave situation in Egypt and the absence of his Majesty's High commissioner from that country , the King has been graciously pleased to appoint general Allenby to be his Majesty's special High commissioner for Egypt and the Soudan .

he is directed to exercise supreme authority in all matters military and civil , to take all such n

measures as he considers necessary and expedient to restore law and order in those countries , and to order and administer in all matters as may be required by the necessity of maintaining the King's protectorate over Egypt on a secure and equable basis . You should also arrang for the publication of the appointment in these terms .

**F. O. 407/184 , From Sir M. Cheetham To Earl Curzon ,
Cairo , March 22, 1919.**

I received your telegram No.309 of 7th March during the night , and on 8 march I requested Major General Watson , General Officer Commanding force in Egypt to arrest with as little delay as possible for deportation and interment in Malta the following leaders of the Nationalist agitation : Saad Zaghlul Pasha , Ismail Sidky Pasha , Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha and Hamad El- Bassal Pasha . These arrests were carried out without incident during the afternoon , and the prisoners passed the night in Kasr – el- Nil Barracks .They were taken in closed moter

cars to the 11 O'clock train for Port Said next morning , the 9th March, and embarked on the " Caledonia " which sailed that evening .The political crisis had now lasted for nearly four months . it had inevitably had an unsettling effect on the mind of the educated Cairo population and created a general feeling of uneasiness . when definite action was at last taken , it was only to be expected that some from of unfriendly manifestations would take place .

these , as was natural took , the form of demonstrations by the students with whom Saad Zaghlul Was popular on Sunday morning the students of the higher colleges law, agriculture, engineering, and commerce, made noisy demonstration, entered the medical school, and forced the students to join them . I should report that during this incident Dr. Keatinge, Director of the school, of Medicine and of Kasr el – Aini Hospital, was knocked down, but received no injury . the police dispersed this demonstration with difficulty and made 310 arrests .

The nature of events of the 9th March showed that it might be necessary to call in military assistance for the police . the General officer commanding , therefore , made arrangements for troops to be available early in the morning of the 10th .

The students were joined by the town roughs , and a considerable amount of rioting , chiefly confined to breaking glass and uprooting trees in public gardens took place . the trams were smashed by the mob in the course of the afternoon . the military were compelled to fire , and slight loss of life occurred Rowdyism Died down in the evening and the night was quiet .

**F. O. 407/184, From Sir M. Cheetham (Cairo) To
Foreign Office in London , March 25, 1919.**

The Bedouins of Western Behera remained dangerous but their attacks were bled at bay until the arrival of military assistance . their number , however was reported to be increasing especially in the

neighborhood of Kom Hamada , Delingat , Hosh Issa , and Abo Matamir .

Further disorder occurred at Damietta ,south of Cairo , but for a disturbance at Giza , suppressed by the police , the country appears to have been quiet as far as Beni- Suef . At Minia there was a peaceful demonstration , but at other places in that province communications were further destroyed , stores burnt , and gran collected for the army seized more damage was done at Assouan .

On the 20th , the situation again improved , and with the exception of a renewed outbreak of small dimensions in Qaliubia , and continued pillage in northern Gharbia , little disturbance appears to have occurred .

On the 21th , a serious attack was made on Kafr el-Shekh by a mob estimated at of 200 rifles and 6000rounds of ammunition belonging to the police and Ghafirs . A demonstration was held at Port Said , which had hitherto been peaceful . the demonstrators

, having been prevented by British troops , who inflicted some casualties , from passing from the Arab to the European quarter , forced their way into the police station of the former quarter and caused some damage , but dispersed under the fire of the police. Renewed gatherings of Bedouins were reported from the Fayoum and some bands were apparently moving north from the Fayoum and Beni Suef . Alexandria was perfectly quiet from the 18th onwards and no danger was reported from the Western desert .

**F. O. 407/184, Allenby'S Declaration to Egypt, 28
February 1922**

Whereas His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognise Egypt as an independent sovereign State; and Whereas the relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire;

The following principles are hereby declared: -

1 - The British Protectorate Over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State. 2- So soon as the Government of his Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on the 2nd November, 1914 shall be withdrawn. 3- The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt : -

- (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;
- (b) The defence of against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;
- (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;
- (d) The Soudan .

Pending the conclusion of such agreements, the status quo in all these matters shall remain intact.

Third

The French occupation and the bombing of the Syrian cities 1945 .

F. R. ,The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State , Beirut, May 18, 1945.

Following is translation of original French text referred to in my 137, May 18 .:

"The first gesture of the authorities of Free France upon its arrival in the Levant in 1941 was to proclaim the independence of Syria and Lebanon. It is because of this gesture that this independence is now a fact. France congratulates herself that the initiative taken by her has had this happy result. She desires that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments exercise their full authority without any kind of limitation or obstacle.

I "It is in this spirit and without any reservation respecting the independence of Syria and Lebanon that the French Government desires to assure, in so

far as she is concerned, the defense of the essential interests which France retains in Syria and Lebanon.

"These interests are of three kinds: Cultural, economic and strategic.

"The cultural positions of interest to Syria and France may be defined and guaranteed by a university convention.

"The respective economic positions may be defined and guaranteed by various accords in accordance with ordinary international procedure (a convention of establishment, a consular convention, a commercial agreement, etc.).

"As regards the strategic positions, these would consist of bases permitting the guarantee of France's lines of communication and of her overseas possessions.

"Once agreement is reached on these three points, the French Government would be agreeable to affecting the transfer of the special troops to the States under reservation of maintaining the troops

under the High French Command as long as circumstances do not permit the full exercise of a national command." Wadsworth

**F. R. ,Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Acting Secretary of State, Washington , May 31,
1945.**

The Chargé d'Affaires of Syria called on me this afternoon and left with me the appended note which he said was already a little out of date in view of rapid developments in the Levant; the, Charge had wished to deliver the note yesterday afternoon but I gathered that there had been some garbles in the telegram which had to be cleared up.

The Charge pointed out that two- important considerations are set forth in the note: first, that the hostilities in the Levant would have a disastrous effect on this year's crops so that the country would be threatened with famine, and second, that the armed conflict would endanger world security in the strategic region of the Middle East at a time when the

war in Asia is not yet over. The hostilities are affecting the entire Arab world.

I thanked the Charge for the note, which I said would have our careful consideration. I stated that in the meantime I wished to tell him of two steps which had been taken this morning in press conference: one, my statement to the press that we concurred with the intention of the British Government to use its best efforts to prevent further bloodshed in the Lebanon, and second, the release of the text of our note of May 28 to the Provisional French Government on this general subject, a copy of which I handed to the Charge.

I said that we were in constant touch with the French Government and with the Governments of Syria and Lebanon, and that we earnestly hoped for an early termination of the hostilities, which were especially unfortunate as occurring at the very moment that the nations were trying at San Francisco to establish a world organization for the maintenance

of peace and security. I said that this Government was counseling the Provisional French Government and the Governments of Syria and Lebanon to use their best efforts to avoid further bloodshed.

The Charge thanked me for my statement and said that his Government has complete confidence in the Government of the United States, knowing that our interest in the affair is based purely on principle and not on self-seeking. Joseph C. Grew

**F. R. , The Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, Beirut,
May 31, 1945.**

I have just received through Satterthwaite and British military courier a message addressed to President Truman handwritten and signed by President Quwatly this morning reading in original French text as follows: " Syria is the object of widespread destruction. French bombs have been showered pitilessly on peaceful unarmed cities.

"Homs, Hama and Aleppo have been subjected to unparalleled, bombardments. For 3 days Damascus, the city that is historic and holy for the Arab and Moslem world, has been subjected to savage bombardments by planes, artillery and tanks. Fires following the bombardments have broken out everywhere. Entire sections and streets have been ravaged by fire, bombs and destruction. Several thousand persons have been killed and wounded in the streets and under the ruins. Bombardments and machine guns continue exterminating peaceful men, women and children.

"All these killings are supposed to be justified only because we refused to grant special privileges to France incompatible with our sovereignty and independence. Our country is destroyed despite assurances given by Allies recognizing our independence. I cite among these assurances the last letter that the lamented President Roosevelt addressed

to me personally and signed a few hours before his death.

"We are convinced that the sentiments of democracy, justice and peace of the United States will not allow the continuation of the destruction of Damascus and other Syrian cities and the extermination of its peaceful populations in (several words missing) . Do not democratic and human principles require that an end be put to these massacres ? "

Satterthwaite adds that a similar message has been sent to Churchill. Wadsworth

F. R. ,The Soviet Chargé (Novikov) to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, June 1, 1945.

SIR: The Soviet Government has instructed me to transmit to you its following note:

"In accordance with information received, military actions are taking place on the territory of Syria and Lebanon, it being known that the French

troops there have clashed with the Syrians and Lebanese, having shelled with artillery and mine throwers the capital of Syria Damascus. Damascus is being bombed from air. Armed clashes are also taking place in some other towns of Syria and Lebanon. The number of killed and wounded is mounting with every day.

"The situation is being aggravated by the fact that the said three Governments: France, Syria and Lebanon are members of the United Nations participating in the Conference taking place in San Francisco.

"The Soviet Government considers that the events in Syria and Lebanon do not correspond to the spirit of decisions adopted in Dumbarton Oaks 94 and to the aims of the United Nations Conference on the establishment of an organization for the guaranteeing peace and security of the peoples which is taking place in San Francisco. Therefore the Soviet Government considers that urgent measures should

be taken for the cessation of military actions in Syria and Lebanon and settlement of the arisen conflict by peaceful means. This proposal the Soviet Government has brought before the Provisional Government of the French Republic and is also bringing before the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and China, which (are the initiators of the post-war organization for peace and international security."

**F. R. ,Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Acting Secretary of State,Washington , June 1,
1945.**

Participants: Nikolai V. Novikov, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires , Mr. Grew, Acting Secretary of State / Mr. Durbrow, Chief, Eastern European Division

The Soviet Charge called and left the attached note from the Soviet, Government outlining its position with regard to the Syrian- Lebanese crisis . I expressed to Mr. Novikov my gratification that his Government appeared to be in agreement with the

attitude we have taken in regard to this question. He concurred and brought to my attention, as his personal opinion, the implication contained in the note that the Soviet Government perhaps desired to initiate consultations with the Big Five in order to settle the basic questions involved now that the cease-firing order had been issued by the French Government. Since the note does not ask directly for consultations, I made no comment on Mr. Novikov's personal opinion as to what the Soviet Government might have in mind.

I assured Mr. Novikov that this message would receive our careful consideration and study, and told him that we had yesterday sent to his Government through Mr. Harriman copies of the notes we had sent on this subject.

Joseph C. Grew

**F. R. ,The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the
Secretary of State ,Paris, June 2, 1945.**

The following is translation of communiqué issued last evening by de Gaulle:

"Since the 8th of May the troops of certain French garrisons in Syria in particular at Aleppo, Hama, Hama and Damascus as well as several military and civil French establishments have been sporadically attacked by armed bands at the head of which were often elements of the gendarmerie and the local police of the Syrian Government," These disorders began the day after General Beynet, General Delegate and Plenipotentiary of France, had proposed to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to begin negotiations on the basis of instructions which he had received from the French Government .

Our troops had to resist and were everywhere in control of the situation except in the Djebel Druse which was held only by a few squadrons recruited locally. Our losses total a dozen killed. At Damascus it 'Was necessary to use artillery .' To ease the situation and to comply with the request of the British Government which expressed its fear that ,the incidents in Syria might spread. to other regions of

the Near East the French Government on May 31 ordered the French forces in the Levant to cease fire.

This order Was carried out in the evening of the same day. In the mind of the French Government it was a question of creating if possible .a more favorable climate for conversations with the American and British Governments and later with the Governments of the various Arab States, conversations dealing with the entire situation in the Near East and regarding which moreover the Soviet Government should at least be informed.

On June 1st at 4: 30 p. m. Holman, Counselor (sic) of the British Embassy, brought to the office of the President of the Government the text of a message addressed by Mr. Churchill to General de Gaulle which had been read at 3 : 45 by Mr. Eden to the House of Commons. This telegram having thus been published in its tone and in its form could only permit a public reply, which the President of the Provisional Government of the Republic felt

preferable not to address to the British Prime Minister. "The orders given to the French troops by the French Government .are to cease fire and to remain in their positions." Caffery

**F. R. , The French Ambassador (Bonnet) to
President Truman , Washington, June 4, 1945**

Mr. President : General de Gaulle, President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, has directed me to forward to you the following message, which was sent from Paris on June 1st, and which reached me only today on account of delay in its transmission:

"I understand the concern which you feel about the situation in Syria and in the whole of the Near East. I am convinced that the worst factor of trouble is divergency between the great Powers concerned, a divergency which looks like rivalry, especially when it becomes public.

"I have learned that you had instructed your representatives in Syria and the Lebanon to

recommend moderation to the Governments at Damas and Beyrouth. I thank you for this and hope that their advice will be heeded. The French Government has ordered its troops in the Levant to cease fire on May 31st and to stay on their positions in order to facilitate as much as possible a solution of appeasement. The situation, in my opinion, now can and must become easier. I wish that no de facto initiative taken on the spot by another side may lead to any serious deterioration."

I beg you to accept [etc.] Henry Bonnet

Part (II)

Documents without Commentary

- 1-** L'Égypte à L'époque de Muhammed Ali
- 2-** Declaration On Security In The Arab and
Israel Zone 25 MAY 1950.
- 3-** Agreement On The Suez Canal Base Britain
And Egypt 19 October 1954.
- 4-** Pact (Baghdad) 24 February 1955 .
- 5-** La Situation Politique En Syrie Depuis Mars
1949 jusqu'à 1951 .
- 6 -** The United Nations and the Suez War 1956 .

1- L'Égypte à L'époque de Muhammed Ali

Mohamed Aly, officier albanais et l'un des plus croyants parmi les musulmans, put à force d'énergie et de patience faire de l'Égypte, dès 1805, quand le peuple égyptien mit. ses destinées entre ses mains, une force inattaquable . Ce grand régénérateur ne trouva en Égypte, lors qu'il monta sur le trône, ni arsenal, ni armée organisée, ni marine, ni finances, ni canaux d'irrigation, ni écoles modernes, ni législation, rien, absolument rien !

Esprit génial, Mohamed Aly, par son énergie, a pu rappeler aux Egyptiens leur gloire passée, leur - puissance anéantie et remplacer l'ignorance, la pauvreté, l'anarchie et la faiblesse par la science, la prospérité, l'ordre et la force.

Ce grand réformateur a pris le pouvoir au moment où les Mamelucks, par leur cruauté, martyrisaient cruellement l'Égypte. Leurs lois étaient les plus tyranniques du monde. La justice entre leurs

mains n'était devenue qu'un instrument de despotisme ou de terreur .

Mohamed Aly ressuscita une Egypte agonisante. Il créa des énergies dans l'engourdissement. Il fit des Égyptiens, si longtemps opprimés, un peuple invincible avec lequel nulle armée n'osa se mesurer.

D'où venait donc cette énergie ? D'où a, tout à coup, surgi cet héroïsme, qui étonnait et stupéfiait le monde entier, et comment ce peuple qui s'était laissé écraser jusqu'alors, devint-il subitement un peuple guerrier, conquérant et dominateur?

Le secret de cette transformation instantanée vint de ce qu'il y a en Egypte des trésors enfouis de courage et d'intelligence:

Ce courage égyptien, Mohamed Aly a su le faire renaître et organiser une armée et une marine puissantes. Par l'armée égyptienne il a pu chasser les Anglais d'Aboukir et de Rosette, le 14 Septembre

1807, conquérir l'Arabie et délivrer les lieux saints de l'Islam dans la guerre des Wahhabites en 1818.

Il a donné la sécurité au Soudan Egyptien en 1823, il a remporté des victoires dans la guerre Turco- Grecque en 1826-29, a vaincu l'armée ottomane en 1832-39 et a obtenu l'autonomie de l'Egypte avec son Soudan, en 1840 (Traite de Londres et les Firmans des 13 Février et 1er Juin 1841).

Avec la mise en œuvre de l'intelligence égyptienne, Mohamed Aly a créé des savants dans toutes les sciences et des artistes dans tous les arts. Les missions qu'il a envoyées en France ont provoqué l'admiration de nos professeurs.

La fortune dont les Egyptiens jouissent aujourd'hui est l'œuvre de Mohamed Aly. C'est lui qui a ressuscité la culture du coton, abandonnée durant des siècles . En quelques années, l'Egypte s'est assimilée toutes les puissances de la civilisation. Grâce

au courage et l'intelligence de ses fils, joints au secours heureux de notre France, la terre des Pharaons a repris le chemin, de son grand passé.

**2- Declaration On Security In The Arab and Israel
Zone 25 MAY 1950**

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab states and of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved to make the following statements:

1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the

light of these principles. In this connection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on August 4, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel.

2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances 'will be requested from any other state in the area to which they permit-arms to - be-supplied in the future.

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three

Governments should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

3- Agreement On The Suez Canal Base Britain And Egypt 19 October 1954

ART. 1. Her Majesty's Forces shall be completely withdrawn from Egyptian territory in accordance with the Schedule set forth in Part A of Annex I within a period of twenty months from the date of signature of the present Agreement.

ART. 2 . The Government of the United Kingdom declare that the Treaty of Alliance signed in London on the 26th of August, 1936, with the Agreed Minute, Exchanged Notes, convention concerning the immunities and privileges enjoyed by the British Forces in Egypt and all other subsidiary agreements, is terminated.

ART.3. Parts of the present Suez Canal Base, which are listed in Appendix A to Annex II, shall be kept in efficient working order and capable of immediate use in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the present Agreement. To this end they shall be organised in accordance with the provisions of Annex II .

ART. 4. In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo on the 13th of April, 1950, or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively . These facilities shall include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes .

ART. 5. In the event of the return of British Forces to the Suez Canal Base area in accordance with the

provisions of Article 4, these forces shall withdraw immediately upon the cessation of the hostilities referred to in that Article .

ART. 6. In the event of a threat of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States or on Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

ART.7. The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford over-flying, landing and servicing facilities for notified flights of aircraft under Royal Air Force control. For the clearance of any flights of such aircraft, the Government of the Republic of Egypt shall accord treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the aircraft of any other foreign country with the exception of States parties to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States. The landing and servicing facilities mentioned above

shall be afforded at Egyptian Airfields in the Suez Canal Base area .

ART. 8. The two Contracting Government recognise that the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically commercially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the canal signed at Constantinople on the 29th of October, 1888 .

Art. 9.(a) The United Kingdom is accorded the right to move any British equipment into or out of the base at its discretion.

(b) there shall be no increase above the level of supplies as agreed upon in part C of annex II without the consent of the Government of the Republic of Egypt.

Art. 10. The present Agreement does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the

rights and obligation, of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

ART. 11 . The Annexes and Appendices to the present Agreement shall be considered as an integral part of it .

ART. 12. (a) The present Agreement shall remain in force for the. period of seven years from the date of its signature.

(b) During the last twelve months of that period the two Contracting Governments shall consult together to decide on such arrangements as may be necessary upon the termination of the Agreement.

(c) Unless both the Contracting Governments agree upon any extension of the Agreement it shall terminate seven years after the date of signature and the Government of the United Kingdom shall take away or dispose of their property then remaining in the Base .

ART. 13. The present Agreement shall have effect as though it had come into force on the date of

signature. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible .

4- Pact (Baghdad)24 February 1955 .

ART. 1. Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defense . Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

ART. 2. In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of the co-operation provided for in article (1) above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

ART. 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute

between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

ART. 4. The High Contracting Parties declare that dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international, obligation, incompatible with the present pact.

ART. 5. This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date on which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact, The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with article (2) . These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.

ART. 6. A Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the pact. The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

ART. 7. This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties.

ART. 8. This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications. In witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have signed the present pact in Arabic, Turkish and English, all three texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.

5 - La Situation Politique En Syrie Depuis Mars 1949 jusqu'à 1951 .

Le principal facteur qui a provoqué le premier coup d'État et lui a fait réserver un si bon accueil par l'opinion publique est le désastre en Palestine . Aux côtés des autres pays arabes, la Syrie a participé à la bataille de Palestine, mais sans préparation et la responsabilité de ce manque de préparation incombe à tous les gouvernements qui se sont succédés durant l'ancien régime .

Il ne fait aucun doute que le parti dirigeant de l'époque avait alors commis de très nombreuses erreurs. Et le parti de l'opposition, le parti populiste, exagérait ces erreurs, pour les montrer plus importantes qu'elle ne l'étaient en réalité . Il ne faut pas comprendre que je cherche à innocenter le régime de l'époque. Mais je veux dire que l'opposition n'a réalisé aucun plan pour réparer ces erreurs. Elle s'en servait pour calomnier les dirigeants .

dans une telle situation, le désastre palestinien a provoqué une vague de découragement et de colère dans le peuple. Il était normal que cette vague gagne l'armée, qui est une fraction du peuple. Et ce fut le premier coup d'État.

Lorsque fut réalisé le premier coup d'État, en mars 1949, Husni Zaim tenta d'instaurer un régime constitutionnel, et afin de réaliser ce projet, plusieurs de mes camarades et moi-même nous sommes en contact avec la plupart des organisations politiques, notamment avec le parti populiste . Ces

organisations et ce parti n'ont pas eu de courage de prendre en main le pouvoir, ce qui a encouragé Husni Zaim à proclamer la dictature militaire que nous ne désirions guère en faisant notre coup d'État.

L'instauration de la dictature militaire par Husni Zaim a contraint l'armée à intervenir une nouvelle fois. Le second coup d'État, en août 1949, était dirigé par le général Hinaoui s'était entouré d'une catégorie de politiciens qui manquaient de foi dans leur pays et qui croyaient à l'impossibilité pour la Syrie d'affronter seule les menaces extérieures, notamment le danger sioniste. Ces politiciens encourageaient le général Hinaoui à voir d'un bon œil la fédération de la Syrie et de l'Irak.

Comme tous les Syriens, comme tous les officiers de notre armée nous ne sommes pas partisans de l'isolationnisme. Nous avons consacré et nous consacrons tous nos efforts pour réaliser les conditions par lesquelles l'unité arabe deviendra une réalité dont nous sentons la nécessité. Mais nous ne

voulons pas pour réaliser cette unité, nous asservir de nouveau à une couronne étrangère et il est bien établi que l'Irak ne jouit pas encore de sa complète indépendance et qu'il est entravé par des traites qui amenuisent sa liberté. Il est bien établi aussi que l'armée irakienne malgré ses possibilités considérables, n'a pu remplir tout son devoir durant les opérations militaires en Palestine.

Les politiciens qui faisaient le siège du général Hinaoui l'ont poussé à recourir à la violence pour réaliser leurs objectifs et nous placer devant le fait accompli. Des mesures nombreuses ont été prises alors pour l'incarcération d'un grand nombre d'officiers supérieurs de l'armée . Mais nous veillions. Et au moment opportun nous avons réagi. Nous écartions Hinaoui pour sauver le régime républicain. Nous avons tout fait pour éviter la violence. Nous avons limité notre action à des mesures militaires similaires en écartant Hinaoui et en arrêtant ses assistants, mais en laissant entièrement

libres de leurs actions les politiciens, afin d'éviter le scandale, et dans l'espoir que notre action et notre bienveillance leur donneraient à réfléchir et les ramèneraient dans la voie juste, pour la sauvegarde de l'indépendance du pays .

Nous avons fait connaître à ces politiciens notre sincère désir d'instaurer une régime constitutionnelle stable, et nous avons collabore avec eux pour l'élaboration de la Constitution. Nous avons collabore avec eux à leur avènement au pouvoir. Mais il nous est apparu par la suite que, malgré toute notre bonne volonté, les politiciens n'avaient pas renoncé à leurs objectifs et qu'ils pensaient toujours réaliser avec le temps ce qu'ils n'avaient pu accomplir jusqu'alors, et cela en tuant la confiance de la nation en elle-même leur arme néfaste fut d'empêcher la stabilité du régime, en créant des crises qui se sont repesées plusieurs mois durant, et même dans la plus terrible des situations, au mois de mars dernier, lorsque l'armée faisait face à l'agression sioniste.

Ils ont choisi ce moment Pour créer une crise ministérielle qui a laissé le pays sans gouvernement pennt plus de vingt-cinq jours, La dernière crise ministérielle fut l'œuvre de ces politiciens, qui veulent ainsi montrer le pays sous un faux jour.

La dernière crise ministérielle a débute par un désaccord entre le Président du Conseil, M. Nazem Hakim, et le ministre des Affaires Etrangères, M. Atassi, au sujet de la politique intérieure. Et ce désaccord s'est développé sur le plan de la politique étrangère à un moment tout à fait inopportun. Les sujets de ce désaccord étaient par exemple le rattachement de la gendarmerie au ministère de l'Intérieur ou la désignation d'un civil à la tête ou ministère de la Défense, comme si l'armée n'était pas l'armée du pays, l'armée du peuple et les populistes soulevaient ces questions contre l'armée, comme s'ils n'étaient pas redevables à l'armée de leur maintien au pouvoir .

Le Président de la République a fait montre de beaucoup de sagesse et de sagacité. Il a déployé bien des efforts pour résoudre la crise ministérielle. Il a chargé plusieurs personnalités de former le gouvernement. Mais les politiciens ont fait échouer tous ses efforts. Et, en fin de compte, sous la pression et la menace, ils l'ont forcé à charger M. Dawalibi de former le Cabinet.

M. Dawalibi a formé en effet le gouvernement, selon les données imposées par le parti populiste, et effaçant l'opinion de l'armée, qui cependant doit être entendue plus que tout autre dans les circonstances présentes ou notre pays est toujours en état de guerre avec l'Israël, malgré l'armistice qui suspend les opérations militaires. Et encore une fois, contraints et forcés par les agissements du parti populiste, nous avons dû mettre un terme à ces agissements d'un parti qui voulait servir ses intérêts partisans et les intérêts personnels de ses membres.

Nous avons procédé à l'arrestation du Président du conseil et d'un certain nombre de ses collaborateurs ainsi que de quelques députés. Nous nous sommes adressés de nouveau au Président de la République pour tenter de trouver une solution et de rétablir la constitutionnalité du régime, à la suite de la démission de M. Dawalibi . Tous les efforts sont demeurés vains, en raison de l'entêtement du parti populiste à maintenir la crise, dans un état aigu. La dernière solution à laquelle le président eut recours était un accord avec les groupes parlementaires pour charger M. Ahmed Khudja de former un cabinet qui procéderait à la dissolution de la chambre.

Le parti populiste n'a pas laissé échapper l'occasion et a dressé des obstacles nombreux. Et le Président de la République a échoué dans ses dernières tentatives pour trouver une solution constitutionnelle . L'action des populistes aggravant la situation, le Président de la République a décidé de résilier ses fonctions, ce qui a forcé le Conseil

Supérieur de la Guerre me confier les charges de Chef de l'Etat, me conférant sa confiance en m'accordant le pouvoir exécutif . J'ai procédé à la dissolution de la Chambre, qui était lion de représenter réellement le peuple syrien, puise de nombreuses organisations n'y sont pas représentés et que son élection est sujette à caution de la part de beaucoup de ses membres. En outre, cette Assemblée a outrepassé sa mission, car désignée comme Assemblée Constituante, elle s'est transformée en Assemblée Législative afin que les populistes conservent leur sièges et continuent de tirer profit de leur influence .

Après la dissolution de la Chambre, j'ai voulu donner la preuve que dans ces conditions j'agis comme colonel de l'armée syrienne qui aspire seulement au service de son pays. J'ai remercié le Conseil Supérieurs de la Guerre de la confiance placée en moi et lui ai remis les charges qu'il m'avait confiées.

Le Conseil a alors conféré au colonel Fawzi Silo les attributions de l'autorité législative et exécutive, en attendant la désignation d'un parlement qui serait issu d'élections justes . Le colonel Silo a chargé les secrétaires généraux des ministères des attributions des ministres, par l'ordre militaire numéro deux .J'ai ferme espoir que sera rétabli dans le plus bref délai, un régime parlementaire don sera issu le nouveau gouvernement. Le colonel Fawzi Silo est l'officier le plus haut en grade de l'armée syrienne. Son passé sans tâche, ses capacités militaires, son expérience, sa culture confirment notre conviction que la cause de notre pays se trouve en des mains sûres . Quant à moi, je retourne à mon ancien poste de Chef de l'Etat-Major général.

Radio Damas, 3/12/1951

6 - The United Nations and the Suez War 1956 .

On 29 October 1956, the United States informed the Security Council by letter that armed

forces of Israel had penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt and requested an immediate meeting to consider "The Palestine question: Steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt". The Council considered the question at four meetings, between 30 October and 1 November, in which the representatives of Egypt and Israel participated .

The representative of the United States opened the morning meeting on 30 October by stating that his Government believed it imperative that the Council should act in the promptest manner to determine that a breach of the peace had occurred, to order that the military action undertaken by Israel should cease immediately and to make clear its view that the Israel armed forces should immediately withdraw behind the established Armistice Lines.

The Secretary-General then reported that, according to the Chief of Staff of the Truce

Supervision Organization (UNTSO), Israel troops had crossed the international frontier and had occupied positions in Sinai in violation of the General Armistice Agreement and the Council's cease-fire order of 11 August 1949. The Chief of Staff had that morning requested the withdrawal of the troops and also a ceasefire, in which the concurrence of Egypt had been asked .

At the same meeting, the representative of Egypt stated that Israel had committed the most serious act of armed aggression since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreements between the Arab countries and Israel. He emphasized that the armed and unprovoked attack on Egypt, after Israel had ordered general mobilization, constituted an act of war and demonstrated beyond any doubt the aggressive and expansionist aims of Israel's policy.

The representative of Israel then stated that Fedayeen units from Egypt had created the latest breach of the peace by invading the territory of Israel

from Egypt. On the evening of 29 October, Israel had taken security measures to eliminate the Egyptian Fedayeen bases in the Sinai peninsula .

In a later intervention, he asserted that in recent months it had become apparent that the Arab Governments, and especially Egypt, had come to regard the Fedayeen weapon, initially used in 1955, as an instrument not for mere harassment but for Israel's destruction. He rejected charges of aggression and asserted the sovereign right of self-defence.

The representative of the United Kingdom opened the 749th meeting on the afternoon of 30 October with a statement based upon remarks made that morning before the House of Commons by the British Prime Minister. Describing the tension that for some time past had been increasing on the frontiers of Israel, and pointing out that, unless hostilities could quickly be stopped, free passage through the Suez Canal would be jeopardized, he informed the Council that the United Kingdom and

French Governments had that afternoon addressed urgent communications to Egypt and Israel, calling upon both sides to stop all warlike action by land, sea and air forthwith and to withdraw their military forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal.

They had asked the Egyptian Government to agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily into key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. If, on the expiration of twelve hours, either or both Governments had not undertaken to comply with these requirements, British and French forces would intervene in whatever strength might be necessary to secure compliance.

Since the time limit was to expire the next morning, 31 October, the representative of Egypt requested an evening meeting of the Council to consider the act of aggression involved in the Anglo-French threat of force and the imminent danger of occupation of Egyptian territory.

efore the Council at the time was a draft resolution submitted by the United States whereby the Council would: (1) call for an immediate Israel withdrawal behind the established Armistice Lines; (2) call upon all Members to refrain from the use of force or threat of force in the area, to assist the United Nations in ensuring the integrity of the Armistice Agreements and to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance to Israel so long as it had not complied with the resolution; and (3) request the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on compliance with the resolution and to make recommendations for the maintenance of international peace and security in the area.

The United States representative urged adoption of this draft resolution without delay to meet the situation created by the present military penetration of Egypt. He accepted a change suggested by several members to add another paragraph at the beginning

of the text, whereby the Council would call upon "Israel and Egypt immediately to cease fire".

The majority of speakers welcomed the initiative of the United States representative and considered that it was the Council's urgent task to secure a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Israel forces from Egyptian territory.

The representative of France, however, opposed the draft resolution, and said that the Council could not condemn Israel in view of the openly affirmed Egyptian policy of annihilation of Israel, the expansion of Egyptian imperialism, open intervention in French internal affairs, direct material assistance to rebellious citizens and Egypt's illegal seizure of an essential international waterway. The French-British communications to Egypt and Israel were designed, he said, to secure effective separation of the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal.

The United States draft resolution, as amended, received 7 votes in favour, 2 against, with 2 abstentions, but was not adopted because of the negative votes cast by two permanent members of the Council, France and the United Kingdom.

The USSR representative then introduced a draft resolution by which the Council would call upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established Armistice Lines. He accepted an amendment, proposed by China, adding a paragraph calling upon Israel and Egypt immediately to cease fire.

At the 750 th meeting in the evening of 30 October, the USSR draft resolution, as amended, received 7 votes in favour, 2 against, with 2 abstentions, but was not adopted, owing to negative votes cast by two permanent members, France and the United Kingdom.

The Council, at that meeting, also had on its agenda a letter dated 30 October from the representative of Egypt about the communication of that date presented to Egypt by France and the United Kingdom. He declared that its authors seemed to have lost sight of the fact that the Suez Canal area and the Canal itself were an integral part of Egypt. Egypt had been the victim of Israel aggression, its territory had been invaded, and it had been obliged to use force. For the French and United Kingdom Governments to try unilaterally to settle a question already brought before the Security Council was an entirely unjustifiable violation of the Charter. Until the Council took the necessary measures, Egypt had no choice but to defend itself and to protect its rights against aggression .

Before the meeting adjourned the representative of Yugoslavia suggested the possibility of calling an emergency session of the General Assembly under the terms of Assembly resolution 377 on "Uniting for

Peace", since the use of the veto had rendered the Council powerless in the face of a situation deteriorating by the minute .

When the Council resumed discussion the next afternoon, 31 October, reports had been received that French and British aircraft had begun air attacks against military targets in Egypt.

The Suez Canal subsequently was blocked when Egypt sank ships in the Canal, closing it to navigation. The Secretary-General was the first speaker at the meeting. Stating that he would himself have called for a meeting of the Council had not the initiative already been taken, he declared that, as a servant of the Organization, he had the duty to maintain his usefulness by avoiding public stands on conflicts between Member nations unless and until such an action could help to resolve the conflict.

However, the discretion and impartiality imposed on the Secretary-General by the character of

his immediate task could not degenerate into a policy of expediency. He had also to be a servant of the principles of the Charter, and its aims must ultimately determine what for him was right and wrong. For that he must stand .

He stated further that a Secretary-General could not serve on any other assumption than that - within the necessary limits of human frailty and honest differences of opinion- all Member nations honored their pledge to observe all Articles of the Charter. He should also be able to assume that those organs which were charged with the task of upholding the Charter would be in a position to fulfill their task. He concluded that, were the Members to consider that another view of the duties of the Secretary General than the one stated would better serve the interests of the Organization, it was their obvious right to act accordingly .

The representatives of France and the United Kingdom stated that the Egyptian Government

had rejected the Franco-British communication of 30 October. As a consequence, the United Kingdom and French Governments had intervened. The action being taken was strictly limited to military targets, primarily airfields .

The intervention had as its overriding purposes the safeguarding of the Suez Canal and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Middle East. The intervention was a temporary measure. It was not aimed at the sovereignty of Egypt. The representative of the United Kingdom emphasized that he did not condone any Israel action aimed at the occupation of positions in Egyptian territory. In his view, Israel should withdraw its forces as soon as that could be satisfactorily arranged .

Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution whereby the Security Council, taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at its 749th and 750th meetings had prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the

maintenance of international peace and security, would call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in the Assembly's "Uniting for Peace" resolution 377, in order to make appropriate recommendations .

The representatives of France and the United Kingdom both held that the draft resolution was out of order. The latter argued that no resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter on the substance of the item then before the Council had been submitted and voted upon, and therefore it could not be determined that the Council had failed to take a decision owing to the lack of unanimity of the permanent members, thus establishing the precondition of invoking the procedure of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution .

He also declared that neither of the two resolutions voted upon at the previous meetings could be invoked to support the Yugoslav proposal. After rejecting, by 6 votes to 4, with 1 abstention, the

proposal of the United Kingdom that the draft resolution should be ruled out of order, the Council voted upon the Yugoslav draft resolution and adopted it by 7 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions .

ثالثا

التعليق على الوثائق (وثائق الجزء الأول)

- أولا : الخارجية البريطانية ومشروع مد امتياز قناة السويس ١٩٠٩ م .
- ثانيا : الحكومة البريطانية والثورة المصرية عام ١٩١٩ م .
- ثالثا : الاحتلال الفرنسي وضرب المدن السورية ١٩٤٥ م .

أولاً : الخارجية البريطانية ومشروع مد امتياز قناة السويس ١٩٠٩ م .

أيدت وزارة الخارجية البريطانية مشروع مد امتياز قناة السويس ، وكان جورست المندوب السامى البريطانى في مصر (١٩٠٧ - ١٩١١ م) قد ألقى بثقله وراءه ، وأوضحت البرقيات والرسائل المتبادلة بينه وبين وزارة الخارجية البريطانية تأييدها للمشروع ، كذلك أوضح دارنبرج في إحدى اجتماعاته بمجلسش إدارة الشركة أن وزارة الخارجية البريطانية راغبة في المشروع ، بينما عارضته وزارة الخزانة البريطانية بشدة (١) .

وقد كان جورست المخطط والمحرك للمشروع ، بل أن أدوارد جراى - وزير الخارجية - استفسر من جورست في برقية له بتاريخ ٢٨ يونيو ١٩٠٩ عن طريقة الرد على الاستفسارات التى انهالت على وزارة الخارجية حول حقيقة المفاوضات الجارية بين الحكومة المصرية والشركة حول مد الامتياز . فاقترح جورست أن تكون صيغة الرد كالاتى : " المفاوضات بين الحكومة المصرية وشركة قناة السويس متوقفة بالنسبة لمسألة مد الامتياز " (٢) . وفعلاً ردت الخارجية البريطانية على استفسار غرفة التجارة البريطانية بذلك (٣) .

ومع ذلك لم يستمر هذا التوقف طويلاً ، فقد قام دارنبرج برحلة إلى مصر ، وأجرى مفاوضاته المبدئية حول مد امتياز الشركة ، وبالتالي جرت بينه وبين وزارة الخارجية البريطانية مراسلات حول البنود والمبادئ العامة التى تهم الطرفين حول مشروع هذه الاتفاقية .

وقد خضعت بنود مشروع اتفاقية مد الامتياز إلى دراسة وتحليل دقيق من وزارة الخارجية البريطانية وجورست من جهة وشركة قناة السويس من جهة أخرى ، فقد أرسل دارنبرج إلى إدوارد جراى رسالة شخصية يوضح فيها

(1) F . O . 371 /13, No . 29 . sept 2,1990

(2) Ibid , 371/ 43, No . 21 . Gorest to Grey . Cairo , June 29 , 1909 .

(3) Ibid , No . 22, Chamber of commerce . July 7 , 1909 .

أنه سوف يعرض على الجمعية العمومية للمساهمين بالشركة في اجتماعها يوم ٢ نوفمبر ١٩٠٩ الاقتراح الآتي : أولاً: تخفيض رسوم العبور في قناة السويس ٢/١ فرنك اعتباراً من أول يناير ١٩١١ . ثانياً: إن الرسوم سوف تخفض بمعدل لا يقل عن ٢/١ فرنك للطن ليصل الرسم إلى ٦ فرنكات عندما تصل إجمالي الحمولة الصافية المارة في قناة السويس ١٩ مليون طن . ثالثاً: تصل الرسوم إلى ٥ فرنكات في السنة التالية للحمولة الصافية للقناة بعد أن تبلغ ٢٢ . ٦ مليون طن كحمولة صافية . وطلب دارنبرج عدم نشر أى من المعلومات السابقة قبل قيام الشركة بإخطار المساهمين بهذا الموضوع (١) . وعبر إدوارد جرای عن شكره لدارنبرج لعزمه إجراء تخفيض تدريجي لرسوم المرور في قناة السويس (٢) .

وفي ٤ نوفمبر ١٩٠٩ أبرق إدوارد جرای لجورست موضحاً له أن البند الرابع في الاتفاقية المقترحة لمد الامتياز قد أزال كل الإغراءات أمام مجلس إدارة الشركة لزيادة الأرباح التي قدر لها التراوح ما بين ٥٠ و ١٠٠ مليون فرنك مثلما كان مركزها في السنوات السابقة ، وأن أى مزايا ستستقطع من الشركة سوف تكون لصالح مصر . وطلب إدوارد جرای في برقيته لجورست إعطاء هذه المسألة عنايته واهتمامه ، ورأى جرای أن المزايا الخاصة بمصر يمكن ضمانها ببعض الإجراءات كما يمكن بقاء زيادة الأرباح للشركة (٣) .

ورد جورست على اعتراض إدوارد جرای بالنسبة للمادة (٢) من مشروع اتفاقية مد الامتياز ، فأوضح " أنه والمستشار المالي " هارفي " قد درسا بعناية هذه النقطة ، ولم يكن هناك نص في المشروع الأصلي وتم قبولها

(1) Ibid , No . 54, Prince D'Arenberg to Grey , Paris . 6 November 1909

(2) Ibid , No . 65, Grey to prince D'Arenberg, November 15, 1909 .

(3) Ibid , 371 / 45 No . 48, Gery to Gorest , November 4 , 1909 .

على مضمض لأن المديرين الانجليز أيدوها بشدة ، ومن أجل تقليل مخاطر تحويل الفوائد بين الشركة والحكومة المصرية وافقت الشركة على وجود بعض النصوص الاحتياطية ، أكد على أن احتمال حدوثها غير متوقع حيث يتم عمل ضمان ، وسوف ترفض الجمعية العمومية قبول المشروع ما لم يتم وجود ترتيبات أو نصوص أخرى . وعلى هذا قرر مجلس النظار - بالاتفاق مع المستشار المالي - إخطار الشركة أنه ما لم يتم إسقاط النص الخاص بضرورة ضمان مستوى أدنى لإيرادات الشركة من خلال الفترة التي سيبدأ فيها مد عقد الامتياز ، فإنهم لن يستطيعوا التوصية على الاتفاقية أمام الجمعية العمومية" . واستطرد جورست في رسالته قائلاً : " أن الموضوع الآن تحت البحث بتقديم تعويض للشركة مقابل إسقاط هذا النص ، وربما يكون البديل هو زيادة عدد سنوات الامتياز لبضع سنوات ، بينما سيكون الأثر المالي على مصر بالنسبة لهذا النص أقل قبولاً من الاقتراح الخاص بالضمان ، وتكون وحدة المصالح لطرفي الاتفاقية قد تم ضمانها" (١) .

ومن جانبه أوضح إدوارد جرای في برقية شخصية لجورست أنه قد أعطى تعليمات للأعضاء الانجليز في مجلس إدارة شركة قناة السويس - على كره منه - بالموافقة على مشروع الاتفاقية الخاصة بمد امتياز شركة قناة السويس شريطة أن تتلقى الحكومة البريطانية " تأكيدات مرضية " على : أن فئات رسوم المرور سوف يتم تخفيضها . ورغبة الحكومة البريطانية في استعادة بعض النفوذ عن طريق شغل الأماكن التي تخلو بين المديرين البريطانيين غير الرسميين في مجلس الإدارة . وكذلك على عدم رغبة " إدوارد جرای " في استخدام الحكومة المصرية كوسيلة للإبتزاز للحصول على امتيازات للحكومة البريطانية من مجلس إدارة شركة قناة السويس . ومن جهة أخرى

(١) Ibid , 371 / 43 No . 53, Gorest to Grey . Cairo . November 6 , 1909 .

يجب أن يكون واضحاً أن الحكومة المصرية صاغت نصوصاً طيبة لمصر ،
وأنها " أي الحكومة المصرية " ليست مستعدة لقبول أى مشروع نتيجة الضغط
عليها ، ثم أن وزارة الخارجية استبعدت الاعتراضات التي أثارها وزارة الخزانة
، واهتمت فقط بمسألة الحصول على نصوص أفضل - في الاتفاقية - لصالح
السفن والملاحة البريطانية ، وبالنسبة للتمثيل مستقبلاً في مجلس الإدارة (١) .

وقد أبدت وزارة الخارجية البريطانية اهتمامها بتزايد التمثيل البريطاني
في مجلس إدارة الشركة ، فقد بعث إدوارد جراى برسالة إلى رئيس مجلس إدارة
شركة قناة السويس في ٤ نوفمبر ١٩٠٩ يوضح فيها اهتمامه بمسألة تمثيل
ملاك السفن في إدارة الشركة ، وهو موضوع سبق للشركة أن اقرته في لجنة
لندن (٢) ، وقد نفذ ذلك بتعيين لورد راثمور Lord Rathmore في عام
١٨٩٦ . وقد أقر رؤساء مجلس إدارة شركة قناة السويس السابقون ذلك . إلا
أنه منذ ذلك التاريخ لم ينفذ هذا الإجراء ، ورأى جراى أنه من المستحب إعادة
هذا النظام ، وأبدى امتنانه في حالة تأكيد دارنبرج الموافقة على هذا المبدأ ،
بشغل أى منصب يخلو في " لجنة لندن " لأن الهدف من ذلك هو استمرار
الاتصالات بين الحكومة البريطانية ومجلس إدارة الشركة ضماناً لتمثيل
المصالح المختلفة للشركات الملاحية البريطانية (٣) .

ثم أن الخارجية البريطانية اهتمت بمسألة عرض الاتفاقية على مجلس
شورى القوانين المصرى فقد استفسرت وزارة الخارجية من جورست عما إذا
كانت اتفاقية مد الامتياز ستعرض على مجلس شورى القوانين المصرى
لدراستها أم لا ، وعما إذا كانت الجمعية العمومية ستحل محل مجلس الشورى

(١) Ibid , No . 56, Grey to Gorest , November 8 , 1909 .

(٢) اتفاقية ٣٠ نوفمبر ١٨٨٣ .

(٣) Ibid , No . 5, Grey to prince d'Arenberg . November 4 , 1909 .

في نظر هذا المشروع^(١) . ومن جانبه أراد إدوارد جراى تكبيل مصر بنص في الاتفاقية يقر دفع غرامة مالية عند تحللها من الاتفاقية ، حيث اقترح جراى أن تتضمن مسودة الاتفاقية نصا يسمح للحكومة المصرية أو يحفظ لها حق التحلل من مد الامتياز في أى وقت ، في مقابل أن تدفع الحكومة المصرية للشركة مبلغاً من رأس المال تفدر على أساس متوسط الأرباح التى حققت على سبيل المثال خلال عشر سنوات مضت ، ويمكن أن يلجأ الطرفان إلى المحاكم للتحكيم في حالة الاختلاف بينهما^(٢) . وتشاور جورست مع بول هارفى حول هذا الموضوع فاعترض على هذه الفكرة وأيده جورست على أساس أن نصاً كهذا في الاتفاقية سيكون قاتلاً لأى فرصة للاتفاق وأن الشركة لن تقبل ذلك ، وأكد جورست أنه يبحث نقاط معينة تضمن المساواة في المزايا بين الشركة والحكومة^(٣) .

على أية حال ، فإن الاهتمام الذى أدته وزارة الخارجية البريطانية تجاه مشروع مد امتياز قناة السويس يوضح بما لا يدع مجالاً للشك مدى أهمية المشروع بالنسبة للبريطانيين ، وهى الأهمية التى تنبع من أهمية قناة السويس كمجرى مائى يربط بين الشرق والغرب ، لذلك كان هذا الاهتمام من جانب الخارجية البريطانية بالمشروع .

ثانياً : الحكومة البريطانية والثورة المصرية عام ١٩١٩ م .

انتهت الحرب العالمية الأولى في ١١ نوفمبر ١٩١٨م بهزيمة ألمانيا والنمسا والدولة العثمانية وانتصار قوات الحلفاء ، ومع نهاية الحرب تبلورت الحركة الوطنية فى مصر حول فكرتين أساسيتين هما : إنهاء الاحتلال

(1) Ibid , No . 47, Gery to Gorest, November 4 , 1909 .

(2) Ibid , No . 57, Grey to Gorest . November 8, 1909 .

(3) Ibid , No . 6, Gorest to Grey . Cairo , November 10 , 1909 .

البريطاني الذي حل بالبلاد المصرية منذ عام ١٨٨٢م ، وإعلان مصر دولة حرة مستقلة ذات سيادة ، لذلك كانت الثورة أمرا ضروريا لنيل هذه المطالب .
وقد تجمعت الأسباب للقيام بالثورة في البلاد ، فقد ساءت الأوضاع الاقتصادية ، وصار مألوفا في الريف أن تصادر ممتلكات الفلاحين من ماشية ومحصول لأجل المساهمة في تكاليف الحرب ، وتم تجنيد مئات الآلاف من الفلاحين بشكل قسري للمشاركة في الحرب ، كما حرصت السلطات العسكرية على إجبار الفلاحين على زراعة المحاصيل التي تتناسب مع متطلبات الحرب وعلى القيام ببيع المحاصيل بأسعار تقل كثيرا عن الأسعار السائدة . وفي الوقت نفسه شهدت هذه الفترة ارتفاعا للأسعار بشكل ملحوظ ، بما فيها أسعار السلع الأساسية ، وارتبط ذلك أيضا بنقص حاد في السلع الأساسية ، وقد أدى ذلك إلى تدهور الأوضاع المعيشية لكل من سكان الريف والمدن ، كما استاء كبار الملاك بسبب تدخل السلطات في نوع المحصول على حساب زراعة القطن ولصالح السلع الغذائية وأهمها القمح . ومن جانب آخر ، كان إعلان الحماية وما تبعه من قرارات قد أدى إلى تبرم المصريين من الاحتلال وقد ساهمت حركة الصحافة والأدب في تنبيه الرأي العام المصري تجاه ما تقوم به سلطة الاحتلال في البلاد ، وإلى ضرورة إنهاء الحماية البريطانية على مصر وطلب الاستقلال .

وجاء السبب المباشر للثورة عندما أتفق كل من حسين رشدي رئيس الوزراء وسعد زغلول وكيل الجمعية التشريعية وعبد العزيز فهمي وعلي شعرواي على أن يقوم الثلاثة الأخيرين بزيارة المندوب السامي البريطاني " ريجنالد ونجت " للحديث معه في أمر السفر للمشاركة في مؤتمر الصلح بباريس لعرض القضية المصرية والمطالبة بالاستقلال ، حيث كانوا قد جمعوا توكيلات من الشعب المصري للحديث باسمه في هذا المطلب ، وبالفعل تم ذلك

في ١٣ نوفمبر ١٩١٨م ، وإزاء تمسك الوفد بهذا المطلب رفض " ونجت " قبول سفر الوفد المصري إلى مؤتمر الصلح ، بينما استمرت اجتماعات أعضاء الوفد مطالبين بإلغاء الحماية والاستقلال ، وإزاء تعاطف قطاعات شعبية واسعة مع هذا التحرك ، قامت السلطات البريطانية بالقبض على سعد زعلول وثلاثة من أعضاء الوفد هم محمد محمود وحمد الباسل وإسماعيل صدقي ، ورحلتهم إلى مالطة في الثامن من مارس عام ١٩١٩م ، وكان ذلك إيذانا بقيام الثورة التي اجتاحت جميع أنحاء البلاد .

ففي اليوم التالي لاعتقالهم ، أشعل طلبة الجامعة في القاهرة شرارة التظاهرات وفي غضون يومين امتد نطاق الاحتجاجات ليشمل جميع الطلبة بما فيهم طلبة الأزهر ، وبعد أيام قليلة كانت الثورة قد اندلعت في جميع الأنحاء من قرى ومدن ، ففي القاهرة قام عمال الترام بإضراب وتم شل حركة الترام ، تلا ذلك إضراب عمال السكك الحديدية ، ولم يكتف هؤلاء بإعلان الإضراب ، بل قاموا بإتلاف محولات حركة القطارات وابتكروا عملية قطع خطوط السكك الحديدية التي أخذها عنهم الفلاحون وأصبحت أهم أسلحة الثورة . وأضرب سائقوا التاكسي وعمال البريد والكهرباء والجمارك ، تلا ذلك إضراب عمال المطابع وعمال الفنارات والورش الحكومية ومصلحة الجمارك بالإسكندرية . ولم تتوقف احتجاجات المدن على التظاهرات وإضرابات العمال ، بل قام السكان في الأحياء الفقيرة بحفر الخنادق لمواجهة القوات البريطانية وقوات الشرطة ، وقامت الجماهير بالاعتداء على بعض المحلات التجارية وممتلكات الأجانب وتدمير مركبات الترام .

وفي الوجه البحري قامت جماعات الفلاحين بقطع خطوط السكك الحديدية في القرى والمدن ، ومهاجمة أقسام البوليس في المدن . ففي منيا القمح أغار الفلاحون من القرى المجاورة على مركز الشرطة وأطلقوا سراح

المعتقلين ، وفي دمنهور قام الأهالي بالتظاهر وضرب رئيس المدينة بالأحذية وكادوا يقتلونه عندما وجه لهم الإهانات ، وفي طنطا بدأت في ١٢ مارس ١٩١٩ وكذلك في بركة السبع وقلين ودسوق وسمنود وزفتي من مراكز محافظة الغربية ، ومن الأمور الجديرة بالفخر والاحترام ، أن زفتي أعلنت استقلالها ، وأنزلت العلم الذي كان مرفوعا على مركز الشرطة ، ورفعت علما آخر وطنيا بدلاً منه وتم تشكيل لجنة وطنية برئاسة يوسف أحمد الجندي لإدارة جمهورية زفتي وقامت تلك الإدارة بتحصيل العوائد ورسوم الأسواق وأخذت تنفق ما حصلته في تحسين أحوال مركز زفتي ، فتم ردم المستنقعات وأصلحت الشوارع كما أصدرت صحيفة . أما في الوجه القبلي فكانت الثورة اشد من الوجه البحري إذ طبعت في الجملة بطابع العنف ، وبلغ من خطورتها أن انقطعت المواصلات تماما بين الوجه البحري والوجه القبلي ، ففي الفيوم هاجم البدو القوات البريطانية وقوات الشرطة ، وفي أسيوط قام الأهالي بالهجوم على قسم البوليس والاستيلاء على السلاح ولم يفلح قصف المدينة بطائرتين في إجبارهم على التراجع ، أما في قرية دير مواس محافظة المنيا فقد هاجم الفلاحون قطارا للجنود الإنجليز ودارت معارك طاحنة بين الجانبين .

وعلى الجانب الآخر ، كان رد فعل القوات البريطانية من أفضع أعمال العنف الذي لاقاه المصريين في التاريخ الحديث ، فمنذ الأيام الأولى كانت القوات البريطانية هي أول من أوقع الشهداء بين صفوف الطلبة أثناء المظاهرات السلمية في بداية الثورة . وعقب انتشار قطع خطوط السكك الحديدية أصدرت السلطات بيانات تهدد بإعدام كل من يساهم في ذلك ، وبحرق القرى المجاورة للخطوط التي يتم قطعها ، وتم تشكيل العديد من المحاكم العسكرية لمحاكمة المشاركين في الثورة ، ولم تتردد قوات الأمن في حصد الأرواح بشكل لم يختلف أحيانا عن المذابح ، كما حدث في الفيوم عندما تم قتل أربعمئة من

البدو في يوم واحد على أيدي القوات البريطانية وقوات الشرطة المصرية ، ولم تتردد القوات البريطانية في تنفيذ تهديداتها ضد القرى كما حدث في قرى العزيزة والبدرشين وغيرها من القرى ، حيث أحرقت هذه القرى ونُهبت ممتلكات الفلاحين .

وبعد أقل من شهر من اندلاع الثورة ، حاولت السلطات الإنجليزية تهدئة تلك الثورة بالإفراج عن سعد زغلول ورفاقه ، فتم الإفراج عنهم يوم ٧ أبريل ١٩١٩م وسمح لهم بالذهاب إلى مؤتمر الصلح بباريس ، ووصل الوفد إلى باريس يوم ١٩ أبريل ١٩١٩م وطلب مقابلة الرئيس الأمريكي ويلسون الذي كان قد أصدر تصريحات بشأن حق الشعوب في تقرير مصيرها إلا أن الرئيس الأمريكي نفسه أعلن في نفس يوم المقابلة ٢٣ أبريل ١٩١٩م اعترافه بالحماية البريطانية على مصر ، ثم اعترفت ألمانيا أيضا بتلك الحماية في ٧ مايو ١٩١٩م ولم يجد الوفد المصري من يفاوضه فذهب إلى الهيئات النيابية والصحف والرأي العام الإنجليزي ولكن دون جدوى وفي حين اتخذ الوفد المصري طريق التفاوض تجاه القضية ، فإن الشعب المصري أستمر في ثورته وشهدت تلك الفترة العديد من المظاهرات والإضرابات وأعمال العنف .

أمام ذلك ، رأت الحكومة البريطانية التخفيف من حدة الثورة فأقرت في الأول من أبريل ١٩١٩م ، إرسال لجنة تحقيق في أسباب الأحداث بمصر برئاسة اللورد ملنر إلى مصر ، غير أن اللجنة تأخر ذهابها إلى مصر حتى ٧ ديسمبر ١٩١٩م ، على أية حال ، فإن الشعب الثائر كان يرفض دائما أسلوب التفاوض ، ويصر على الثورة والرفض ، فبرغم استمرار المفاوضات بين الوفد والإنجليز ، ومجيء لجنة ملنر إلى مصر للتفاوض ، استمر الطلاب في الإضراب ، وحدثت مظاهرات في كل مكان في شهري أكتوبر ونوفمبر ١٩١٩م ، كما أضرب المحامون والطلاب والموظفون احتجاجا على لجنة ملنر

بدءا من يوم ١٧ ديسمبر ، واندلعت المظاهرات في القاهرة والأقاليم احتجاجا على لجنة ملنر ، وبالتالي فشلت اللجنة . لذلك ، تم استدعاء الوفد المصري إلى لندن لأجل التباحث مع اللورد ملنر وبالفعل ذهب الوفد المصري إلى لندن بقيادة سعد زغلول في يونيه ١٩٢٠م لأجل التفاوض ، واستمرت تلك اللقاءات من ٥ يونيه ١٩٢٠م حتى ٩ نوفمبر ١٩٢٠ ، غير أنها فشلت ، كما فشلت بعدها مفاوضات رئيس الوزراء المصري عدلى يكن مع السيد كيرزون وزير الخارجية البريطاني في عام ١٩٢١م ، وهو مادفع بريطانيا إلى إصدار تصريح ٢٨ فبراير ١٩٢٢م ، والذي كان قد نص على : إنهاء الحماية البريطانية على مصر وتكون بذلك مصر دولة مستقلة ذات سيادة ، وإلغاء الأحكام العرفية التي أعلنت في ٢٤ نوفمبر ١٩١٤م ، وتضمنت الفقرتان التاسعة والعاشر على المبادئ التي ستحكم بها مصر ، والتي كان أهمها إعادة منصب وزير الخارجية والعمل لتحقيق التمثيل السياسى والدبلوماسى لمصر وإنشاء برلمان يتمتع بحق الرقابة على السياسة والإدارة لحكومة مسؤولة على الطريقة الدستورية يرجع فيها إلى الشعب المصرى وإلى حين إبرام الاتفاقيات بين الطرفين يكون لانجلترا بعض التحفظات ، وهى تأمين مواصلات الإمبراطورية البريطانية في مصر ، وحق الدفاع عن مصر ضد أي اعتداءات أو تدخلات خارجية، وحق حماية المصالح الأجنبية بمصر وحماية الأقليات ، والحق في التصرف في السودان .

ثالثا : الاحتلال الفرنسى وضرب المدن السورية ١٩٤٥م .

كان نزول القوات الفرنسية بالأراضي اللبنانية وانتشار خبر مذكرة الجنرال " بينيه " التي قدمها للحكومة السورية بخصوص المطالب الفرنسية والقوات الخاصة هو البداية للمظاهرات التي عمت مدينة دمشق منذ صباح يوم السبت الموافق ١٩ مايو ١٩٤٥م ، حيث أضرب طلاب المدارس وخرجوا

في مظاهرات صاحبة ، والتي امتدت إلى مدن أخرى مثل " حمص " و " حلب " و " حماة " ، وحل الإضراب العام في البلاد ، وتطور الوضع في مدينة دمشق إلى صدام دموي مع القوات السنغالية ، وسقط عدد من الفرنسيين قتلى في عمليات اغتيال اتهمت فيها السلطات الفرنسية قوات الأمن المحلية بعدم القيام بواجباتها ^(١) ، وامتدت المظاهرات إلى لبنان حيث أعلنت بيروت الإضراب العام ، وسار الطلاب يحملون الأعلام ويهتفون لاستقلال بلادهم ، وأعلنت الجامعة الأمريكية توقيف دروسها ، كما أضرب المحامون بعد أن اتخذت نقابتهم قرارها بذلك في ٢٤ مايو ١٩٤٥م ولمدة ثلاثة أيام تأييداً لموقف الحكومة ، وأما سيدات لبنان فقد تظاهرن وتقدمن بمذكرة للحكومة يؤكدن فيها على طلب تسليم القوات الخاصة للبنان وسوريا ، وكذلك جميع الصلاحيات المتبقية ^(٢) .

ونظراً لشدة هذه المظاهرات لجأ الفرنسيون إلى استخدام القوة مع المتظاهرين وخاصة في سوريا ، ففي ١٩ مايو ١٩٤٥م وجه إليهم الفرنسيون نيران أسلحتهم في دمشق " و " حلب " و " حمص " و " حماة " وغيرها من المدن السورية ^(٣) ، وفي يوم ٢٨ مايو تطورت الأوضاع حيث واجهت القوات الفرنسية ثورة شاملة في سوريا هوجمت فيها المواقع والثكنات الفرنسية من قبل المتظاهرين الذين ساندتهم أحياناً عناصر من الشرطة المحلية ، كما هوجمت وأحرقت المكاتب الفرنسية ووقعت معركة حقيقية في "

^(١) وزارة الخارجية المصرية : كود أرشيف رقم ٧٨٠٠٤٥٦٥٨ ، ملف رقم ٣ ج١ ، خطاب رقم ٦٢ بتاريخ ٢٢ مايو ١٩٤٥م . وانظر أيضاً :

بشارة الخوري : مصدر سابق ، ج ٢ ، ص ص ١٣٩ - ١٤٠ .

ميشيل كرستيان دافيه : المسألة السورية المزدوجة ، ترجمة : جبرائيل بيطار ، دار طلاس للترجمة والنشر ، دمشق ١٩٨٤م ، ص ص ٤٠٢ - ٤٠٣ .

^(٢) منير تقي الدين : مرجع سابق ، ص ص ١١٨ - ١٢٠ .

^(٣) مذكرات أكرم الحوراني : ج ١ ، ص ٤٢٦ .

حسن البعيني : مرجع سابق ، ص ٣٦٧ .

حماه " ، كما تمت السيطرة تماماً على جبل الدروز من قبل السوريين ^(١) ، وفي يوم ٢٩ مايو بدأ الفرنسيون القصف المدفعي والجوي لمدينة دمشق وغيرها من المدن ، والذي استمر لمدة ثلاثة أيام ضرب خلالها مقر الحكومة ومجلس النواب ومقر إقامة رئيس المجلس النيابي ، ودمرت الأحياء السورية ، وقطعت فرنسا الاتصال بين دمشق وبقية المدن السورية وكذلك الاتصالات الخارجية ، ونتيجة هذا الهجوم وقع عدد كبير من الضحايا قدر بعدد ٥٠٠ قتيل و ١٤٠٠ جريح ^(٢) . وقد علنت الحكومة الفرنسية هذا التصرف في بيان أصدره شارل ديغول في الأول من يونيو ١٩٤٥م بأنه كان ضرورة لصد الهجمات من قبل عصابات مسلحة من قوات الأمن المحلية ^(٣) .

أمام هذه المواجهة من الفرنسيين عقد في صباح يوم السبت ٢٩ مايو ١٩٤٥م اجتماع في بلدة " شتورة " بلبنان بين ممثلي الحكومتين السورية واللبنانية حضره من الجانب اللبناني عبد الحميد كرامي وهنري فرعون ومن الجانب السوري جميل مردم ، وقرر الجانبان إرسال برقية مشتركة إلى رئيس الوزراء المصري لدعوة مجلس الجامعة العربية إلى الانعقاد في أقرب وقت عملاً بالمادة السادسة من ميثاق الجامعة العربية ، كما أنهما استعرضا الموقف واتفقا على الاستمرار في اتباع خطة موحدة في كلا البلدين للدفاع عن حقوقهما والاتصال الدائم بممثليهما السياسيين في الخارج ^(٤) . ومن جانبه أرسل الرئيس شكري القوتلي إلى الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية رسالة أكد

^(١) ميشيل كرستيان دافيه : مرجع سابق ، ص ٤٠٥ .

^(٢) F.R., from the minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the secretary of state, D. May 31, 1945, volume VIII , p. 1125 .

صلاح العقاد : مرجع سابق ، ص ٩٤ .

^(٣) F.R., from the ambassador in France (Caffery) to the secretary of state, D. June 2 , 1945 , volume VIII , p. 1131.

^(٤) أحمد خليل محمودي : مرجع سابق ، ص ١٠٦ .

منير تقي الدين : مرجع سابق ، ص ١١٩ .

فيها على العدوان الفرنسي على بلاده ، وأن هذا التصرف الفرنسي يرجع إلى رفض بلاده الموافقة على منح فرنسا وضعاً مميزاً في سوريا مقابل تسليم القوات الخاصة ^(١) .

وبالفعل كانت الولايات المتحدة سباقة في موقفها مما يجري في سوريا ، ففي يوم ٢٨ مايو ١٩٤٥م قدم سفيرها في باريس السيد " كافري " بناءً على تعليمات من حكومته مذكرة إلى الحكومة الفرنسية بأن تعيد النظر في سياستها تجاه دولتي المشرق بهدف التعامل معهما على اعتبار أنهما دولتان مستقلتان ^(٢) ، وفي ٣٠ مايو بعث الرئيس الأمريكي رسالة إلى ديغول وكذلك إلى حكومة بريطانيا ، والتي أكد فيها على أن الوضع في دولتي المشرق يتدهور بسرعة ، وأنه من الواجب أن تتخذ الخطوات الفعالة للتوصل إلى وقف القتال ، وأن من رأى أمريكا دعوة حكومات فرنسا وسوريا ولبنان للاتفاق على هدنة ، على ألا يتخذ أي من الطرفين خلال مدة الهدنة أي خطوة لتحسين موقفه ، وبخاصة من جانب فرنسا بإدخال قوات إضافية وإمدادات إلى سوريا ولبنان لأن هذا قد يثير المواطنين بعد الاشتباكات المسلحة التي حدثت ، وقد يكون من الأفضل أن تقوم القوات البريطانية وبموافقة الطرفين على أمر المحافظة على النظام خلال فترة الهدنة ، وكذلك دعوة ممثلي سوريا ولبنان للمشاركة في المحادثات التي سوف تعقد في لندن أو باريس ^(٣) ، وفي ٣١ مايو وجه الرئيس ترومان رسالة إلى ديغول يطالبه فيها بالامتناع عن أي عمل من

(1) F.R., Memorandum by the director of the office of Near Eastern and African affairs (Henderson), D. May 31, 1945, volume VIII , p. 1118 .

(2) Ibid , p. 1119 .

(3) Ibid , From the Acting Secretary of state to the secretary of state, D. May 30, 1945 , volume VIII , p. 1116 .

شأنه أن يزيد من تفاقم الوضع في سوريا ولبنان حتى يمكن استعادة الهدوء والتوصل إلى حل سلمي يهدف إلى تسوية مرضية (١) .

وأما بريطانيا فقد استدعى رئيس وزرائها " تشرشل " في ٣٠ مايو ١٩٤٥م السفير الفرنسي في لندن بحضور أنتوني إيدن **Anthony Eden** وزير الخارجية وطلب منه إبلاغ حكومته ضرورة وقف إطلاق النار في دمشق ، وفي حالة متابعة العمليات العسكرية فإنه سيأمر بتدخل القوات البريطانية (٢) ، وفي ٣١ مايو أعلن السيد إيدن في مجلس العموم بأن حكومة صاحب الجلالة قد رأت أنها لم تعد تستطيع أن تقف بمعزل عن هذه الحوادث (٣) ، وفي نفس اليوم أرسل تشرشل رسالة إلى ديغول قال فيها : إزاء الموقف الخطير الذي نشب بين قواتكم وبين دولتي المشرق آسف أن أبلغكم أننا قد أمرنا القائد العام في الشرق الأوسط بأن يتدخل ليحول دون الاستمرار في إراقة الدماء ، محافظة على الأمن في هذه المنطقة وهي منطقة مهمة للمواصلات التي تستخدم في الحرب ضد اليابان . وإنا تجنباً للاصطدام بين القوات البريطانية والفرنسية نطلب منكم أن تأمروا في الحال القوات الفرنسية بأن تكف عن إطلاق النار ، وأن تنسحب إلى ثكناتها ، وبمجرد وقف إطلاق النار ورجوع النظام إلى نصابه نكون مستعدين لأن نبدأ محادثات ثلاثية بين بريطانيا وفرنسا وأمريكا في لندن (٤) . ولعل الشيء الذي يجدر ذكره هو أن هذا الموقف الحاسم من بريطانيا يرجع إلى هاجس تعاضم حركة التضامن مع

(١) **Ibid** , from the Acting Secretary of state to the ambassador in France, D. May 31, 1945 , volume VIII , p.p. 1121 – 1122 .

(٢) ميشيل كرستيان دافيه : مرجع سابق ، ص ٤٠٥ .

(٣) سيتون وليمز : مرجع سابق ، ص ١١٦ .

(٤) صلاح العقاد : مرجع سابق ، ص ٩٥ .

سوريا في البلدان العربية ، وهو ما يمكن أن يهدد الوجود البريطاني في كثير من هذه الدول ^(١) .

وأما الحكومة السوفييتية فإنها أرسلت إلى الحكومة الفرنسية نسخة من المذكرة التي سلمها القائم بالأعمال السوفيتي " نوفيكوف Novikov " إلى الخارجية الأمريكية في أول يونية ١٩٤٥ م ، حيث أكدت المذكرة على أن : " الحكومة السوفييتية ترى أن الأحداث التي وقعت في سوريا ولبنان لا تتوافق مع روح القرارات التي اعتمدت في مؤتمر دومبارتون أوكس ^(٢) Dumbarton Oaks ، ولا أهداف مؤتمر الأمم المتحدة المنعقد في سان فرانسيسكو San Francisco لإنشاء نظام يحقق الأمن والسلام للشعوب المنعقدة فيه ، لذلك فإن الحكومة السوفييتية ترى أنه ينبغي اتخاذ تدابير عاجلة لوقف العمليات العسكرية في سوريا ولبنان وتسوية النزاع الناشئ عن طريق الوسائل السلمية ^(٢) .

أمام هذه المواقف لم يكن أمام الحكومة الفرنسية سوى أن تدعن لها ، لذلك أصدر شارل ديغول في مساء الأول من يونية ١٩٤٥ م بياناً أكد فيه على وقف القتال امتثالاً لطلب الحكومة البريطانية خشية من أن تمتد هذه الحوادث من سوريا إلى مناطق أخرى في منطقة الشرق الأدنى ، وأن الحكومة الفرنسية أمرت القوات الفرنسية في سوريا بوقف القتال في ٣١ مايو ، وذلك لإيجاد جو أكثر ملاءمة لإجراء محادثات مع الحكومة الأمريكية والبريطانية ومع حكومات الدول العربية لاحقاً حول الوضع في الشرق الأدنى بصورة

^(١) بيير بوداغوف : مرجع سابق ، ص ٢٥ .

^(٢) انعقد هذا المؤتمر خلال الفترة (٢١ أغسطس ١٩٤٤ - ٧ أكتوبر ١٩٤٤ م) بمشاركة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وإنجلترا والاتحاد السوفييتي والصين ، وقد صيغت فيه مبادئ دخلت في مواد ميثاق هيئة الأمم المتحدة .

^(٢) F.R., from the soviet Chargé (Novikov) to the Acting Secretary of state , D. June 1, 1945, volume VIII , p.p. 1128 - 1129 .

كاملة^(١) . والحقيقة أن هذا البيان يؤكد أن الجانب الفرنسي قد اقتنع أن حل القضية لا يكون بفرض المعاهدات التي يريدها بالقوة ، وإنما الحل يكون فقط من خلال التفاوض .

^(١) **Ibid**, from the ambassador in France (Caffery) to the secretary of state, D. June 2 , 1945 , volume VIII , p. 1131 .

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